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INTRODUCTION 
The idea and the practice of urban renewal has been observed, 
debated, maligned, and nearly forgotten since its inception in the late 
1940s. For most of the next twenty years urban renewal held great 
promise for solving the physical, social, and even the economic 
problems of American cities. After little new construction and general 
neglect of the urban fabric since the late 1920s, cleaning up and 
rebuilding extremely deteriorated urban areas seemed long overdue. 
The genius of the urban renewal program, from any city's 
perspective, was its ability to use federal finances to solve persistent 
local problems. Urban renewal made a vast pool of resources available 
to cities, but left decisions about where and how to spend the money 
primarily to local officials' discretion. For the first time, most cities had 
an opportunity to reshape their environments in a ''rational 11 way and at 
a relatively small cost to city taxpayers. In earlier decades, significant 
urban redevelopment was usually considered too expensive or too 
complicated to undertake, so few efforts of this kind were made. 
Urban renewal is a short-hand term for a complex city improve-
ment agenda. The fundamental goal, as stated in the 1949 enabling 
legislation, was to attain 11 a decent home and a decent living environ-
ment11 for all Americans. Over the life of the program, many different 
tools were used to approach that goal, ranging from clearance and 
complete reconstruction in the 1950s to a greater emphasis on 
rehabilitation in the 1960s. Despite the differing mechanisms, the goal 
was always the same -a better, cleaner, healthier urban environment. 
Although urban renewal was at times a rather drastic action, at 
first it was generally well received. Improvements brought about by the 
program were dramatic and they were heralded by city officials, and by 
most residents. Few complained when slums left from the nineteenth 
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century were removed. But by the late 1960s the ideas that had 
fostered urban renewal were being questioned by residents affected by 
the program, and the practice of urban renewal was openly criticized 
by academics and community activists. Urban renewal, in its traditional 
guise, was abandoned as a tool for civic improvement in the early 
1970s. But the effects of this program linger on, in the landscapes of 
our cities, and in our ideas about how city problems should be ad-
dressed. 
Following urban renewal's demise, various federal programs 
bent on improving the physical appearance of American cities surfaced 
in the mid-1970s. Among these were Urban Development Action 
Grants (UDAGs), Community Development Block Grants (CDBGs), 
and many new-fangled city bonding programs. But no recent program 
has achieved quite the scope or scale of the city change brought about 
under the urban renewal program. This one improvement effort con-
tinues to stand out in the minds of many urbanites as the quintessential 
example of federal government involvement in American cities. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, Minneapolis and St. Paul, like most 
other sizable American cities, used urban renewal extensively. 
Although both cities experienced dramatic changes under the banner 
of urban renewal, few people recognize this fact today. What recogni-
tion there is is usually negative, as in many other cities. Planners and 
other informed observers may argue about the uniqueness and wide-
ranging scope of urban renewal's accomplishments in Minneapolis and 
St. Paul. Many believe that the Twin Cities achieved much more than 
other comparably sized cities, and that, overall, the program was 
successful. Most ordinary citizens probably could not say much about 
what urban renewal accomplished here, aside from pointing to public 
housing projects, perhaps the most visible symbol of the program's 
effects on every urban landscape. 
This volume attempts to place urban renewal in a broad historical 
context - and to overcome the widespread lack of knowledge and 
understanding about the Twin Cities' renewal efforts. Using the 
program's local implementation as the starting point, we describe what 
was done, where, and when. Our purpose is twofold: to analyze the 
social and political processes that guided local renewal decisions, and 
to determine what spatial considerations were important in these 
decisions. Our basic assumption is that local renewal projects had an 
impact beyond the proposals, plans, and projects themselves. Despite 
what many people may think, urban renewal has significantly affected 
the current landscape of the Twin Cities. 
Throughout this study, we will use terms that reflect value 
judgments, terms such as 11 blight, 11 "improvements," 11 success, 11 and 
"failure." We note here that such terms reflect the values in place 
throughout the life of the urban renewal program. Scarcely anyone in 
1955 would have chosen to remain in and rehabilitate an old house 
when a new one was available. Today, different choices might be 
made. Urban renewal was based on the premise that newer was better, 
that efficiency of land use was to be valued, and that given a choice, 
most people would obviously choose to accept middle class standards, 
not incidentally the standards of most professional planners who 
directed urban renewal programs. 
An examination of past local urban renewal efforts may even be 
timely. Formal urban renewal efforts have languished for more than a 
decade. But the need for a revitalization program has remained - and 
possibly intensified in recent years. Even in a comparatively well-off 
urban environment like the Twin Cities, signs of this need abound. The 
recent appearance of homeless families is one strong indicator. This 
phenomenon was almost unknown in the heyday of urban renewal, 
when most of the homeless were individual men. Consequently, 
planners' attention in some cities has turned once again to the issues 
raised under urban renewal. In late 1986 Minneapolis and St. Paul 
began jointly promoting a $40 million "Urban Revitalization Action 
Program," which is being funded by the state, not the federal govern-
ment. As Mayor George Latimer described in a speech late in 1986, 
there are neighborhoods that form an "arc of hardship" around the 
downtown - neighborhoods with serious social and physical problems. 
In this statement, an echo of the 1940s arguments for urban renewal 
could be heard very clearly. 
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1. WHY URBAN RENEWAL 
WAS NEEDED 
To those who know the landscape of the Twin Cities well, a trip 
back to the late 1940s might present some unfamiliar sights. Newer 
and younger residents might find it hard to believe that some sections 
of Minneapolis and St. Paul that are now full of glittery new development, 
were overcrowded, more densely built-up, and generally worn-out in 
appearance. It is difficult enough for many of us to imagine the Twin 
Cities without the freeway network-though with a quite extensive 
streetcar system. It is perhaps even harder to think of the Twin Cities 
without most of the suburbs, without the Dales or any other shopping 
centers, with most entertainment facilities (including movies) either 
downtown or along one of the streetcar strips, and with approximately 
a third of a million more people residing in Minneapolis and St. Paul 
proper than do today. 
Myriad government documents and newspaper articles from the 
1950s describe this unfamiliar Twin Cities landscape. What emerges 
is a description of places in both cities that are almost unrecognizable 
today, though many problems still remain. The differences occur partly 
in terms of scale. Most of us now live well beyond the strict confines 
of the two cities, and the problems of the cities hold little interest for 
non-residents. Many of us now bring far different expectations to the 
landscape. We expect an orderliness that was seldom possible in the 
past. We also expect that "someone 11 is responsible for solving 
whatever problems appear, and we are willing to look toward govern-
ment at various levels for solutions. As the Twin Cities faced the 
prospect of renewing and redeveloping themselves in the 1950s, many 
had to be convinced that city governments were the proper vehicle for 
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change, and that city officials had the authority to force change on 
sometimes-unwilling constituents. 
LIMITED EARLY REVITALIZATION EFFORTS 
Minneapolis and St. Paul were already aging by the early 
decades of the twentieth century. The majority of structures in both 
downtowns and in nearby residential neighborhoods dated from the 
boom years of the 1870s and 1880s. The economic life of the two cities 
had changed by the early 1900s, and land use had changed in 
response. The decline of the Minneapolis milling district was the most 
dramatic example. The lumber mills that had dominated the first 
decades of the city's life were idle by 1920, and flour milling was 
declining. The large area devoted to milling along the Mississippi River 
front near downtown was no longer needed. St. Paul had never been 
as dominated by one industry, but change was evident there too, as 
the decline of the East Third Street warehouse and commercial district 
demonstrated. Both downtown cores migrated as new economic 
functions and new building styles emerged. In Minneapolis the 
downtown moved away from the river, down Hennepin and Nicollet 
avenues. St. Paul's downtown moved away from the river and Lower-
town up toward a new commercial and retail core along St. Peter and 
Wabasha streets. 
The residential neighborhoods had changed as well. The 
development of a comprehensive streetcar network starting in the 
1890s had allowed a great expansion of the area available for housing. 
People were able to move farther from downtown, and live in newer 
houses on larger lots. But both cities still had districts of inexpensive, 
crowded, poorly maintained, and unhealthful housing. 
The economic boom of the 1920s, however, aggravated the 
problem of growing obsolescence in the Twin Cities. Automobiles 
became more common, and the road network was extended, fueling a 
powerful wave of suburbanization and making the downtowns even 
more congested. New housing styles had evolved, and much of the 
existing stock in the two cities was old fashioned and set on small lots 
without garages and modern conveniences. Even neighborhoods that 
had once been middle or upper class had started to 11filter 11 down to less 
affluent residents. Levels of maintenance slipped, and houses were 
subdivided, often illegally. Other neighborhoods, built to house the 
immigrant poor of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were 
worse off. These areas had been inexpensively constructed to start 
with, and had not been properly maintained (Martin and Lanegran 
1983). 
The deteriorating landscape of the two cities concerned many 
people in the Twin Cities, and various improvement efforts were under-
way by the turn of the century. Responses to deterioration came in two 
forms: social and economic. The first meant to improve the living 
conditions of the urban poor; the second attempted to revive the 
fortunes of the two cities. There were, quite naturally, different leaders 
and different constituencies for these two goals. Social improvement 
efforts usually emanated from religious leaders, charitable foundations, 
or civic groups. Economic revival efforts came from business groups 
or individual businessmen. 
Naturally, St. Paul and Minneapolis had separate and duplicate 
business, social, religious, and civic groups, and the efforts of these 
groups in the two cities did not correspond exactly. The two efforts for 
social improvement and for economic revival have sometimes been 
complementary and sometimes competitive, but always distinct. A part 
of the revitalization effort in the Twin Cities since the early years of this 
century, these social and economic goals persist as separate and 
distinct motivations today. 
By the turn of the century businessmen in both cities recognized 
that action was needed to revive the decaying downtowns. In Minne-
apolis, early improvement efforts focused on the old, deteriorated heart 
of the city next to the river. As the lumber industry declined, the historic 
business core of the city (Bridge Square) was left behind as commercial 
and retail activity moved west and south. In the early 191 Os the 
Commercial Club, a business organization, sponsored a planning effort 
for the entire city, but with special attention to the downtown. The 
resulting 1917 document, Plan of Minneapolis (E. H. Bennett), offered 
many grand ideas, ranging from a monumental civic center at Bridge 
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Bridge Square 
Plan of Minneapolis, 
1917. 
The Beaux-Arts design for 
a grand entrance to 
Minneapolis shows 
improvements proposed 
for the downtown 
riverfront where Hennepin 
and Nicollet intersect. 
The radial street heading 
toward the new City Hall 
was never built. 
Square to wide boulevards cutting through the core of the city and 
linking civic institutions. At the time, only a new downtown park 
resembled the plan. But it laid the groundwork for future thinking about 
improving the downtown landscape, and these ideas assumed impor-
tance when the urban renewal program later emerged (Bennett 1917). 
In St. Paul, the capitol approach area was the focus of similar 
early concern. In 1906 the city adopted a plan for a grand approach 
to the capital. This plan was proposed by Cass Gilbert, the architect 
who had designed the most recent capitol building. The plan entailed 
clearing the seamy residential district that had developed in the vicinity, 
and rerouting many of the streets (The Western Architect 1909). The 
city, county, and state governments were involved, but St. Paul 
businessmen provided the leadership. Sporadic activity ensued during 
the 191 Os and 1920s, but few elements of the plan were visible. After 
World War II, under the urban renewal program, the plans were revived 
and eventually accomplished in a greatly altered version. 
Although the grand plans proposed for both cities in the early 
decades of this century languished for a time, the real estate boom of 
the 1920s prompted a resurgence of construction in both downtowns. 
In Minneapolis this was represented by the appearance of the Rand 
Tower and Foshay Tower. In St. Paul, civic, business, and government 
leaders created a grand boulevard by clearing several blocks of super-
annuated warehouses on the river side of East Third Street in 1932 
(Herrold 1933). This site was then widened into the elegant Kellogg 
Boulevard and the riverside land made into a formal park. In the early 
1930s, as the pace of private building was grinding to a halt, the present 
city hall-county courthouse building was constructed as a way to 
rejuvenate downtown with public funds. 
Social improvement efforts in the Twin Cities predate these 
economic revitalization projects. In the late nineteenth century, settle-
ment houses aided the immigrant poor in both St. Paul and 
Minneapolis, and private foundations actively assisted the needy. The 
Wilder Foundation (formerly the Wilder Charity) was probably the most 
active, though only in St. Paul. Wilder provided many and varied social 
services, including basic things like public baths, for many residences 
had inadequate plumbing. Well into the twentieth century, public health 
remained a prominent concern; in 1917 Carol Aronovici, a nationally 
renowned expert on city planning, investigated St. Paul's needs in this 
area (Aronovici 1917). Religious organizations also provided social 
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Third Street in St. Paul, 
circa 1930. 
Here was St. Paul's 11front 
yard" on the Mississippi 
River before the 
construction of Kellogg 
Boulevard. 
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Kellogg Boulevard, 
1932. 
When the improvements to 
Third Street were 
completed, the new 
Kellogg Boulevard gave 
the riverfront a much 
neater appearance. Note 
services in both cities. During the 1930s Minneapolis was one of the 
few cities in the country to secure a federally-funded public housing 
project. Known as the Sumner Field project, and located at 6th Avenue 
North and Bryant Avenue, this housing was the result of a cooperative 
effort by Minneapolis civic and government leaders over a period of 
almost five years. 
Unfortunately, early revitalization efforts from the 1900s though 
the late 1940s in the Twin Cities did not improve the living conditions of 
the urban poor markedly, nor did they reverse the trend of decay in the 
commercial and older residential districts. The scale of the problems 
was too large for currently available solutions, though the roots of later 
success are visible in these actions. Little change was achieved either 
socially or economically without cooperation among diverse elements 
of the two cities' leadership. 
Business, charity, civic, religious, and government leaders in 
each city had to work together to accomplish even the limited revital-
ization of the early decades of the century. Most of those early 
projects - such as the new city halls that both cities built, the building 
of the Kellogg Boulevard esplanade in St. Paul, and the Gateway Park 
project in downtown Minneapolis - required some kind of government 
aid and support. Though projects of these kinds were almost always 
privately initiated through the 1940s, the business-inspired downtown 
projects always included an infusion of public money in some form. 
that access to the river 1111 
here is mostly visual. ~ 
The new post offices that both cities secured in the 1930s represented 
another approach. Here federal money (secured by lobbying con-
gressmen) helped anchor efforts to revitalize parts of both downtowns. 
In yet another variation, county and state money was vital to the Capitol 
Approach project. Throughout this period, coalitions of civic, govern-
ment, and business leaders had learned to cooperate to achieve 
specific, limited goals. 
The perceived role of city government changed during the early 
years of the twentieth century in most American cities, including Minne-
apolis and St. Paul. City planning became an established part of the 
two cities' governments in the decade after 1910, as each city set up a 
planning commission and adopted a formal plan. By the 1920s zoning 
was an accepted tool and an acknowledged power of city government. 
By this time, most cities had the ability to control the use to which 
privately owned land was put. Ironically, at the same time the size and 
influence of the Twin Cities' planning operations declined. In the 1930s, 
their operations were briefly revived with federal money, but then the 
decline resumed (Altshuler 1965). The planning commissions 
remained in place though, and the idea of planning as a function of city 
government also survived. By World War II, the Twin Cities had 
achieved several successful revitalization projects, but had yet to make 
a large dent in resolving the problems of physical obsolescence, social 
deterioration, and economic decline. 
PLANNERS' VIEW AND STRATEGY 
The condition of the Twin Cities, and of many other American 
cities in post-World War II America, provided opportunities for planners 
to test their theories in a real world setting. Since the 191 Os and 1920s, 
planners in the United States had evolved strategies to clean up and 
improve the worst examples of city living. Their goals were ambitious: 
to provide clean water and sanitary facilities to all; to begin providing 
safe and modern housing for most; and to help divert traffic out of the 
city by providing new highway systems. Most plans dating from the 
late 1940s and early 1950s betray the environmental and behavioral 
determinism of the times. It is generally assumed in these documents 
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that the physical decay found in American cities (the crowding, mixed 
land uses, and environmental problems described previously) had a 
detrimental social effect on residents. It is likewise assumed that 
large-scale improvements to the environment were the only possible 
solution to the social and physical problems that planners faced. 
The term that planners used to describe the 11 enemy 11 they were 
facing was blight. Blight had many meanings, but was conventionally 
used to describe an urban landscape that was deteriorating. Blighted 
areas were those that had seen better days regardless of whether 
they had originally been used by poor or wealthy people - and also 
included those areas where many residences were interspersed 
among commercial or industrial buildings (especially if the commercial 
purposes were morally disturbing and the industrial products were 
noxious). Blight was anathema to planners because it was not a 
rational or best use of the available land. Jumbled land uses were 
irksome because most planners believed that people's behavior was 
conditioned by the environments they lived in - and poor living arrange-
ments were assumed to have dire consequences for children raised in 
them. 
The City, a 1939 film shown at the New York World's Fair, 
embodied this attitude perfectly. The film depicts slum children playing 
in streets and alleys while their fathers go off to work in factories or steel 
mills. This view is then juxtaposed with scenes of children frolicking in 
a lush suburban setting, while a voice intones, "The choice is yours. 11 
The message is far from subtle. The implication is that we can improve 
the collective fate of our children by building the right kinds of housing 
in the right kinds of neighborhoods. Doing anything less is grievously 
wrong, as well as a major social and cultural error. 
Traditional arguments of public health professionals are evident 
in this kind of thinking. The terminology and the ideas have been 
publicized since the late nineteenth century, particularly in studies of 
the living conditions of the urban poor (Kellogg 1909). Those who 
investigated these sites found people living in apartments with no water, 
little light, and less ventilation, and many were even living in cellars. 
These conditions did not afflict only the wretched poor in places like 
New York City; Aronovici's 1917 study of St. Paul recorded many of the 
same conditions in the 11vile precincts 11 of St. Peter Street. 
Physical planners wanted to improve the landscapes of 
American cities and to create a direct social good. During the early 
years of the urban renewal program, planners' priorities focused on this 
double goal. It was not a goal that was shared by the business interests 
who wanted the central cities fixed up. Redistributing social goods (like 
housing) was inherently a program of economic redistribution, and this 
was not what the business community liked about urban renewal. 
Competition from offices and retailers in the suburbs, however, did 
arouse business interest in renewal; downtown businessmen saw in 
renewal a chance to improve their situations vis-a-vis the growing 
suburban competition. As Gerald Moore, the vice-president of the 
Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce, said in 1961, 11Actually, we owe 
Southdale a debt of gratitude for awakening the downtown business 
community to do something to improve itself" (Buildings 1961 a). If 
renewal also helped some people, that was fine, but for businessmen 
that was certainly not the paramount goal of the program. 
URBAN RENEWAL BECOMES NECESSARY 
A massive wave of suburbanization followed World War II, fueled 
by a long pent-up demand for housing. A decade of depression and 
five years of resource diversion for the war effort had seriously eroded 
new housing construction in Minneapolis and St. Paul, as elsewhere in 
the country. Beginning in the late 1940s, private developers strove to 
satisfy demands for middle-class housing through new construction in 
suburbs and in previously vacant parts of the cities. Federal policies 
supported this surge of suburban growth: federal subsidies for high-
way construction made suburban locations more accessible, and 
federal loan programs, such as the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) 
and Veterans Administration (VA), favored new housing over old. This 
new wave of suburbanization undermined the appeal of city neighbor-
hoods for the middle class by providing attractive alternatives. 
Suburbanization affected downtown areas too. Increasingly, 
goods of all kinds were transported by truck, rather than by railroad. 
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New manufacturing technologies that favored expansive, single-floor 
buildings made the extensive commercial-warehouse districts adjacent 
to most downtowns obsolete. Downtowns suddenly needed to be 
redesigned to fit their changed economic position. 
In the Twin Cities and across America, progressive business 
groups began to push for downtown redevelopment, constituting what 
some have called a 11 pro-growth 11 coalition (Mollenkopf 1983). Usually 
these groups differed from, or even opposed, traditional business 
organizations like a chamber of commerce. The latter tended to 
represent a broad spectrum of business interests, were politically 
conservative, and resisted active government involvement in economic 
affairs. The progressive business groups were dominated by financial, 
insurance or legal firms, rather than small businesses; they recognized 
that government had a necessary role in downtown rejuvenation 
(Akenson 1962). Local business concerns about downtown revitaliza-
tion were echoed at the national level by efforts to secure federal 
assistance for city renewal programs. 
At the same time, efforts persisted to house the nation's poor. 
The private market had never been able to provide decent housing 
inexpensively enough for the poorest Americans. Until the 1930s, this 
problem was wholly a local issue, generally addressed only by 
charitable organizations. Federal housing programs of the 1930s 
signaled a change - local governments could now look beyond their 
own resources to solve these housing needs. But these programs 
were never well-funded, and they did not actually produce much 
housing. 
These various social and economic concerns finally coalesced 
in the U.S. Housing Act of 1949-the legal framework for the implemen-
tation of urban renewal as public policy. The act had three main 
purposes: slum clearance, public housing construction, and economic 
renewal of cities. As far as possible, these goals were to be met through 
the private market, with substantial federal aid to local governments 
(Martin 1977). Ultimately, local governments would be responsible for 
renewal activities. During the debate over this act, most states enacted 
laws enabling cities to create local authorities to plan and coordinate 
urban redevelopment. Minnesota's law was passed in 1947, and both 
Minneapolis and St. Paul created housing and redevelopment 
authorities within a year, before the federal law was enacted. 
The U.S. HousingActof1949wasamendedin1954, 1959, 1961, 
and 1965, but remained the same in character until the passage of the 
u.s. Housing Act of 1968, which introduced the Neighborhood 
Development Program. The successive amendments refined the 
process of renewal. Cities were given progressively more respon-
sibility, private developers' involvement in the program steadily 
increased, and citizens were eventually brought into the process. 
Clearance was gradually de-emphasized, and rehabilitation stressed 
for residential areas. Relocation benefits for people and businesses 
displaced by clearance (non-existent when renewal began) were 
improved, though slowly, by successive federal amendments. Com-
prehensive city-wide planning became increasingly important due to 
renewal. 
HOW URBAN RENEWAL FARED 
Urban renewal evolved over its lifetime, but had some persistent 
characteristics. Renewal depended upon interaction among the 
federal government, the local authority, a city government, and private 
developers. The federal government, through the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and its predecessor agencies, 
provided substantial loans and grants and supervised local planning 
and performance. Local authorities planned renewal projects, acquired 
and cleared land, found developers, and built and operated public 
housing. City governments found a local 11 in-kind 11 contribution for each 
renewal project, usually through investment in infrastructure improve-
ments. Most of the actual redevelopment was done by private 
companies on land provided by the local authorities. The cost of the 
land was 11written down. 11 That is, the developer paid only the value of 
the land and not the actual cost of preparing the site, which was much 
higher due to building acquisition, demolition, and relocation costs 
(Anderson 1964). 
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Comprehensive planning was an integral part of urban renewal 
from the beginning. Local authorities were charged with devising plans 
and ensuring that redevelopment complied with these. In both Minne-
apolis and St. Paul, renewal helped to revive the moribund planning 
function of city government. Both cities had duplicated their planning 
functions: each located some aspects of planning within the city 
government proper and other aspects in the new Housing and 
Redevelopment Authorities (HRAs). This separation of planning func-
tions has sometimes led to friction and competition. 
Planners and other city officials viewed renewal as a big task, 
and one that could not be done piecemeal. One major stumbling block 
to earlier revitalization efforts was the fractured nature of land owner-
ship, especially in downtowns. It was inordinately difficult to assemble 
a large piece of land and create a new use. This could be done, but it 
was costly. In the early 1960s the Dayton Company privately assem-
bled an entire block in downtown St. Paul for a new department store, 
but probably paid a higher price for it than a renewal agency would 
have (Shippee 1984). 
Urban renewal made land acquisition a much easier process. 
The legislation gave local governments the power of eminent domain, 
and empowered local housing authorities to use it. Eminent domain 
was critical to successful renewal because it allowed a city government 
to condemn privately-owned land and take it, even over an owner's 
objections. There were restrictions on land that could be taken: it had 
to serve a public purpose, and the owner had to be fairly compensated. 
There were, of course, legal objections to this extension of the tradi-
tional notion of 11public purpose" (that being land that was actually used 
by a government function, such as an airport). But these objections 
were settled in 1949 by a U.S. Supreme Court ruling that slum clearance 
was a public purpose, even though the land would be sold to a private 
developer after clearance. 
Renewal efforts in the early 1950s ran into snags everywhere in 
the country, including in the Twin Cities. City officials knew that 
developer commitments were needed before clearance proceeded; 
some cities were so anxious to begin renewal that they went ahead 
without developers, and were stuck for years with visible parcels of 
empty downtown land (including both Minneapolis and St. Paul). 
Inevitably, other kinds of problems arose, such as neighborhoods 
opposing the location of public housing. St. Paul's renewal was even 
slowed by two legal challenges. Still, from the start, the Twin Cities 
seemed to have a strong, if overly ambitious, renewal experience. St. 
Paul was among the first cities in the country to get public housing built 
and in service. In Minneapolis the Glenwood project was one of the 
first large clearance projects, and the downtown Gateway project was, 
at one time, the largest of its kind in the nation. 
By the late-1960s there was widespread opposition to urban 
renewal on the part of planning critics and neighborhood activists 
throughout the United States. The program seemed to need a major 
overhaul. It had failed, despite twenty years and billions of dollars, to 
transform American cities (Jacobs 1961 ). City residents were tired of 
being displaced and seeing their urban neighborhoods destroyed in 
the name of progress -whether for freeways or for renewal. Their 
rising opposition led to the U.S. Housing Act of 1968, which instituted 
the Neighborhood Development Program (NOP). In Minneapolis and 
St. Paul, NOP did not effect a wholesale change, at least in the 
residential areas. But a new strategy had long been evolving that was 
based on spot clearance, rehabilitation and conservation, and effective 
citizen participation. The changes were institutionalized in NOP, and in 
two other Great Society programs, Model City and Pilot City. The latter 
two broke with traditional renewal efforts in attempting a unified attack 
on urban problems by mixing physical renewal with social programs. 
Model City programs, in particular, also opened new channels of 
influence by helping to create competing agencies and new political 
posts. 
Public housing policy had also changed over the years. The 
early housing efforts in the Twin Cities included large family housing 
projects. By the mid-1960s, there was widespread opposition to 
family projects, and the local authorities stopped constructing them. 
From the mid-1960s through the early 1970s, a substantial amount of 
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public housing was constructed in the Twin Cities, but almost all of it 
was housing for the elderly, a politically palatable product. 
SUMMARY 
Much has been written about the ideas and the implementation 
of the urban renewal program in the United States during the 1950s 
and 1960s. Most of this literature views urban renewal as a program 
that: (1) worked to the disadvantage of people most in need of 
improved housing -a great deal of substandard housing was removed, 
but a relatively small amount of low-income housing was constructed; 
(2) was a boondoggle for developers-they were able to acquire land 
inexpensively from city authorities, and often made large profits on the 
projects built on this publicly acquired land; and (3) focused on 
economic development issues C'let's fix up downtown") at the expense 
of housing and neighborhood concerns (Anderson 1964; Hartman 
1964; Gans 1965). 
Viewed in retrospect, much of this criticism is valid, but it does 
not tell the whole story. Critics have portrayed planners who developed 
and implemented urban renewal programs as heartless beasts who 
turned a deaf ear to the real needs of "the people." But it is hard to see 
most renewal officials as greedy and profiteering, or as consciously 
trying to exercise their power over helpless city residents. There are, 
for example, no notable cases of renewal officials growing rich working 
on these programs. If anything, the views of those who implemented 
urban renewal programs in the Twin Cities and elsewhere can be 
considered somewhat naive. They assumed that renewal could be 
accomplished quickly, that private developers would clamor for the 
opportunity to build in available areas, and that the renewal process 
could be carried out with relatively few snags. None of these assump-
tions proved to be true. 
2. SLUM CLEARANCE 
Planners in the late 1940s and early 1950s had a "solution" for 
the problems of urban social and physical decay. They prescribed total 
clearance and massive reconstruction -the first phase of the urban 
renewal program-to remove and replace the worst parts of America's 
cities. City planners believed this approach could accomplish more 
than any other tactic because it would provide them with the opportunity 
to begin again with a clean slate. More specifically, it would allow 
infrastructure problems like unimproved streets and flooding to be 
corrected, eliminate decayed housing, and permit rational separation 
of land uses. This view of the problems and potentials for America's 
cities made things seem possible that could only have been imagined 
two decades earlier. The clearance approach to urban problem solving 
provided a tool as well as an argument about what should be done to 
improve physical and social conditions in cities. 
In Minneapolis and St. Paul in the 1950s most of the following 
conditions could be found without much difficulty: 
• Large quantities of deteriorated housing were present 
throughout the older areas of both cities. The widespread 
practice of illegally subdividing houses into many smaller 
units greatly complicated this situation. After World War II, a 
housing shortage was experienced throughout the country, 
due to the pent-up construction lag left from the Depression. 
Returning veterans squeezed themselves and their families 
into whatever space was available, exerting even more 
pressure on the already overburdened stock of older 
housing. 
• The land-use pattern mixed commercial, industrial, and 
railroad facilities with residences in many different parts of 
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both cities. This kind of development, typical of many 
nineteenth-century working class neighborhoods, was 
convenient for those who needed to walk to work, but posed 
potential environmental hazards and created some difficult 
and dangerous intersections for trains, streetcars, and 
pedestrians. 
• The infrastructure system in both cities was becoming 
increasingly inadequate, and in some areas, was decaying. 
Several neighborhoods' streets were seriously deteriorated 
they were still either cobbled or unpaved. Most of the 
sewers in both cities combined storm runoff with normal 
sewage, much of which was simply dumped into the 
Mississippi River. Electric wires and telephone lines were 
above ground almost everywhere. 
Planners and many city officials assumed that the prevalent 
environmental problems and serious social problems were a by-
product of these deteriorated landscapes. Residents in some poorly 
designed areas regularly experienced flooding, particularly in those 
neighborhoods located along the river flats. Many residents also faced 
serious public health risks due to overcrowding in much of the housing, 
particularly since diseases like polio were still not under control and 
presented a frightening risk, especially for children. Juvenile delin-
quency, as well as vice and crime, were also widespread (Martin and 
Lanegran 1983). School officials had worried for decades about the 
effects of city life on young minds and bodies, and those in the Twin 
Cities shared those fears. 
Alone, many of these problems might have been addressed 
separately, albeit slowly. But the massing of problems found in entire 
neighborhoods made each individual problem harder to solve. Civic 
leaders who stood ready to improve conditions in the Twin Cities faced 
a real challenge. Their task was enormous given the limited availability 
of local resources; if they had had only local resources at their disposal, 
very little could have been accomplished. 
CASE STUDIES 
Within Minneapolis and St. Paul, only a few urban renewal efforts 
may be considered slum clearance projects in a conventional sense. 
These areas all contained extremely deteriorated housing as well as 
some industries. They were, by any measure, the worst residential 
sections in either of the cities, and there was a general consensus that 
they needed to be replaced. 
THE CAPITOL APPROACH 
The earliest public concern over deteriorated areas in St. Paul 
focused on the Capitol building. From the turn of the century, business 
and civic leaders had wanted to improve the approaches to the Capitol. 
Its grounds were small and the building was surrounded by aging and 
deteriorating housing. In 1903 Cass Gilbert, the noted architect of the 
Capitol, presented to the St. Paul Commercial Club a plan for a series 
of grand approaches to the Capitol. Gilbert's plan was quite visionary; 
it was also a fully realized example of the 11city beautiful 11 style of this 
time. Gilbert posited grand boulevards and large landscaped open 
spaces punctuated by monuments - all wide vistas that would open up 
the Capitol area and connect it to downtown. 
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St. Paul, circa 1927. 
The Capitol Approach area 
in the late 1920s, before 
major improvements, shows 
only two official buildings: 
the Capitol itself and the 
Historical Society building, 
to the right of the Capitol. 
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In 1906 the city council adopted Gilbert's plan on the recommen-
dation of the ad hoc Capitol Approach Committee. In 1907 the state 
legislature authorized the city to acquire land in accordance with 
Gilbert's plan. Soon after, the governor's Executive Council began 
planning new state buildings in the vicinity of the Capitol. 
In 1916 the Amherst Wilder Charity hired Carol Aronovici to 
conduct a housing survey of St. Paul. The report he issued painted a 
gloomy picture of conditions in St. Paul. Aronovici found the housing 
around the Capitol to be poor, though not the worst in the city. The 
housing on the hill behind the Capitol was old, but in general was 
structurally sound. Most of the housing below the hill, in front of the 
Capitol and to the east, lacked plumbing and had poor ventilation. West 
of the Capitol, areas of adequate housing existed alongside non-
residential uses. Aronovici recommended a radical and expensive 
program of housing improvement for low-income workers (Aronovici 
1917). The Wilder Charity declined to fund the ambitious program, and 
Aronovici resigned. 
This early momentum did little to improve the Capitol area. 
Isolated improvements were made over the years, but the area around 
the Capitol continued to decay. The grand boulevards and formal 
lawns envisioned by Gilbert were not built, but the state government 
did build two new buildings adjacent to the Capitol, adhering to Gilbert's 
plan -the Minnesota Historical Society building in 1917, and the State 
Office Building in 1932. St. Paul continued to worry about the Capitol 
area, and the City Planning Board's Capitol Approach Committee met 
regularly throughout the 1920s and 1930s. But there were few concrete 
results because funding for the improvements was a major obstacle 
during this period. A dispute recurred over whether the expense of 
redevelopment should be borne by the state, because the area sur-
rounded the Capitol, or by the city, because the neighborhood was a 
part of St. Paul. This funding dispute greatly impeded all improvement 
efforts. After World War I, a drive to build a memorial to the state's war 
veterans complicated the argument, since the Capitol approach was a 
preferred location for the proposed monument. 
In 1930 Cass Gilbert returned to St. Paul and addressed the city 
council. The council and Ramsey County each voted $3,000 to pay for 
a new Capitol plan. The plan was produced, but predictably, lan-
guished during the 1930s. The Depression eroded any prospects that 
state, county, or city governments could afford to pursue the plan, but 
discussion and planning continued. 
One of the beneficial side effects of the Depression was the 
employment of students and scholars through the United States Works 
Projects Administration 0/VPA). The St. Paul City Planning Board 
employed a number of these students to study conditions in the city. 
In 1937 the board issued a new study of housing in St. Paul. This survey 
sampled seven areas of old housing in the city and studied in detail the 
district just east of the Capitol (St. Paul City Planning Board 1937). The 
findings echoed the 1917 Aronovici study, with nearly twenty years' 
wear added. The report recommended razing much of the district's 
housing and that the federal Public Works Administration (PWA) con-
struct public housing. A 1936 Fortune magazine article on conditions 
in the Twin Cities underscored these findings, reporting that St. Paul's 
"slums are among the worst in the land," and portraying seedy tene-
ments up against the Capitol in an illustration (Fortune 1936, 118). 
During World War II two significant changes in the four-decade 
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St. Paul, looking north 
along Wabasha toward 
the Capitol, 1949. 
A close-in view of one of 
the major streets in the 
Capitol Approach area 
gives some idea of the 
"slums at the front door of 
the Capitol" that would 
eventually be cleared. 
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delay in renewal efforts occurred in the Capitol area: a renewed resolve 
on the part of the state government and the intrusion of the National 
Defense Highway System into the city. 
In 1945 the state legislature created the Capitol Area Architec-
tural and Planning Commission and authorized the construction of the 
Veterans' Service Building. Clearance and street realignment began 
that year. The Capitol Approach project covered 103 acres, running 
from the building toward downtown (see Map 2). Since the federal 
urban renewal program did not yet exist, all of the money for this project 
was provided by the state and local governments (Phelps 1985). 
By 1944 it had become clear that the federal government in-
tended to build a "national defense highway" through the Twin Cities, 
and not around them. George Herrold, the St. Paul City Planning 
Engineer, favored using divided parkways in the city instead. He said 
that freeways would "muss up 11 and aggravate rather than alleviate traffic 
congestion. Herrold urged that if the federal government insisted on 
building a freeway through the city, it should follow the railroad corridor 
north of University Avenue to minimize disrupting residential areas 
(Herrold 1956). 
By 1946, however, a different route was chosen for the 
freeway-that of the present 1-94. This locational decision was based 
solely on civil engineering criteria and faced very little public discussion. 
Federal and state highway engineers simply ignored questions of 
social disruption, and countered Herrold's traffic studies with their own. 
Herrold lost this battle, but continued to criticize the freeway plan for 
more than a decade. (Altshuler 1965; Herrold 1956). 
Together the state-directed Capitol Approach project, the 
federal freeway, and the new federal urban renewal program radically 
changed the Capitol area in the 1950s. The St. Paul HRA, created in 
1947, began planning an ambitious renewal of the Capitol area in 1950, 
after first getting the McDonough and Roosevelt public housing projects 
underway. The H RA's Capitol plans were approved by the city govern-
ment in 1952, and by the federal government in 1953. These plans 
specified two formal project areas: the Eastern Redevelopment, abut-
ting the Capitol Approach area on the east, and the Western 
* State Capitol 
1 Mt. Airy 
2 St. Paul-Ramsey Hospital 
3 Sears 
University Ave 
Western 
3 
G N Rail Road 
Redevelopment, abutting the Capitol Approach on the west. These 
projects totaled seventy-one acres as originally planned, and were 
Minnesota's first federal urban renewal efforts (Phelps 1985). 
The freeway route had been decided before the HRA planning 
began, but the H RA cooperated with the state highway department in 
land acquisition and with the Capitol Approach Commission in plan-
ning. Contemporary newspaper accounts usually referred to the 
Eastern and Western redevelopments as the 11Capitol area projects, 11 a 
recognition that the two federal projects and the state project formed a 
coherent renewal area west, south, and east of the Capitol (Journal of 
Housing 1952a). The curve of the freeway separated the area from 
downtown, Ramsey Hill, and the east side. 
The central and southern portion, planned as a formal grouping 
of public buildings and grounds, focused visually on the Capitol. The 
Veterans' Service Building, opposite the Capitol, separates the formal 
grounds from the freeway to the south. John Ireland Boulevard leads 
to the St. Paul Cathedral, the sole, truncated remnant of Gilbert's array 
of grand approaches to the Capitol. 
The Western Redevelopment was planned as a mixed-use area, 
partly private multifamily housing and partly commercial. Eastern 
Redevelopment was planned as private multifamily housing. Neither 
Map 2. Capitol 
Approach Projects 
Aerial view of Capitol 
Approach, 1957. 
The approach has been 
completely rebuilt, with 
new state office buildings 
replacing the former 
slums. Note that the 
freeway, /-94, has not yet 
appeared. 
plan was realized exactly. The HRA's overconfidence in the desirability 
of the location and energetic opposition by the business community to 
H RA plans slowed the process of redevelopment dramatically, and 
altered some of the resulting land uses. 
Clearance began in both HRA areas in early 1954, but some 
rehabilitation was implemented even in this early clearance project. 
Several blocks of homes at the northwest corner of the Western project 
were spared from clearance and rehabilitated privately because no 
public rehabilitation program yet existed. All the rest of the two areas 
were cleared. The first land sales were held in 1955, but generated little 
interest from prospective developers of private housing. The HRA's 
early enthusiasm for quick redevelopment was dampened (Shippee 
1984). 
Over the next several years the H RA encountered a series of 
obstacles that stalled renewal's progress. In 1956 the HRA secured 
bids for the largest commercial tract in the Western district, and chose 
Sears, Roebuck, and Co. for the site. Downtown St. Paul retail and 
property interests were distressed. Fearing the competition of a 
suburban-style retail development so near to the old retail core of the 
city, a consortium of downtown business interests filed two lawsuits 
challenging the constitutionality of the HRA's sale to Sears. The court 
did not support their claim (Altshuler 1959b). In 1957 the FHA refused 
to insure the mortgage for a proposed private apartment development 
in the Eastern district, having determined that there was no demand for 
private market-rate housing in that location. In 1958 the Urban Renewal 
Administration notified the St. Paul H RA that no new projects would be 
approved until the problems associated with the Eastern and Western 
projects were resolved. 
Redevelopment efforts in the area did not stand still. The state 
continued with its improvements of the central portion. In 1954 the city 
council had approved the Mt. Airy site for public housing, just northeast 
of the Capitol and adjacent to the Eastern project. By 1957 the HRA 
had completed clearing the Eastern and Western districts. That same 
year the Mt. Airy site was added to the Eastern district and partially 
cleared; the Mt. Airy housing project-St. Paul's third-was built be-
tween 1957 and 1959. 
By 1959 the renewal projects began to move forward again. 
Following a court's decision to uphold the constitutionality of the HRA's 
sale of land to Sears, the sale was completed. The problem of unsal-
able land in the Eastern district was also solved through the involvement 
of another level of government-that of Ramsey County. Ancker 
Hospital, the aged and deteriorated county facility on West Seventh 
Street, needed to be replaced, and the county had been looking for a 
new site for several years. Not surprisingly, the search process had 
degenerated into a heated, politicized squabble. In 1959 the county 
board finally solved its own problem, and the HRA's, by choosing the 
present county hospital site in the Eastern district (Altshuler 1965). 
The project area filled in during the 1960s. In the Western district 
private developers built rental housing on much of the land that the HRA 
had set aside for this purpose. The Holiday Inn and the Summit State 
Bank were built on commercial sites. The Valley high rise for senior 
citizens was built in the Eastern district in 1963 and the Mt. Airy project 
was expanded in 1967. By the end of the 1960s the Capitol projects 
were completed and officially closed. One strip of land along the 
freeway in the Western district, planned for private housing, could not 
be sold and was finally used for a senior citizen high rise in 1970. 
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St. Paul, looking from 
the Cathedral to the 
Capitol, 1959. 
Above the curve of 
Summit Avenue one can 
see the density of what 
would become the 
Summit-University 
renewal area, land 
cleared for 1-94, and the 
completed Capitol 
Approach improvements. 
The residential neighborhood around and in front of the Capitol 
was almost completely obliterated by public action. The freeway cut a 
swath, other streets were rerouted, almost all of the houses were razed, 
and most of the land was converted to public, commercial, or multiple-
dwelling use. Today only scattered bits of the old neighborhood 
remain: behind the Capitol in the Capitol Heights neighborhood which 
was not included in the project areas and was not cleared; north of the 
Mt. Airy housing project; and on Fuller Street in the Western district. 
The Capitol Approach project was closed in 1958. The final 
public cost, including all state and local monies, was $9 million. The 
Eastern project, which cost $2 million, was closed in 1964, and the 
Western project, which cost $3. 75 million, was closed in 1968. Two-
thirds of both projects were federally funded. The monetary cost of 
renewal was not the only price paid. The clearance of the approach in 
the late 1940s displaced 1,620 people from their homes; the Eastern 
r 
and western clearance during the mid-1950s displaced 1,064 families 
and 253 individuals; and the freeway displaced 433 households be-
tween 1959 and 1961. A large number of those displaced, especially 
during the freeway construction, were blacks (St. Paul City Planning 
soard 1968b). 
St. Paul's black residents were concentrated west of the Capitol 
around the Rondo Avenue commercial strip by 1920. By 1940, nearly 
go percent of St. Paul's black population lived in the general area of 
low-cost housing stretching from the Rondo area east to the Capitol 
environs. The Eastern and Western and Capitol Approach clearance 
efforts tightened the lower end of the rental housing market in St. Paul 
considerably. The new public housing projects helped, but did not 
solve the housing problems. Blacks and other minorities were espe-
cially affected because they were discriminated against in the housing 
market. 
Open occupancy was a hot political topic in Minnesota in the 
1940s and 1950s. Minorities were, without question, restricted in 
choosing where to live. Those displaced during the 1940s and mid-
1950s, through state and HRA action, increased the concentration of 
blacks in the Rondo area. Rondo was not a textbook example of either 
a slum or a ghetto. A social survey in the 1930s found the housing to 
be in fairly good condition -far better than in Minneapolis black 
neighborhoods-except in the far eastern area, which the HRA's 
Western project later cleared (Schmid 1937). Rondo was a racially 
mixed area. It was home not only to a majority of St. Paul's blacks, but 
also to other minorities and many whites. 
Freeway construction demolished the Rondo Avenue com-
munity, and more than 75 percent of the people displaced were black. 
The HRA provided relocation services to those displaced; as a strong 
advocate of open occupancy, it used its referral service to try to end 
segregation in St. Paul. Despite this effort, blacks displaced by the 
freeway tended to remain in the same part of St. Paul, either because 
they suffered prejudice in other parts of the city or because they feared 
that they would. Consequently, the black community expanded south 
and west into the Summit-University neighborhood, whose white resi-
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dents were busy moving to the suburbs. 
The official renewal plans for the Capitol area were largely 
realized as planned, though some changes were made, and the 
process took far longer than planners had envisioned. There was 
broad support for the proposed improvements. Proximity to the Capitol 
made these renewal efforts symbolic, and perhaps inevitable. Their 
location also meant that state funding was potentially available to 
augment local renewal resources. Moreover, civic leaders had long 
hoped for a closer connection between downtown and the Capitol, and 
HRA planners saw this area as vital to downtown St. Paul's rejuvenation. 
Physical conditions in the Eastern and Western projects varied 
from run-down to fair, but the housing was not the worst in the city. 
Still, the age of the housing, the poor construction quality, and the mixed 
land uses dictated that great changes were likely. In the end the 
landscape of these areas was completely altered. Deteriorated houses 
were swept away and infrastructure improvements were made, though 
fewer units of private housing were built than civic leaders had planned. 
More public facilities appeared, including some that were a bit dis-
sonant aesthetically. Although the Sears store and the Holiday Inn may 
seem jarringly out of place to contemporary eyes, their services were 
well used at the time and still function well today. 
The Capitol area revitalization efforts had many traits typical of 
early renewal projects nationwide: long delays, constitutional chal-
lenges, resistance by the business community, drastic alteration of land 
use, overconfident early plans, and the displacement of minority resi-
dents. Real action did not begin until state and federal money became 
available to aid local efforts. The city simply could not afford to achieve 
its goals alone. With this assistance, the public agencies succeeded in 
transforming a decaying residential area into a mixed public, commer-
cial, and multifamily housing district. 
GLENWOOD 
The largest slum clearance project in Minneapolis was called 
Glenwood. This was the only local project that could be considered a 
"classic" example of early renewal as practiced in cities like New York 
p 
City and Chicago. As defined here the Glenwood project includes both 
the Grant and Glenwood neighborhood portions of the near-north side 
of Minneapolis (see Map 3). Renewal began here in earnest in 1956, 
just one mile west of downtown. 
The Glenwood project area was not just an isolated area of need, 
nor was it the first time that this area had attracted the city's attention. 
As early as 1925, a study of the north side (which included the Grant 
area) identified a multitude of physical and social problems: 
The general appearance [of the Grant area] is one of 
poverty and neglect. The houses are dilapidated and 
unpainted ... Porches sag, stairs are rickety. Streets are 
littered with papers and rubbish ... In the summer the 
odors of the heated rubber, decaying garbage, and old 
mash from moonshine stills are vile. Due to this filth 
and decay the neighborhood is swarming with insects, 
rats and mice (Women's Cooperative Alliance 1925, 
12). 
Like many contemporary studies, this one focused on the social 
results of these living conditions. The lack of 11positive 11 moral influences 
on children growing up in such circumstances posed the greatest 
concern for early reformers. They worried about the prevalence of 
drinking and prostitution, school truancy, and so many ethnic and racial 
groups in one small area. But their worrying produced few solutions. 
The earliest redevelopment scheme for the near-north side 
occurred in 1933, when the city moved the municipal market from the 
downtown warehouse district to Lyndale and Glenwood avenues (see 
Map 3). This placement of the "farmers' market 11 in an extremely 
deteriorated residential area underscored the area's transformation. 
The Oak Lake neighborhood, once a fairly prosperous middle-class 
haven, had become a slum by the 1930s. The city's redevelopment 
efforts eliminated the area's housing; the two shallow lakes were filled 
in, and sites for industry were made available. A few years later, a 
nearby section of the near-north side community was selected for the 
first public housing project in Minneapolis. The Sumner Field homes, 
built in 1938, replaced thirty acres of slum housing around Bryant 
Avenue and 6th Avenue North (Olson Highway) with 600 new multi-
family units (Minneapolis City Planning Commission 1936). 
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Map 3. Glenwood 
Renewal Area Plymouth Ave 
Plymouth Ave 
Olson Memorial Hwy 
3 
Glenwood Ave 
Creek 
2 
4 
1 Sumner-Field 
2 Oak Lake 
3 Munsingwear 
4 Farmers Market 
By the 1950s it was once again apparent that housing in near-
north Minneapolis required attention. The Glenwood and Grant 
neighborhoods, reaching from Lyndale Avenue west to Humboldt 
Avenue, and from Glenwood Avenue north to Plymouth Avenue, were 
designated as clearance projects in 1956 and 1960 respectively. (The 
Harrison neighborhood just to the west of Glenwood, and in somewhat 
better physical condition, was chosen in 1959 as a rehabilitation 
project.) 
Glenwood presented both a problem and an opportunity to 
Minneapolis planners. To them it was a consummate example of blight, 
with few redeeming features. The cit-rs survey of the area, taken after 
the renewal project was already underway, identified several areas with 
"poor environments." These included housing that needed major repair 
or rebuilding, adverse land use mixtures, a badly designed and ineffi-
cient traffic system, and environmental deterioration resulting from the 
t 
) 
r 
1 
r 
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poor drainage around Bassett's Creek (Minneapolis HRA 1964). 
What the planners saw in Glenwood was an area in severe 
decline, and one that looked likely to deteriorate even further. The 
conditions of the area in the 1950s were probably the worst in the city, 
and there were few prospects for positive change in the near future. A 
1949 survey taken by the H RA shocked the investigators who found 
that many of the houses in the area had been carved up into "a maze 
of sleeping rooms" (Minneapolis City Planning Commission 1950). Still, 
Glenwood's problems were not equal to those of well-known big city 
slum areas. Someone who looked at an identical area today would see 
a run-down neighborhood, but might envision some rehabilitation for 
the housing stock rather than total clearance. Even in the 1950s 
Glenwood was not without some distinct advantages, most notably a 
good location relative to downtown Minneapolis. 
What most worried planners about Glenwood was not its physi-
cal condition alone, but the likely effect that it might have on the relatively 
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Glenwood area, 
mid-1950s. 
This view, just behind 
the Olson Highway 
commercial strip, 
depicts some of the 
adverse environmental 
conditions found in the 
Glenwood area. 
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healthy surrounding areas. Some went so far as to label Glenwood "a 
cancer 11 that could threaten adjacent areas. A 1964 field survey of the 
near-north community above Olson Highway endorsed this view. 
Eighty percent of the housing fell into the 11good11 or 11fair 11 categories 
whereas only abol!t 8 percent was 11very good. 11 Only 1 O percent was 
in the "poor" category and a minuscule 2 percent was 11very poor. 11 The 
Grant neighborhood, just north of Glenwood, was ranked as being in 
substantially worse shape, but even it was mostly in fair-to-good 
condition. The fact that a large amount of relatively good quality 
housing might be threatened by the deterioration evident in Glenwood 
was the factor that weighed most heavily in the decision to clear it 
(Minneapolis HRA 1964). 
Glenwood was also an area that had been experiencing major 
social and racial transitions since the 1950s. Like some other older 
neighborhoods, it was losing residents at a faster rate than the city as 
a whole; between 1950 and 1960, the population in Glenwood declined 
nearly 15 percent (Minneapolis HRA 1977). For many years Glenwood 
had housed two of the city's minority groups: Jews had lived in the 
area since the 1890s, and blacks had begun to move into the com-
munity in the early 1920s. For the most part, the Jewish residents led 
the way in moving west through the north side - black residents fol-
lowed in their wake. Following World War II, as suburban housing 
opportunities opened up for many north side residents, the black 
population of Glenwood increased substantially, reaching 44 percent 
just before renewal. 
The Renewal Process 
The Glenwood urban renewal project began comparatively 
early. Initial application was made in March 1950. But it was not until 
1953 that Glenwood won a federal planning grant, and not until 1954 
that the Federal Authority approved the project itself. Because of these 
delays, the Glenwood project was carried out under the 1954 amend-
ments to the Urban Renewal Act (the first in a series of amendments 
that lowered the amount of residential reconstruction required of the 
renewal effort). 
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The project area consisted of 180 acres, reaching from 12th 
Avenue North to Girard Avenue, and from Glenwood Avenue North to 
Olson Highway. Most properties in this area were slated for clearance. 
Acquisition and demolition of Glenwood properties began in March 
1956; by the end of the next year acquisition and relocation were 
11 substantially complete" only 74 out of 661 structures to be acquired 
still stood at that point (HUD 1974; Minneapolis HRA 1957). The total 
cost of the Glenwood project was $8,530,845 ($11,522,071 less 
$2,991,226 in land sales -the city paid approximately $2.8 million and 
the federal government approximately $5.6 million). The city's 
contribution - a payment-in-kind contribution rather than cash -
included the Harrison school addition and playground, a new fire 
station, and the rebuilt streets and utilities. 
Before the renewal project began, 78 percent of all families in 
Glenwood had been living in substandard housing. The 1950 Census 
estimated that more than 40 percent of the dwellings in Glenwood were 
either dilapidated or lacked a private bath. (The comparable figure for 
the nearby Harrison neighborhood was 28 percent.) Throughout the 
project more than 700 units of substandard housing, valued at $6.5 
million, were destroyed; these were replaced by 831 standard housing 
The Glenwood Homes 
site, mid-1950s. 
This site, one of the city's 
"most blighted'' and one 
of the first to be cleared, 
was typical of the 
surroundings in the 
Glenwood area before 
clearance. 
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The Glenwood Homes 
site, 1960. 
The same site after 
renewal. Blighted 
structures were replaced 
with these family units and 
with several high-rise 
towers. 
units, valued at $23 million. Glenwood's new housing stock contained 
a few fairly large apartment blocks, including some public housing units. 
The Glenwood Homes, completed in 1960, had 278 family units; 
Lyndale South ~partments, completed in 1959, had 104 family units 
and 88 units for the elderly. Also dating from this period was University 
Towers, a building with 361 units for families (Minneapolis City Planning 
Commission 1974). 
Several public improvements were included in the Glenwood 
project: a new firehouse valued at $40,000, an eight-acre-playground 
attached to Harrison School, and an addition to the school valued at 
$900,000 (Minneapolis HRA 1966a). Before renewal about ninety-three 
acres of Glenwood's land were used for residential purposes, thirty-two 
acres for nonresidential needs and about fifty-five acres for streets. 
When renewal was completed, only about sixty-seven acres were 
residential, sixty-one acres nonresidential, and fifty-two acres streets. 
After renewal was completed tax revenues for this area increased to 
approximately four times what they had been. Renewal also increased 
the number of jobs in Glenwood. Businesses employing approximately 
1,000 people remained throughout the renewal process, including large 
employers like Munsingwear and Northland Milk (Snyder 1973). By the 
completion of renewal there were 2,700 jobs in the Glenwood area. 
A total of 1,000 families and 200 individuals were displaced by 
the Glenwood renewal efforts, including 269 minority households and 
individuals. The minority households dispersed in the following 
manner: 5 remained in the project area, 4 7 moved to the Hay neigh-
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Residential relocation was perhaps the notable aspect of 
Glenwood's renewal, but it was only one aspect of the program. 
Perhaps as interesting was the effect of renewal on businesses in the 
area. For Glenwood, creating more space for industry and increasing 
the number of jobs were prime components of the renewal process. 
But this did not always happen. One study of the commercial transi-
tions on Plymouth Avenue-the northern boundary of the Grant project 
which was designated in 1960-yielded some very different con-
clusions. This study looked at the business closings and relocations 
stemming from the riots on Plymouth Avenue in 1967. Those inter-
viewed were chiefly middle-aged or elderly Jewish merchants who had 
operated small retail or service establishments. Many told of suffering 
both vandalism and physical threats before the riots. Most indicated 
that the riots were the reason for their moves, but they also described 
a generally declining business climate and the loss of customers to the 
suburbs. Most of those who remained in business moved their opera-
tions closer to their homes in the suburbs, or to areas where they felt 
less threatened. However, few were happy with the moves they had 
made. They felt that they were financially better off when they were still 
on Plymouth Avenue, and that the suburban rents they were paying 
were much too high. Almost half of the group did not voice these 
complaints for they had simply retired (Palm 1969). 
Glenwood was then the 11classic 11 example of early residential 
renewal in Minneapolis. It had all of the physical preconditions that 
caused planners and others to consider the area blighted, and it also 
had a large concentration of politically powerless minorities. (This area 
was represented by white city council members through the late 1970s.) 
The result of these circumstances in Glenwood was massive and rapid 
clearance; for example, demolition began here only twelve days after 
the first acquisitions. The cleared land in Glenwood was reused partly 
for light industry, but largely for public housing. Political and civic 
support for the Glenwood project was widespread. Glenwood was 
changing from a predominantly Jewish neighborhood to one that was 
primarily black, and its location on the periphery of downtown (and 
along well-traveled commuter routes) made it quite visible. Glenwood 
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borhood, 59 went to Grant, 20 to Harrison, and the remaining 128 
households relocated predominantly on the near-north and near-south 
sides (in the historic areas of black settlement in Minneapolis). Within 
a few years of the Glenwood project, most of the rest of the near-north 
community became either a renewal or redevelopment area (the Grant 
area in 1960, and near north itself in 1968). Families who had been 
displaced from Glenwood had priority access to the new housing being 
built, but only 18 of the total 1,000 families who were displaced returned 
to live in Glenwood again (Minneapolis Tribune 1962). 
Glenwood area, 
early 1960s. 
A view of the new 
Lyndale Homes project, 
looking toward the new 
Olson Homes. These 
buildings replaced the 
run-down commercial 
structures near Olson 
Highway. 
f Minneapolis' opportunity to demonstrate that, like bigger cities was 
h as New Haven, Pittsburgh, and Chicago, it too could redeem a sue 
lost part of the city. 
THE WEST SIDE FLA TS 
For half a century, the worst living conditions in St. Paul were 
found in three separate areas: Swede Hollow, in the shadow of the 
Hamm Brewery on the east side; the Upper Levee, near downtown 
beneath the High Bridge; and on the West Side Flats, across the 
Mississippi River from downtown. Swede Hollow and the Upper Levee 
were probably the more decrepit- most houses in both areas had 
neither city water nor sewer, and many were little better than shacks -
but it was the Flats that drew steady attention from the city fathers, civic 
improvers, and business leaders throughout the first half of the twen-
tieth century. The Flats was a mixed area, with both sound and poor 
housing, and some adequate infrastructure (see Map 4). The area 
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Map 4. West Side Flats 
Redevelopment Projects 
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attracted attention because it was more extensive, had more people, 
and was more obvious than either Swede Hollow or Upper Levee. The 
Flats area was visible irom the business district downtown, and repre-
sented a potential resource for a city eager to rejuvenate. 
The Flats (now Riverview Industrial Park) was never a desirable 
residential location. The area's first settlers were poor French 
Canadians and Irish. During the 1850s and 1860s, the West Side Flats 
across the river was not even a part of St. Paul. The first bridge to the 
Flats charged a toll, effectively excluding working people from crossing 
regularly. In the 1870s the Flats was annexed by St. Paul, and a toll-free 
bridge opened (Pierce 1971). The St. Paul Chamber of Commerce, 
which had promoted the annexation and the bridge, envisioned the 
area as housing the workers needed by downtown's burgeoning 
commerce and industry. Its vision was accurate, and the Flats popula-
tion increased. Railroad connections were improved, and commercial 
and industrial buildings were constructed, along with more housing, 
though the housing was usually not of high quality. The Flats was 
widely perceived as a bottom rung on the city's residential ladder. 
In the 1880s a new ethnic group began to settle on the Flats. 
East European Jews, driven by pogroms in Russia and Poland, found 
their way to St. Paul. Most were destitute, and the Flats offered the 
lowest rents in town. By the mid-1890s the Flats was predominantly 
Jewish. A 1915 census of the portion of the Flats east of Robert Street 
showed that 71 percent of families were Jewish (Pierce 1971 ). Much 
of the housing was poor and deteriorating, and environmental condi-
tions were often poor, but the Flats was a vibrant community. The 
neighborhood life has been vividly described by William Hoffman in 
Tales of Hoffman (1961) and Those Were the Days (1957). Many 
Jewish families eventually prospered and moved away from the Flats 
to other neighborhoods including Selby-Dale, the Midway, and espe-
cially the new development of Highland Park. 
By the end of the 1920s, Jews no longer dominated the Flats, 
and by 1940 few were left. But the Flats was not deserted. Population 
and congestion increased during the 1920s, and worsened dramati-
cally during the economic pressures of the 1930s. During these years 
,-
e 
~-
e 
h 
s 
e 
e 
F 
f 
•,ng number of Flats residents were Mexican-Americans seeking 
a grow 
a better life than the seasonal agricultural labor that had drawn most of 
them to Minnesota. By the 1940s the Flats had become St. Paul's 
rimary Mexican-American neighborhood. 
p The physical condition of the Flats had concerned city officials 
since shortly after the turn of the century. Parts of the Flats were 
flood•prone or swampy, the housing had been inexpensively and poorly 
built, and urban services had not been extended to much of the area. 
Following his Wilder Charity survey in 1917, Carol Aronovici reported 
that much of the Flats were "wholly unfit for human habitation," and a 
~. 1151um of the worst character" (Aronovici 1917). The years just after the 
e first world war were the height of Americans' fear that the Red Menace 
;;J might spread from Bolshevik Russia, and Aronovici feared that the 
1- despicable conditions of life on the Flats would "foster syndicalism, 
11 sabotage and other philosophies opposed to the present order." 
1, Aronovici collected impressive and depressing statistics on the condi-
s tion of housing in the Flats area. More than half of the houses had no 
sewer connection; a third had no city water, forcing residents to carry 
;. water from wells of suspect cleanliness; 60 percent had no provision 
d for garbage collection; and near the river a third of the houses had 
e swampy yards. 
y Nothing actually happened as a result of Aronovici's study and 
~t recommendations. Two decades passed and, in 1937, a WPA-
h supported housing study was issued. The summary report gives no 
,- detailed analysis of the Flats but leaves little doubt that conditions were 
8 worse: "one and two room shacks literally in the shadow of industrial 
1 plants 11 and "homes inhabited by squatters; homes built from salvaged 
y materials that present hopeless living conditions" (St. Paul City Planning 
s Board 1937). 
i- St. Paul officials thought that dramatic change was needed on 
1 
i-
5 
the Flats: their inclinations had long been to sweep the area clean and 
rebuild it. The first St. Paul zoning ordinance, in 1922, imagined much 
of the area totally cleared of housing and used instead for industry. This 
vision of an industrial zone sparking the city's economic rejuvenation 
did not die, though it was not fully achieved for four decades. During 
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Downtown St. Paul, 
the Upper Levee, and 
the West Side, 1952. 
Flooding of the 
Mississippi River 
demonstrated why 
riverfront improvements 
were so necessary. 
the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s sporadic public action ensued. In 1926 
the city bought sixty acres for the municipal airport (later named Holman 
Field). In 1929 part of the levee was cleared for a city barge terminal, 
operated by the newly created St. Paul Port Authority (PA). The airport 
was expanded twice during the 1930s and again during World War II. 
But apart from these public actions there was little change on the Flats, 
and the area continued to decay. By the end of World War 11, the 
condition of housing on the Flats was even worse than it had been thirty 
years earlier. 
Conditions were still shocking in the early 1950s. East of 
Wabasha Street the Flats was primarily residential, with some industry 
along the river. West of residential Wabasha Street, the area was 
commercial and industrial. Much of the land was low-lying and fre-
quently flooded. So much sand and debris had been deposited in 
some areas that many houses could only be reached by steps leading 
down from the street level. Most of the houses were dilapidated. Many 
had been illegally subdivided, and crowding was endemic. City water 
p 
' 
and sewer were still far from universal. Many yards were strewn with 
rubbish. The street grid was cramped, especially west of Robert Street. 
Though railroad tracks crisscrossed the Flats, and were quite prevalent 
west of Wabasha Street, much of the track was disused. The area's 
healthy commercial and industrial establishments were cramped and 
unable to expand, surrounded as they were by squalid housing units. 
A serious flood in 1952, the worst of the century to that date, left 
2,641 people homeless in St. Paul (not all of them in the Flats -the 
Upper Levee was the worst hit). The flood also caused $5 million in 
damages to the west side business and industry (St. Paul HRA 1959). 
Plainly, something had to be done. But, who would do it? And, more 
importantly, who would pay for it? 
Urban renewal came to the rescue. In 1952 the HRA proposed 
a redevelopment project that would clear the Flats of housing and 
blighted industry and commerce and create an industrial park. HRA 
discussions about the problem of the Flats included another agency, 
the PA. In 1952 the city council asked the PA to condemn and acquire 
the floodplain on the west side and transfer it to the HRA for redevelop-
ment. The PA executive director demurred, unsure that his agency had 
the authority to do so. In the end, the Flats was redeveloped by both 
agencies, acting partly in concert (St. Paul Pioneer Press 1957). 
The project got underway only after several years' delay and a 
significant expansion of the scope and power of the PA. The first major 
obstacle was the old problem of flooding. The Urban Renewal Admin-
istration turned down the first HRA proposal, refusing to pay for a 
project in this flood-prone area. In 1955 an engineering study showed 
that flood-proofing was feasible (St. Paul Pioneer Press 1960). The 
agencies then only needed to find the money to pay for the project. 
They found it at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. By the late 1950s, 
the Flats project, christened Riverview, began. The Corps of Engineers 
built three-fourths of a mile of floodwall and two miles of levee at a cost 
of $6.5 million, finally securing the area from the river. Riverview was 
accomplished in two separate but related projects. The PA, with new 
powers authorized by the 1957 state legislation, redeveloped the entire 
portion generally east of Wabasha Street. Clearance began in 1961 
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and was largely completed by the end of 1962. The HRA cleared the 
area west of Wabasha Street. The street grid was changed, unneces-
sary railroad track taken up, and new urban services installed. Some 
existing healthy businesses, notably the American Hoist and Derrick 
plant, were excluded from the project area. The cleared land in both 
parts of Riverview was allocated to light industry, and the PA handled 
leasing both parts to the industrial tenants (St. Paul Port Authority 1962). 
The HRA portion of Riverview cost $8.3 million (of which three-
fourths was provided by the federal government), covered 146 acres, 
and displaced 97 families and 25 individuals. The PA portion covered 
273 acres and displaced 436 families and 111 individuals (St. Paul 
Pioneer Press 1962). Federal relocation laws at that time applied only 
to displacement involving federal renewal funds. Residents displaced 
by the PA were not guaranteed the same relocation services and 
remuneration as were HRA-displaced residents. Much of the com-
munity harbored bitterness toward the PA and opposed its plans. At 
one public meeting a resident, Charles Peltier, said, "They don't need 
my property any more than they need a man on the moon" (Minne-
apolis Star 1964). A neighborhood group sought a delay in the 
clearance, but the PA stood firm. The PA did voluntarily pay the moving 
expenses of displaced residents who applied for help, and those people 
who lost their homes to the HRA also received relocation assistance. 
The major difficulty for displaced residents in both parts of 
Riverview was the expense of other available housing. They had been 
living in some of the most inexpensive rental and owner-occupied 
housing in the Twin Cities. Owners were paid fair-market values for 
their property, but this was rarely enough to buy another home 
elsewhere. Few rental units were available in the city or metropolitan 
area at rents comparable to those that had prevailed in the Flats areas. 
Residents were displaced into a rental market tightened by freeway and 
renewal destruction of dwellings. Mexican-American residents also 
faced racial discrimination. The public housing on the west side that 
was intended to help alleviate the situation was not completed until 
1965-several years after most people had been displaced. About 
two-thirds of the people displaced from the Flats moved up the bluff, 
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3ed and remained on the west side. 
ne- St. Paul's West Side Flats was a problem created by short-
the sighted entrepreneurs in the last decades of the nineteenth century. 
ing The district was poorly designed and built, even by the standards of 
pie the day. The houses were inadequately maintained from the start. 
e. Neither the residents nor the city were able to maintain the area, much 
of less improve it. The Flats was a drain on the municipal budget, costing 
,en more in services (even at a plainly inadequate level) than it could pay 
ed in property taxes. Business, government, and civic leaders had recog-
for nized, from the turn of the century, that a dramatic solution was 
ne necessary for the problem of the Flats. But that solution only appeared 
an after decades of discussion, study, and hand-wringing, when the broad 
1s. powers of the renewal agencies and massive federal aid finally swept 
id aside the Flats-to create the 11 prestige industrial park 11 called Riverview. 
,o Despite its squalor and progressive deqay, the Flats had been 
at a community, and home to several generations of immigrants to St. 
til Paul. Aronovici had seen 11tar paper buildings which are sort of 
Jt embryonic homes indicating in many instances a keen desire for home 
f, ownership without the necessary financial resources" (Aronovici 1917). 
Riverview Industrial 
Park, 1988. 
The former West Side 
Flats has now lost all 
traces of its residential 
character. The industrial 
park created here has 
continued to expand and 
fill up throughout the 
1980s. 
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The Flats area was decrepit and unhealthful, and an eyesore, but it was 
also home to many people who had little money, but indomitable 
courage and a desire for a better life. To Polish and Russian Jews of 
the 1890s and to Mexican-Americans of the 1940s, the Flats was a way 
station. In the 1960s millions of federal dollars finally made their 
dilapidated, flood-prone neighborhood safe for industry. 
Today the city is showing renewed interest in the river front area. 
In recent years the city established a Riverfront Commission to help 
redevelop underused land along both banks of the river near 
downtown. Ironically, some of the land converted from housing to 
industry twenty-five years ago may now be converted back to housing. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Even today it would be hard to disagree that all of the slum 
clearance areas described needed to be substantially rehabilitated. 
Most, in fact, deserved to be totally cleared. The housing had never 
been of much consequence (except perhaps in a small portion of 
Glenwood), and living conditions were, for the most part, quite awful. 
Through renewal all of these areas were changed enormously- most 
were no longer even residential areas. The planners' idea was to clean 
up 11the slums" as quickly and efficiently as possible -get rid of blight 
and transform undesirable landscapes into something that might at 
least prove to be useful. 
Most political analyses would contend that these examples of 
residential clearance and redevelopment were standard practice - that 
they exemplify the conventional ways that urban renewal was carried 
out nationwide. A leftist analysis might identify the presence of a 
pro-growth coalition, a dynamic political leader, and a dynamic busi-
ness group, all pushing for clearance. Some of these perspectives 
were present in the Twin Cities. The pro-growth coalition -those with 
political connections -was more visible in Minneapolis than in St. Paul. 
Neither city really had a dynamic political leader throughout the 1950s 
and early 1960s, though both did have active business groups who 
lobbied for changes. These groups argued that the Twin Cities had to 
be jolted into a new era. For them, the surest way to demonstrate the 
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rnodern and progressive nature of the two cities was to physically 
remove those structures that appeared to be old and worn-out, and 
replace them as fast as possible. 
some former urban renewal officials hold that this interpretation 
may be correct, but that it is also incomplete. They contend that 
renewal models that emphasize total neighborhood clearance do not 
adequately represent the urban renewal experience of the Twin Cities. 
For example, large amounts of existing housing were not removed to 
create public housing in the two cities. Former Twin Cities renewal 
officials also contend that the local programs were always balanced 
between downtown efforts and programs for the neighborhoods. In 
contrast to other cities, there was not the same tendency to decimate 
neighborhoods surrounding downtown to create more opportunities 
1 for business (Shippee 1984). This perspective has seldom been noted, 
I. because most national analyses of renewal have ignored distinctions 
r between renewal practices in different cities. 
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3. DOWNTOWN RENEWAL 
Slum clearance as carried out in the Twin Cities' downtowns did 
not differ significantly in its goals and objectives from that practiced in 
the two cities' deteriorated neighborhoods. In the 1950s and 1960s the 
downtowns had numerous opposing interests that had to be balanced 
against one another; downtown renewal was also quite complex due 
to the sizeable land holdings involved and the expense required to 
modify this land. It was one thing to remove people from unsafe and 
substandard homes in the name of equity and general welfare. It was 
quite another thing to tell businessmen that they had to go elsewhere -
or indeed to reach a consensus about what downtown should be, and 
for whom it should be. 
The downtown areas of Minneapolis and St. Paul have gone 
through many similar changes since they were first settled in the 1830s 
and 1840s. Both cities originated along a water transport route (the 
Mississippi River) like many other nineteenth century cities, and quickly 
evolved into centers of transportation, manufacturing, and wholesaling 
by the turn of the twentieth century. St. Paul, as the practical head of 
navigation on the upper Mississippi River, became an active port. 
Minneapolis, situated above the falls of St. Anthony, provided an 
attractive site for industries driven by water power. The industries that 
expanded with the two cities mirrored their physical circumstances: 
James J. Hill's Great Northern Railroad (now the Burlington Northern) 
was headquartered in St. Paul, and the Washburn-Crosby (now 
General Mills) and Pillsbury flour mills were upstream in Minneapolis. 
These businesses were larger than most in the two cities, but they are 
indicative of the most typical early industries. 
As the downtowns of Minneapolis and St. Paul grew away from 
the river, their functions expanded as did the need to modify their 
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landscapes. In the late nineteenth century both downtowns contained 
a full range of city activities. Many different businesses were present, 
as were various industrial, processing, and production activities. But 
many different kinds of housing as well as schools, churches, and other 
neighborhood support services were also available for all levels of the 
population. It was the 11neighborhood 11 functions that were increasingly 
pushed out of the downtowns as land values increased, and busi-
nesses concentrated in the center. Downtown renewal was not an idea 
that blossomed forth suddenly in the 1940s. It was a process that had 
been underway in various forms for fifty years or more. 
MINNEAPOLIS 
Bridge Square, at the intersection of Hennepin and Nicollet 
avenues, had been the center of downtown Minneapolis in the city's 
early years. In the late nineteenth century Bridge Square was the focus 
of one of the country's largest seasonal labor markets. Lumberjacks, 
farm hands, and construction workers poured into this area in the 
off-seasons - and when there was no work- and new businesses grew 
up to cater to their needs. This meant that lodging houses, flophouses, 
pawnshops, bars, inexpensive restaurants, and inexpensive clothing 
stores appeared in large numbers-there were fifty "cage" hotels 
(literally containing rooms with stacked cage sleeping quarters) or 
lodging houses by 1895 (Rosheim 1978). 
By 1900 city officials, businessowners and other upstanding 
citizens all acknowledged that Bridge Square was deteriorating. 
Retailers began moving south on Nicollet Avenue soon after the con-
struction of Donaldson's Glass Block store at 6th Street in 1886. The 
old City Hall at Bridge Square was considered obsolete by this time, 
and work began on the new City Hall-Courthouse in 1888. When that 
building was finished in 1907, the city government and all of its attendant 
activities moved to 4th Street and 4th Avenue; the old City Hall and the 
entire block of buildings behind it were razed. The entire parcel (now 
the site of the Towers complex) was converted into Gateway Park in 
1908, providing some much needed green space in the densely built-up 
downtown. A classical revival park pavilion containing tourist informa-
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tion and public toilets was built, and a few years later an ornate fountain 
was added to the park (Borchert et al. 1983). 
During the early part of the twentieth century, city officials made 
continuous efforts to improve the Lower Loop area. In 191 O a new post 
office (now the Old Federal Courthouse) was built at Washington and 
Third avenues. A few years later the first mission appeared to serve 
area residents, now predominantly elderly transient laborers and 
alcoholics. In 1918 the state legislature outlawed the cage type of 
lodging houses, but this did not eliminate them from the Lower Loop. 
In 1924 the privately financed Nicollet Hotel was put up to stem the 
deterioration down Nicollet Avenue. Another effort was made in 1931 
when yet another new post office was built across the street from 
Pioneer Square. (This is the current post office; the first one had been 
too small.) Both post offices were built by the U.S. government, not by 
the city of Minneapolis. Both structures were built well before the onset 
of urban renewal, but they fit the classic renewal pattern of local 
improvement efforts paid for by the federal government. Still, none of 
these improvements were sufficiently effective to stem the tide of 
decline in this part of downtown. 
Minneapolis city officials usually rejected the idea of downtown 
improvement efforts. As Alan Altshuler described in his history of 
Bridge Square, 
1915. 
The Gateway pavilion 
(left) had been 
constructed on the site 
of the first City Hall. The 
block face on the right 
is Hennepin Avenue 
between Second 
Avenue and Washington 
Avenue. 
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Minneapolis planning (1965), the system (the city government) seemed 
designed to prevent anything from happening. The 1920 Minneapolis 
charter had created a weak mayor-strong council system based on 
wards. Political parties were weak, nonpartisan elections were the 
norm, the mayor had little power, and the aldermen generally avoided 
innovation. Altshuler described the style of most mayors through the 
1950s as conciliatory-they never sponsored anything, never tried to 
coerce the city council, and worked on issues they cared about through 
citizens' groups. 
When something had to be done, the city council usually 
appointed a civic committee to find a "nonpartisan" solution. The City 
Planning Commission, established in 1919, and the Capitol Long-
Range Improvement Committee, formed in 1953, exemplify these civic 
committees designed to reach consensus and advise the city council 
while insulating council members from controversial decisions. In 
addition to these appointed committees, Minneapolis also had several 
independently elected boards that possessed tax-levying authority 
including the school board, the park board, and the library board. The 
city council's tax-levying power was limited by the Board of Estimate 
and Taxation, and its budget limits were set by state charter. 
Meanwhile, the state of Minnesota had not been reapportioned 
since 1913. Both Minneapolis and St. Paul were greatly under-
represented in the state legislature, where most city proposals were 
handled by the entire county delegation. (St. Paul's city government 
was deeply embedded in a syndrome of graft and corruption 
throughout most of the 1920s and 1930s; Minneapolis had only extri-
cated itself from a similar situation about twenty years earlier.) 
ST. PAUL 
In St. Paul, improvement efforts had long focused on the area 
around the Capitol rather than on the heart of downtown. As mentioned 
previously, in 1906 the city had adopted proposals made by Cass 
Gilbert {the architect of the existing Capitol building) for major 
landscape improvements between the Capitol area and downtown. If 
implemented, Gilbert's grandiose and visionary plan would have 
r 
f 
r 
d a densely built-up residential area just in front of the Capitol, cleare 
and re-routed several major streets. 
The vitality of the Capitol was crucial to the health of downtown 
St. paul. The Capitol building and its functions were an important part 
of St. Paul's identity and economic role. But even though state and city 
officials alike recognized the problems in this area of the city, it would 
be another fifty years before sig_nificant changes were accomplished. 
some downtown St. Paul rejuvenation efforts did occur in the 
1920s and 1930s. The earliest was the clearance of a deteriorating 
warehouse area along the Mississippi River, and the subsequent 
construction of Kellogg Boulevard. Next, several downtown streets 
were widened, most notably Robert Street, to reduce traffic congestion 
and open up the downtown visually. A few years later the new City 
Hall-Courthouse building was constructed on Kellogg Boulevard. But 
from the late 1930s until the 1960s, almost nothing new was done in St. 
Paul's downtown, and the older buildings continued to deteriorate. 
The structure of politics and government in St. Paul from the 
1910s through the early 1960s seriously hampered revitalization efforts. 
From 1912 until 1972 the city operated under a commission form of 
charter. Commission government had enjoyed a brief vogue during 
the 11progressive era, 11 but by the 1950s St. Paul was one of the last large 
cities in the country to cling to it even though many experts considered 
this system antiquated and unfruitful. The city council, or commission, 
combined legislative and administrative functions. Six commissioners 
were elected at large. Each was appointed by the mayor to head one 
of the city government's six bureaus. The mayor, also elected at large, 
held virtually no other executive authority. A voting member of the 
commission, and holding veto power, the mayor could be overridden 
by a majority of the commission. Another official elected at large, the 
comptroller, proposed and monitored the city budget. The commission 
had only limited power to alter the comptroller's budget. Major spend-
ing increases had to be approved by the voters in referendum; 
referendums were routinely defeated. The dual nature of the 
commissioners' offices forced them to act both as legislators repre-
senting the whole city and as advocates for one city bureau. The 
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frequent result was vote swapping. Little public confrontation occurred, 
at least until the 1950s. The city-wide election of commissioners (the 
11alley 11 system) effectively prevented minorities from electing a repre-
sentative (Altshuler 1959b). 
St. Paul politics were dominated by organized labor. Labor and 
Democratic (later DFL) endorsement was usually essential for election. 
St. Paul Democratic politicians tended to be liberal on national and state 
issues but conservative on local government spending. Business 
lobbying favored local fiscal conservatism. The business-supported 
Municipal Research Bureau and Downtown St. Paul, Inc. worked 
actively to keep the city's budget low. The result by the 1950s was a 
comfortable system that provided minimal services at a low tax rate. 
St. Paul property tax rates were the lowest in the metropolitan area, and 
people got what they paid for. Dramatic change was quite unlikely in 
such a system. 
Planning in St. Paul paralleled that in Minneapolis. In contrast 
to their usual obstruction of most public expenditures, local business-
men had favored improvements to the Capitol area. It was the City Club 
that in 1903 invited Cass Gilbert to submit a plan to rejuvenate the 
Capitol approach area, and business leaders continued to boost the 
Capitol project. Later, in 1911, the City Club secured a brief city plan 
from the noted planner John Nolen, but failed to get the commission to 
adopt it (Phelps 1980). In 1914, after further business and civic 
agitation, the commission created the St. Paul City Planning Board. 
The first Plan of Saint Paul, developed by another prominent planner, 
Edward H. Bennett, was adopted by the commission in 1922. The 
board, filled mostly by business leaders in its early decades, has 
continued to exist. Throughout the 1920s, 1930s, and most of the 
1940s, the planning staff consisted of one man: City Planning Engineer 
George Herrold, who worked in the Department of Public Works. In 
the 1920s and 1930s an informal business-backed group, the United 
Improvement Council, was closely involved in the city's public works 
program. 
After 1947 and the passage of state renewal legislation, interest 
in planning grew in St. Paul government. David Loeks was hired as a 
r 
planner, and by 1950 was director of the City Planning Board. George 
Herrold, the long•time city planner, more than eighty years old at the 
. e was nudged aside. Although Herrold may have been willing to t,rn , 
retire, some claim that he was forced out (Altshuler 1965). He did 
continue to publish in planning journals for several more years. During 
the early 1950s the budget and importance of planning in St. Paul grew 
significantly. Leeks cultivated elected officials, and secured a new 
comprehensive city plan. 
The two independent St. Paul agencies concerned with renewal 
had quite different images and constituencies in the 1950s. The H RA 
aggressively promoted public housing and open occupancy, which 
made many business people suspicious of and hostile toward the HRA. 
This hostility flared during the lawsuits over the Western Redevelop-
ment project. The PA, which acquired redevelopment powers in 1957, 
always had better relations with the business community. The PA was 
involved in industrial development, not in controversial social programs, 
and helped reduce the risk of private investment in St. Paul. Typically, 
the PA's board members and executive director were businessmen. 
EARLY PLANS 
Downtown improvement efforts in both cities were sporadic, at 
best, through the first half of the twentieth century. There was a 
constituency for improvement throughout this period, usually led by 
some progressive business group like the Minneapolis Civic Commis~ 
sion. Such groups in both cities raised money before World War I to 
commission plans for rebuilding both cities. These plans, like many 
others of the time, proposed a multitude of improvements, and not just 
for the downtown areas. The Plan of Minneapolis (Bennett 1917) and 
the Plan of St. Paul (Bennett and Parsons 1922) both depicted major 
corrections for the problems of the two cities. The problems addressed 
in these plans included poorly designed and difficult traffic patterns 
(especially around the downtowns) and the need to revitalize the 
centers of the two cities by constructing monumental civic structures. 
The two plans owe much of their inspiration and their proposals 
to the massive reshaping of Paris accomplished by Baron Hausmann 
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during the 1850s and 1860s. His success at chopping through 
densely built-up areas of Paris to create broad boulevards and grand 
vistas inspired many early city planners in the United States. Planners 
all over the country began to reshape their own cities in their heads, if 
not on the actual landscape. Because planners were all responding to 
uniform influences, today early twentieth-century Beaux Arts civic struc-
tures are found in cities across the country. St. Paul's Union Depot and 
the departed Burlington Northern Depot in Minneapolis were both part 
of this trend, as was the 191 O Minneapolis Post Office building (still 
standing across from the abandoned Milwaukee Depot). 
Yet another plan for redeveloping downtown Minneapolis 
emerged in the late 1940s. The Civic Center Development Association 
(CCDA) had been formed in the late 1930s specifically to promote the 
redevelopment of the Lower Loop. Robert Cerny, a local architect, was 
the executive secretary of this group. In the late 1940s he proposed a 
plan to construct major public buildings and surround them with large 
open spaces - a civic center of sorts - in the Lower Loop. 
In some ways it was almost ludicrous for officials in places like 
the Twin Cities - cities that were less than a century old -to consider 
rebuilding. That redevelopment plans such as the ones for Minneapolis 
and St. Paul were funded by private businessmen, who then worked 
hard to try to implement them (though with limited success), indicates 
something of the "progressive" nature of the early twentieth century. 
For contemporary urbanites, one quite illuminating aspect of American 
cities at this time is that private interests were in the forefront of civic 
improvements efforts. This was true in Minneapolis until 1934 when a 
violent truckers' strike ended the open-shop tradition in the city, and 
businessmen withdrew from city politics (Walker 1937). They would 
not reemerge as a development force for another twenty years. 
If the city governments were cool to the idea of downtown 
renewal in the early part of the twentieth century, labor interests were 
positively opposed. By the early 1920s the economic bases of Minne-
apolis and St. Paul were already beginning to evolve away from 
agricultural processing and toward financial work and information 
_processing, a transition that took another half century to complete. The 
,umber industry, for example, had completely disappeared from the 
Minneapolis waterfront by 1920, and the fur trading industry had long 
since fled downtown St. Paul. Downtown plans for civic plazas, impres-
sive governmental buildings, and broad avenues were, in part, a turning 
away from the origins of both cities. Labor organizations were aware 
of the loss of jobs and changing nature of the job market, and they 
opposed any plans that would intensify this process. 
The transition away from manufacturing (in Minneapolis) and 
wholesaling (in St. Paul), and toward creating a "corporate city" image 
for both, greatly accelerated after the Depression and World War II. 
The postwar downtowns were cramped and looked worn. With a few 
exceptions (the Minneapolis Post Office and St. Paul's City Hall), almost 
nothing new had been built in either downtown since the late 1920s. 
Clearly, if the Twin Cities were going to appear modern and progres-
sive, major changes needed to occur. A new landscape for both 
downtowns-a completely new physical landscape-was in order. 
Downtown renewal goals were different from those strictly 
associated with slum clearance. The primary focus was not on better 
housing or an improved social climate, but on economic redevelop-
ment. Creating a corporate city required new, modern buildings to 
serve the needs of financial institutions and the emerging information 
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A portion of the Gateway 
area in the late 1950s. 
The strong 19th century 
character of the buildings is 
evident. This view is from 
Third Avenue South looking 
toward the Post Office; 
Marquette Avenue is the 
street running through the 
center. Most of these 
blocks are now devoted to 
high-rise apartments (the 
Towers and the Churchill) 
and to office buildings 
(Northwestern National Life 
and Washington Square). 
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The Gateway project in 
1960. 
The heavy black line marks 
the boundaries of the 
Gateway project. The new 
public library had been 
built, the Metropolitan 
Building was still standing, 
and little clearance had 
taken place. The large 
cleared parcel across from 
the Post Office 
(foreground) was the site of 
Janney-Semple-Hill, a large 
hardware wholesaler. 
industries. Planners argued that if downtown Minneapolis and St. Paul 
had to be completely rebuilt to accommodate these new functions, then 
that is what would be done. 
THE GATEWAY PROJECT 
City planners assumed that the Gateway area, the old core of 
downtown Minneapolis, would qualify for federal urban renewal assis-
tance when they proposed clearing and reconstructing about one-third 
of the entire downtown in the mid-1950s. Beginning in 1956, federal 
renewal officials raised serious questions about the size of the project: 
was what was proposed too big for the local real estate market? In 
1957 a group of civic and government leaders, led by Mayor P.K. 
Peterson, went to Washington, D.C. to convince federal renewal 
officials that Minneapolis needed a project this size. They were suc-
cessful, and returned with a commitment for the money (Naftalin 1970). 
Not everyone found favor with the proposed redevelopment 
however. Several owners of condemned property tried to stop the 
Gateway plan. They sued the HRA, claiming that the condemnation 
action was "arbitrary and unreasonable." They also challenged the 
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legality of the overall development plan. The owners did not win any of 
these suits, nor did the preservationists who sued to stop the destruc-
tion of the Metropolitan Building (formerly the Guaranty Life Building). 
This last suit made it as far as the Minnesota Supreme Court, which 
upheld the HRA's right to condemn the Metropolitan Building. This 
decision essentially reaffirmed the "greater good" argument about 
eminent domain (Buildings 1961 b). 
The case of the Metropolitan Building was perhaps the most 
difficult one in all of the Gateway planning. The building, designed by 
E. Townsend Mix, was built between 1888 and 1890 and was, at the 
time, the tallest skyscraper west of Chicago. It was universally lauded 
by architects who visited Minneapolis as one of the most exciting 
architectural spaces in the country. The Metropolitan Building had a 
twelve-story interior atrium topped by a glass roof, glass-floored bal-
conies with iron filigree railings, openwork iron elevator shafts, and a 
rooftop terrace. 
The Metropolitan 
Building, 1959. 
Designed by E. Townsend 
Mix, and originally called 
the Guaranty Life Building, 
this landmark was 
completed in 1890 and 
was for decades the tallest 
building between Chicago 
and the west coast. 
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Map s. Minneapolis 
Downtown 
Redevelopment 
1 Post Office 
2 Towers 
3 NW Nat'I Life 
4 Old Federal Court House 
5 Nicollet Hotel 
6 Federal Reserve Bank 
7 Public Library 
8 Sheraton Hotel 
9 City Hall 
10 Orchestra Hall 
11 Loring Park Proiects 
Preservationists argued that the building was an architectural 
treasure and important to the city's heritage. The city building inspector 
contended that the level of maintenance required to bring the building 
up to code was prohibitively expensive; as much as $600,000 was 
needed to replace the plumbing, the heating plant, and the elevators. 
The fire marshal! added to the list of problems with numerous fire code 
violations, including the need to enclose the stairways and elevators as 
well as the atrium (Palmer 1961). The HRA contended that the entire 
Gateway project would be jeopardized if the Metropolitan Building was 
retained, and that a company like Sheraton would not build a new hotel 
on a site across from such an outdated building as the Metropolitan. 
I lr;, 
s, 
Pre-1970 Renewal 
1970-1977 Redevelopment 
1977-1984 Redevelopment 
--Gateway Project 
r,e supreme Court agreed with this view, saying that the Metropolitan 
' Building would have an unfavorable effect on the value of surrounding 
property and lessen the amount of tax generated by the entire area. 
The building was finally torn down in 1962, after the condemned 
property owners' and preservationists' four-year effort to save it. Given 
the preservation activities of the past decade, there is little doubt that 
the Metropolitan Building would have become a Minneapolis landmark 
if it had only been left alone for another ten years. 
By the early 1960s clearance was well underway as the old core 
of downtown Minneapolis was emptied out (see Map 5). The 
redevelopment was coordinated by the HRA, with the federal Urban 
Renewal Administration paying more than three-fourths of the $18 
million renewal cost (primarily for clearance). By spring 1963 more than 
$60 million worth of new construction was either committed or com-
pleted. Existing contracts indicated that $80 million would have been 
invested within eight years of the start of the project (Minneapolis HRA 
1962a). The Knutson Company, a local contractor, was selected by 
the H RA as primary developer for the Gateway project. Knutson 
contracted with the HRA to buy and develop thirty-four of the thirty-
seven acres available for private development by 1971. The company 
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The Gateway project in 
1962. 
Demolition and clearance 
in the Gateway area was 
nearly completed. One 
block to the left of the bank 
sign are the first story 
remains of the 
Metropolitan Building; on 
the block opposite the 
sign, the Sheraton Hotel 
was being built. 
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On the left is the new 
public library. The tall 
buildings in the next 
block would soon be 
demolished to make way 
tor the Sheraton Hotel. 
agreed to submit plans and specifications for each new building to the 
HRA before construction. 
The roster of investments made as part of the Gateway project 
included both public and private entities. Public agencies spent about 
$19 million on new structures for the Minneapolis Public Library, the 
Public Health Center, the State Employment Security Office, and a new 
federal courthouse. Private investment included: $12 million for North-
ern States Power's new office and downtown substation; $1.5 million 
for the Pure Food and Drug building that was owned by a private 
construction company; Northwestern National Life Insurance's $6.5 
million home office; a $2.5 million office building built by the Knutson 
Company and leased to IBM; the $11 million Sheraton Center hotel and 
parking ramp; and the two Towers buildings containing 500 apartment 
units (another 1,000 units in four more tower buildings were proposed, 
but not built). There were also plans for a project called Scandia, which 
was to be the "open square commercial complex" that was number 
three on the list of Gateway goals (Minneapolis HRA 1965). 
By early 1965 the last of 180 buildings in the Lower Loop had 
been cleared. City officials were pleased with the transition underway, 
although the HRA had difficulty selling cleared land after.the initial burst 
of activity in the early 1960s. Instead, the HRA used much of this land 
for parking lots through the mid-1970s and derived substantial income 
in this way. Gateway renewal was essentially suspended in the late 
1960s; only a couple of senior citizens' high rises would be built in the 
next decade. The Lower Loop area had paid $390,000 in real estate 
taxes in 1958. Estimates were that it would pay $1.8 million per year 
when completed, and even with only one-quarter of the project com-
pleted in 1964, Gateway was already generating more than the 1958 
figure. Renewal activity in Gateway would not pick up speed again until 
the late 1970s, when other sources of funding would have to be used. 
By then, more than 1,000 units of housing had been constructed along 
with a great deal of new commercial and office space. But by the 
mid-1960s the primary goal of the Gateway project had been ac-
complished: a skid row slum had been erased, and a major part of 
downtown Minneapolis was being reclaimed. 
The Gateway project was billed at the time as the nation's largest 
downtown development project (Buildings 1961a). It was so large that 
nothing about it was simple - including the task of relocating the 
In the Gateway, 
1963. 
The Sheraton Hotel was 
one of the earliest new 
projects. 
DOWNTOWN RENEWAL 
66 
population and businesses of nearly half of downtown Minneapolis. As 
the property owners' lawsuits indicated, not everyone was pleased with 
the prospect of relocation. Before renewal began there had been 454 
different businesses in the project area. These ranged in size from 
individual service operations to a huge wholesale hardware estab-
lishment that occupied 720,000 square feet. Functionally, they ranged 
from lodging houses and liquor stores to offices, wholesale distributors, 
and light industrial enterprises. 
When the court cases were decided, everyone had to leave 
whether they wanted to or not. The H RA was obligated to reimburse 
building owners at fair-market value, and they further assisted Lower 
Loop businesses with $815,000 in relocation claims (Minneapolis HRA 
1962a). When the process was completed, 73 percent of all Lower 
Loop businesses had relocated within the city limits. Some businesses 
were liquidated as soon as they were acquired by the HRA (27 percent 
fell into this category). More than 50 percent of the businesses in this 
group were the "institutions" of skid row: the lodging houses, missions, 
secondhand stores, and pawnshops that had lost their clientele. 
Another 28 percent of the businesses ceased because the owners felt 
too old to begin again -these were primarily small services like one-
man barbershops and tailor shops. Almost 1 O percent of the Lower 
Loop businesses- mostly bars and liquor stores -stopped operating 
because they lost their licenses (Minneapolis HRA 1963b). 
If the process of moving more than 300 businesses was a 
challenge, relocating Lower Loop residents proved even more difficult. 
The permanent population of this area before the redevelopment was 
2,427, and nearly 600 voluntarily relocated before the acquisition. The 
remaining 1,839 Gateway residents were mostly single, elderly men; 24 
percent were foreign-born and only 4 percent were either black, 
American Indian, or Oriental. A miniscule 75 persons were members 
of families and the other 1,764 were unattached individuals, only 40 of 
whom were female (Minneapolis HRA 1963b). Most of those relocated 
from Gateway did not move far away. More than 65 percent moved 
elsewhere in the downtown, to the Linden-Hawthorne area, to near-
south Minneapolis, or to the Nicollet Island-East Hennepin Avenue 
neighborhood. Many of the rest went to Seven Corners (Cedar-
Riverside) or to the area around Nicollet and Franklin avenues. 
Many of the old men had lived in the Gateway part of downtown 
for four to six decades, and many were alcoholics. When the relocation 
was completed, the quality of housing for this group had greatly 
improved. More than 70 percent of these men had moved to private 
rental housing (sleeping rooms and housekeeping rooms). Another 9 
percent were placed in institutions of some kind. The renewal of 
Gateway effectively eliminated "cage 11 sleeping accommodations in the 
city of Minneapolis. Although their housing situations were better, not 
all former Gateway residents were pleased with their new surroundings. 
Relocation workers told of men who tried to return to their former 
abodes and of others who missed the services provided in the area, 
especially the inexpensive restaurants (Minneapolis HRA 1963b). 
In retrospect, Gateway's renewal must be viewed as a bold 
planning effort on the part of Minneapolis. It was by any measure a 
massive project for the size of the city. Some might argue now that a 
project of this scale was not necessary, especially given the tendency 
in the past decade to preserve older parts of the city. There were 
buildings worth preserving in the Gateway area-the Metropolitan 
Building was not the only one. Today different decisions might be 
made. In Seattle, for example, the old skid row has been rehabilitated 
into Pioneer Square, and is a major tourist attraction. Perhaps the same 
thing could have been done in Minneapolis. At the time, however, no 
one thought that was a likely possibility. 
One can argue now that Gateway was too big and removed too 
much of the old city fabric. But this begs the question of whether 
downtown Minneapolis could have remained viable absent a major 
project of this kind. Planners at the time did not foresee that the city 
would lose 150,000 people between 1950 and 1980. Hindsight cannot 
tell us whether downtown Minneapolis could have been maintained 
through some other means. Certainly it would be a very different kind 
of city without the stimulation provided by the Gateway redevelopment. 
Together with the Nicollet Mall in the mid-1960s, the Gateway project 
helped to generate a progressive reputation for Minneapolis. In 
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A portion of the 
Gateway project in 1963. 
By this time the Federal 
Courts Building 
(foreground) had been 
built along with the IBM 
Building just opposite it 
(now razed). On the 
block to the left of the 
Federal Building is the 
Sheraton Hotel (now 
closed and about to be 
redeveloped) and a new 
parking ramp. The public 
library is to the left of 
these. 
national planning circles especially, Minneapolis became known as a 
city willing to take big risks (Aschman 1971 ). Some might even argue 
that this willingness to innovate has proved attractive to the business 
community. Minneapolis now has a 11corporate city 11 image; to a large 
degree this image is due to changes begun with Gateway's transfor-
mation. 
Gateway was not an unqualified success. It was, by any mea-
sure, a very slow project. In the early 1970s much of the cleared land 
was still vacant, used only for parking lots; many observers wondered 
if this situation would ever change. The clearance effort in Gateway 
had been zealous and too rapid for the market to absorb. The rebuild-
ing process, after the first flurry of structures in the 1960s, stopped 
almost completely until the boom of the late 1970s. In the intervening-
years the hanging slab of the Federal Reserve Bank- architecturally 
the most daring and interesting building in the Gateway project area-
was the only new addition. What came later, as the project area finally 
filled up after twenty-five years, were a group of fairly undistinguished 
office towers and some high rise residential structures ranging from 
luxury rental units to subsidized units for the elderly. 
Interestingly, the lessons of Gateway, regarding both the 
problems of clearing and rebuilding, were not lasting. Minneapolis 
would repeat these lessons in the mid-1970s when the revitalization 
urge struck at the opposite end of downtown. The Loring Park project 
was not urban renewal in its traditional form, but its experiences would 
be strikingly similar to those of Gateway. 
CAPITOL CENTRE 
In the 1950s downtown St. Paul was clearly in trouble. Most 
downtown buildings dated from the 1880s. The building boom of the 
1920s had affected St. Paul much less than Minneapolis; relatively few 
1920s or newer buildings existed, and those that did were scattered 
throughout the central business district. Most block fronts were 
dominated visually by nineteenth-century buildings, so downtown 
looked old, especially since many of the older buildings had not been 
well maintained. 
Moreover, the political and business leadership seemed unable 
to reverse the city's decline. Efforts to promote redevelopment typically 
dissolved into bickering among government, business, and labor 
leaders. In 1958 the St. Paul City Planning Board issued a study, Saint 
Paul's Central Business District, that documented the situation and 
called for action. The study covered 106 city blocks, roughly the area 
bounded by the rail yards on the east, the yet-to-be-built freeway on 
the north, the foot of Ramsey Hill, and the curve of Kellogg Boulevard 
on the west and south. The board's field survey rated 64 percent of 
the building facades in this area as 11poor 11 or "very poor" in appearance. 
Downtown's problems were not just superficial. Many of the 
older buildings were only two, three, or four stories high -low-intensity 
use for the city core - and were often vacant or underused in their upper 
floors. More than one million square feet of the central business district 
were vacant (8 percent of the total). Industrial, wholesale, and residen-
tial uses occupied 27 percent of the total land, and these were uses 
that planners considered inappropriate for a central business district. 
Downtown retailing had been declining steadily; from 1948 to 1954 
more than $15 million in annual sales had been lost downtown (St. Paul 
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Downtown St. Paul and 
the West Side, circa 1950. 
Between the two bridges on 
the downtown side lies 
most of the land that would 
become the Capitol Centre 
project in the 1960s. The 
West Side contains many 
obsolete industrial buildings 
as well as some housing. 
City Planning Board 1958). 
Worst of all, downtown St. Paul's assessed values were drop-
ping. Taking inflation into account, downtown's total value declined by 
more than 50 percent from 1930 to 1956. Only six of the thirty-three 
blocks in the financial and retail core of the city were valued higher than 
they had been in 1930. An important part of the city government's tax 
base was eroding, and large private investments were threatened by 
the decline of downtown. An especially trying problem was the "hole 
in the doughnut, 11 a four-block-area bounded by Wabasha, Minnesota, 
5th and 7th streets, that was moribund (see Map 6). The life of 
downtown formed 11a circular movement around this ... void, 11 according 
to the City Planning Board. This problem area was in the heart of the 
city, a constant, visible reminder of the sad state of St. Paul's business 
district (St. Paul City Planning Board 1958). 
The Planning Board's proposal contained a number of elements: 
• Rationalize land use: Establish group-compatible land uses; 
eliminate incompatible uses; concentrate the sprawling retail 
area along 7th Street. 
r 
T 
Pre-1977 Renewal 
1977-1986 
Redevelopment 
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• Open up downtown visually: Reduce building coverage on 
blocks; increase density with building height; provide open 
space. 
• Improve circulation: Improve vehicular access to downtown; 
make routes into downtown more attractive; improve 
parking; remove surface parking from the core; rationalize 
vehicular circulation; separate vehicular and pedestrian 
circulation. 
• Specific areas: Redevelop the 11hole in the doughnut;" 
preserve Kellogg Boulevard (Wieland 1962). 
Change began in 1960 when George Vavoulis was elected 
mayor of St. Paul. Vavoulis was the first Republican mayor of the city 
in several decades. A downtown florist businessman, he managed to 
stir the business and labor leaders and government agencies of the city 
to take action and, more importantly, to cooperate. The most visible 
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4 Town Square Park 
5 Minnesota Mutual Life 
6 Ordway Music Theatre 
7 Rice Park 
8 Norwest Center 
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11 Mears Park 
12 Pioneer 
13 Endicott 
14 Lowertown 
1 5 Radisson Hotel 
16 Kellogg Square 
iii 17 Federal Courts 
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Map 6. St. Paul 
Downtown 
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vehicle of the new cooperation was the Metropolitan Improvements 
Committee (MIC), formed in 1961. The MIC was a volunteer, private 
group including prominent leaders from both labor and business. Philip 
Nason, president of the First National Bank, was the first MIC president, 
and probably the most influential member. Richard Radman was the 
most prominent labor leader. The MIC included an unusual number of 
corporate decision makers, men who were able to make commitments 
to redeveloping downtown. The MIC hired Robert Van Hoef, a planner 
from Michigan, as it's executive director. Together, Nason, Radman, 
Vah Hoef, and the MIC spearheaded successful downtown renewal in 
St. Paul (Metropolitan Improvements Committee 1962). 
Despite philosophical reservations about government interven-
tion into private property rights, the MIC saw the need to accept local 
government assistance and federal aid; downtown needed help and, 
plainly, could not be renewed privately. Mayor Vavoulis also made 
significant changes to the HRA board. As vacancies occurred, he filled 
the seats with commissioners who were more interested in economic 
redevelopment. The earlier strong HRA focus on public housing was 
tempered. In 1962 the state legislature approved the sale of city bonds 
for downtown redevelopment and added two city council members to 
the HRA board, strengthening the tie between the HRA and city 
government (Greenman 1984; Hesterman 1985). 
From 1949 to 1960 St. Paul had been unable to do anything 
about its decaying downtown, despite acknowledging the need to do 
so. Within the space of three years of George Vavoulis's term as mayor, 
the elements needed for instituting improvements had come together: 
the HRA was more attuned to economic redevelopment, the various 
arms of government were cooperating more closely, and a phalanx of 
business and labor leaders stood ready to fight together for a revitalized 
downtown. The MIC hired a group of local architects to formulate a 
plan for downtown St. Paul in 1961. In 1962 the plan was released to 
the public; it became the basis of the official HRA plan, the Capitol 
Centre project (Van Hoef 1962). 
The planning philosophy of Capitol Centre was to create a strong 
core in downtown, and to build outward from it. Capitol Centre was an 
r 
I downtown project in two ways. Unlike Minneapolis' Gateway unusua 
. t and most downtown renewal projects of the period, the Capitol 
proJeC 
centre project area was at the core of the downtown, rather than on 
f •nge capitol Centre included the city's financial and retail heart. the n · 
secondly, the project was compact, especially when compared to 
sprawling Gateway. It comprised only ninety-five parcels of land on 
twelve city blocks. Most of Capitol Centre's twelve blocks would be 
cleared and rebuilt (see Table 1 ). A few landmark buildings, notably 
the Pioneer and the Endicott, were saved. Several structures that 
would later have been considered architectural gems were razed: the 
Guardian Life and Manhattan buildings. 
The principles of the Capitol Centre plan emphasized flexibility 
and echoed the City Planning Board's recommendations for the whole 
of downtown. The primary intention was to eliminate the jumbled land 
uses that were blighting the area, and rebuild at a higher density for 
financial and commercial use. The retail corridor along 7th Street was 
to be reinforced. The cramped, nineteenth-century feeling of the old 
downtown was to be banished through increased open space, plazas 
and courtyards, and building setbacks. 
Block 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
J 
K 
L 
Intended Reuse 
retail or commercial 
retail or commercial 
retail or commercial 
retail or commercial 
retail or commercial 
retail or commercial 
retail or commercial 
commercial 
commercial 
residential 
commercial 
commercial 
Actual Reuse 
(c - commercial: r- retail) 
Town Square/Radisson (r/c) 
Twin City Federal (c/r) 
Minnesota Mutual Life (c) 
Economics Laboratory, Northern Federal (c) 
Northwestern Nat'I Bank, Skyway Bldg. (c/r) 
American National Bank (c) 
Farm Credit Bank State Employment Service (c) 
First National Bank expansion (c) 
Jackson Ramp (parking) 
Kellogg Square Apts., YWCA (resident/service) 
Federal Courts (public) 
development now in progress 
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Table 1. Reuse Plan for 
Capitol Centre 
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The plan, complete with several design innovations, called for a 
middle-class housing development smack in the heart of downtown, 
not on the fringe as in most downtown renewal (the Towers in Minne-
apolis, for example). Capitol Centre also included an ambitious plan 
for enclosed pedestrian movement through and between buildings. 
The first skyway in the Twin Cities was built as part of Capitol Centre in 
1966, connecting the Federal Courts Building and the Endicott building. 
The skyways are all owned by the city, enabling St. Paul to enforce 
design standards and accessibility. 
Renewal in downtown St. Paul functioned as it did in other cities. 
The HRA was the local agency that did the planning, received federal 
grants, acquired land through negotiation or condemnation, sold the 
cleared land to developers, and enforced compliance with the plan; the 
city government made the public improvements; and the MIC found 
companies to build on the cleared land. Often, decision makers of firms 
that built in Capitol Centre were MIC members, and major developers 
were committed even before proposals were advanced. Before Capitol 
Centre got underway, two supporting developments just outside the 
project boundaries were built. Dayton's bought up an entire block of 
the "hole in the doughnut" and built a new department store, and the 
St. Paul Hilton Hotel (now the old Radisson) was built at Kellogg 
Boulevard and Wabasha Street. The first commitment within the project 
was from the federal government. In 1961 the General Services Ad-
ministration agreed to erect a new federal courts building on Robert 
Street between Kellogg Boulevard and 4th Street. 
The Capitol Centre project was successful in at least two ways. 
First, the project area was redeveloped in a manner approximating the 
plan, although it took longer than was first supposed. The planned 
concentration of retail uses along 7th Street failed. Instead, retail uses 
have spread throughout the downtown, and most commercial buildings 
have a~ least some retail space, especially on the skyway level. Many 
of the cleared blocks were rebuilt fairly quickly, and only one remains 
underused today. After more than twenty years, Block L (bound by 
Kellogg Boulevard, and Jackson, 4th and Sibley streets) is finally being 
developed. Construction on the first phase, a large municipal parking 
r 
ramp, began in early 1987. An office tower for the local public television 
station will be added later, and uncertain long-range plans include a 
hotel. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the Capitol Centre 
project gave downtown St. Paul a strong economic core and a strong 
social/physical base for continued revitalization. By 1966 property tax 
revenues had increased by $6 million (St. Paul HRA 1972). The project 
demonstrated that government-aided redevelopment, in partnership 
with the business community, could succeed in improving downtown. 
It showed what could be accomplished by diverse interests working 
together with a lot of public and private investment. The public agencies 
have continued to work for downtown redevelopment, and the MIC 
(which in 1979 changed its name to Operation '85) has continued to 
lobby business and government. The revitalization of downtown St. 
Paul has spread east into Lowertown, west into the Rice Park-Civic 
Center area, and north into the Science Museum-St. Joseph's Hospi-
tal area. The Capitol Centre project established a strong core from 
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St. Paul's Lowertown 
area, 1984. 
Similar in some ways to the 
Bridge Square area that 
was cleared in 
Minneapolis, this section 
of downtown St. Paul 
survived some battles over 
clearance to become a 
restored residential and 
entertainment district. 
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which the renewal of downtown has spread as planned. 
The project's public costs totaled $29.9 million, $19.9 million of 
which was federally provided. The Capitol Centre project area was not 
vacant before renewal, of course, and people and businesses were 
displaced. Unlike the Gateway area, the Capitol Centre area did not 
house many residents: a total of 12 families and 126 individuals were 
displaced (St. Paul Ctiy Planning Board 1968b). As in Gateway, all of 
these people were poor. Many of the businesses in Capitol Centre that 
were displaced were probably never reestablished. The conditions in 
the project area meant that rents and taxes were low, so that marginal 
businesses could stay afloat. It was hard to find similar conditions 
elsewhere in the city. Certainly, those businesses purchased by the 
HRA were fortunate. The building owners received a fair price for 
property that had only a limited market otherwise. 
The Capitol Centre project was architecturally a product of its 
times, but today the redevelopment does not always find an apprecia-
tive audience. Recently Larry Millet, the architectural critic of the 
Pioneer Press-Dispatch, included six Capitol Centre structures on his 
list of the ten ugliest buildings in downtown St. Paul, quite an accom-
plishment for only twelve blocks (St. Paul Pioneer Press-Dispatch 
1985). The six buildings included the Holiday Inn Town Square ("late 
modern dreck"), Kellogg Square ("bland and banal"), Minnesota Mutual 
Life ("a corporate fortress, aloof and insulated from the life of the city"), 
Northern Federal ("simply boring 11 ), Norwest Crossing (a "glorified 
parking ramp 11 ), and Town Square ("the anonymous shopping center 
architecture of the 1960s"). 
Though Capitol Centre was an important first step for downtown 
renewal in St. Paul, the initiative was short-run. By the mid-1970s 
downtown faced troubles again. The original Capitol Centre project 
was replaced by a larger Neighborhood Development Program (NDP) 
project- the Central Core - and then became Development District# 1, 
one of the Twin Cities' early tax increment financing efforts (St. Paul 
PED 1985). Throughout these changes development remained stag-
nant, failing to produce enough new growth to pay off the public debt. 
But downtown St. Paul managed not to relapse into the inertia 
r 
T 
of the 1950s, and a series of interconnected events finally produced a 
dramatic turnaround in the late 1970s and early 1980s. First, a new city 
charter, effective in 1972, streamlined the municipal government and 
created the potential for strong leadership from the mayor. Second, 
the end of project renewal in 197 4 began a new era in development 
finance, making creative solutions by city officials possible and, per-
haps, necessary. Third, the election of George Latimer in 1976, and 
his continuous re-elections, gave the city a strong mayor to wield the 
power implicit in the new charter. Latimer has proven immensely 
successful at mobilizing city government and business interests to 
rebuild downtown St. Paul. Lastly, the creation of the Department of 
Planning and Economic Development (PED) in 1978 combined and 
reorganized several disparate agencies. Formerly, planning and 
development activities were fragmented, with the City Planning Board, 
the Community Development Agency, and the HRA all playing a role. 
PED finally gave St. Paul a coordinated, efficient, and creative develop-
ment agency. By the late 1970s, with a vigorous development agency, 
firm business support, and an influential leader, downtown St. Paul was 
poised to take advantage of all prospects for growth. 
NEW TOOLS 
In 1972, through a moratorium, President Richard Nixon ended 
project-based renewal and the construction of public housing for 
families, although projects that were already approved were completed. 
It was soon clear that new approaches to redevelopment, and espe-
cially new financial tools, had to be devised. When the moratorium 
finally ended, federal aid resumed, but in a changed form. As part of 
the doctrine of reducing federal control over local government, aid was 
no longer tied to particular, spatially defined projects. A wide variety of 
federal loan and grant programs have been tried over the years to 
stimulate housing rehabilitation and to spur further revitalization. 
In the years since the end of project-based urban renewal, the 
Twin Cities have both adapted to their changed circumstances. They 
have grown sophisticated in using new financial tools, devised citizen 
participation structures that bring significant numbers of residents into 
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the decision-making process, and streamlined the structure of the 
agencies that do the work of redevelopment. 
Community Development Block Grants 
Begun in 1974, the CDBG program replaced project-based 
renewal of the 1950s and 1960s. The federal government transfers 
money to city (and county) governments, but with far fewer restrictions 
than under previous urban renewal programs, and with far less monitor-
ing than under project renewal. CDBG money must be used primarily 
to benefit low- and moderate-income people and to prevent blight. 
This program gives cities greater redevelopment flexibility, but it also 
effectively erodes the role of comprehensive planning in city redevelop-
ment. 
CDBG money has been used in various ways, sometimes con-
centrated in census tracts with enough people to meet the income 
guidelines, sometimes to benefit poor people city-wide. CDBG money 
is entitlement money; cities do not have to compete for grants but 
instead are allocated amounts determined by population and poverty 
levels. Allocations of CDBG funds have declined steadily under the 
Reagan administration, which wishes to eliminate the program totally. 
Urban Development Action Grants 
Another federal urban program, UDAG, was begun in 1977. The 
UDAG program is not based on entitlement, but on competition. HUD 
awards grants to cities with the most promising proposals. The idea 
was that a small amount of federal money could be used to foster 
iminative solutions to urban problems. If a project worked in one city 
with federal subsidy, the idea could be adopted in other cities without 
federal aid. 
From a federal perspective the program had a serious flaw. The 
money tended to go to cities with the best development staffs and not 
to cities with the worst urban problems. Both Minneapolis and St. Paul 
did well under the UDAG program until Congress discovered that 
money was not going to the most distressed cities. Since 1982 the 
rules have been changed to give preference to the most needy cities 
r 
Tnd UDAG awards to St. Paul and Minneapolis have declined. 
i 
Both cities will continue to benefit from the earlier years, how-
ever. The UDAG awards went to the agencies, not to the private 
developers who actually did the projects. The developers were loaned 
the UDAG money, which must be repaid. Both cities have set up UDAG 
repayment pools that will represent significant income streams which 
can be used for future development. 
Revenue Bonds 
The variety and use of /oca/financial tools dramatically increased 
beginning in the early 1970s. Revenue bonds had been used 
throughout the renewal process to raise funds for the local share of 
project expenses. Since 197 4 the amount of indebtedness in St. Paul 
and Minneapolis has increased tremendously. The Industrial Develop-
ment Revenue Bond (IDRB) and the Housing Revenue Bond (HRB) are 
issued by a governmental unit and sold to investors who benefit from 
the tax exemption of the interest paid on their investment. The 
proceeds of the bond sale are used by a private developer to complete 
a development or housing project. The developer repays the principal 
and interest from the project's profits. tax increment financing works 
somewhat differently. Bonds are sold by the government unit and are 
tax exempt, but are tied to a defined geographic area rather than a 
specific project. The interest and principal payments are made from 
the increased tax revenue generated in the project area. State legisla-
tion during the late 1960s and 1970s gradually expanded the authority 
of Minnesota cities to engage in the new forms of development finance. 
Revenue bonds are tied to individual, privately developed 
projects. The bonds are sold by state or local governments and the 
proceeds (minus fees) are loaned to the private developer. The buyers 
of the bonds are repaid by the revenue from the developer's project 
(hence the name). Unlike general obl-igation bonds that local govern-
ments sell to raise money for their own projects, Industrial Revenue 
Bonds (I RBs) are not backed by the "full faith and credit" of the issuing 
government. This means that the taxpayers are not responsible for any 
default (Minnesota House of Representatives' Research Department 
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1978). As a practical matter, the issuing agencies are concerned about 
defaults because their bond ratings, and therefore their ability to sell 
bonds in the future, would be affected. When private developers 
default, and a few have in the Twin Cities, the public agency involved 
usually salvages the project. Bond holders are still paid. 
Although often thought of as tied to industrial development, 
bonds are used today for commercial, housing, and mixed-use 
developments too. Housing revenue bonds, though somewhat more 
complex, have been used heavily in both St. Paul and Minneapolis. 
Often a housing bond will have a social goal added to its basic 
economic development purpose. Developers who receive housing 
revenue bonds are usually required to make some number of the 
dwelling units produced available to low- and moderate-income 
households. 
People buy IRBs to shelter income from taxation, so each bond 
represents lost revenue to the federal and state governments. Because 
of the advantages of sheltering income, buyers are willing to accept a 
lower rate of return on an IRB than they would from a taxable invest-
ment. This interest rate differential allows the developers who receive 
IRB money to borrow at below-market rates. Estimated loss to the 
federal treasury for fiscal 1985 was $9.3 billion; to the Minnesota 
treasury, $77 million (Citizens League 1985). 
The money raised through the sale of I RBs is an indirect subsidy 
from the federal and state governments. The developers who receive 
IRB proceeds and the agency officials who use the bonds as tools tend 
to regard the money as private because it is repaid by the developer. 
The fundamental point, however, is that without the governmental 
subsidy no money would be available. The interest paid to the buyers 
of the bonds is exempt from taxation by the federal government and, if 
the bonds were sold by a Minnesota agency, by the state government 
also. 
In 1984 the U.S. Congress voted to end the tax exemption for 
IRBs at the end of 1988 and placed a cap on the total issued by each 
state in the interim. Minnesota set limits for each issuing agency. 
Congress may change its mind in response to vigorous lobbying by 
r 
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TIF has been controversial in Minnesota for more than a decade, 
and state tax increment legislation has steadily evolved. Use of TIF was 
relatively uncontrolled until 1979 when the legislature passed a major 
tax increment law. The 1979 act was amended in 1980, 1981, 1982, 
and 1985, and county governments and the Citizens League are 
agitating for more amendments. 
In 1985 and 1986 the Minnesota State Auditor, the Citizens 
League, Hennepin County, the Program Evaluation Division of the 
Legislative Auditor, the League of Minnesota Cities, and the Minnesota 
House of Representatives' Research Department all put out major 
research publications on TIF. Major issues these publications ad-
dressed include the following: 
1. The cost of TIF to the state government through increased 
school and local government aids. 
2. The effect on overlapping jurisdictions of tying up assessed-
value in TIDs. 
3. Alleged "abuses" or at least rule bending in the use of 
increments. Some cities, the legislative auditor says, are 
using increments for purposes that violate at least the spirit 
of the 1979 act. 
4. The "but for" questions. A crucial element of the 1979 act 
allows the creation of a TIO only when no development would 
take place "but for" public action. The law leaves the deter-
mination of "but for" up to the creating government unit. 
5. Excessive use. Some critics of Tl F charge that it is risky to 
have too much of a city's assessed value captured by TIOs 
because it reduces fiscal flexibility. Minneapolis' and St. 
Paul's assessed values are near the top of the list in terms of 
total captured value, but are relatively low in percentage. 
Minneapolis has about 8 percent of total value captured by 
Tl Os and St. Paul only about 4 percent. The city of Chanhas-
sen, by comparison, has 17 percent. 
6. Use of excess increments. Sometimes a TIO produces more 
increment than expected, or more than is needed for im-
provements or debt service. Critics say that the only 
T 
municipal officials, but the prospect of life without IRBs depresses many 
city development agencies. 
Tax Increment Finance (TIF) 
Tl F was invented in California in the 1940s, but Minnesota 
municipal governments have adopted the technique wholeheartedly. 
At least 214 Minnesota cities were using TIF in 1985, up from just one 
in 1968 and four in 1974 (Minnesota Legislative Auditor f986). About 
thirty states allowed TIF, but Minnesota municipalities seem to be 
among the most avid users (though good comprehensive statistics do 
not exist). 
The purpose of TIF is the same as that of other development 
tools: to induce private investment by providing public aid. The 
differences are that TIF works in spatially defined areas called tax 
increment districts (TIO) and public expenditures are financed by 
borrowing against future tax receipts. 
The authorizing government unit (usually a city) designates the 
TIO with specific geographic boundaries. For the life of the district 
(which varies from eight to thirty years depending on the purpose of 
the district) all increases in assessed property value and the taxes 
flowing from the increase are dedicated to the TIO. The increase in 
value is termed the increment and is captured by the TID. The captured 
value is not available to any of the jurisdictions that levy taxes on real 
property- municipal government, county government, school district, 
and (in the Twin Cities) metropolitan authorities. These "overlapping" 
jurisdictions receive less tax revenue for the life of the TID. 
The controlling unit of government may or may not issue tax 
increment bonds - bonds that are guaranteed by the tax increment of 
the district. The district's public expenditures may instead be paid from 
other sources -CDBGs, U DAGs, or revenue bonds in most cases. The 
Tl D captures all increased value of the district, not just those that directly 
result from public expenditure. As the assessed values in the Tl D rise 
over the life of the district, the tax increment is devoted to paying for 
public improvements and paying off the principal and interest of any 
public bonds issued. 
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rush of building in America's downtowns in recent years has been 
boosted, in part, by the tax advantages of accelerated depreciation: as 
a result, all taxpayers help to subsidize the construction of these new 
buildings. St. Paul even found a way to overcome restrictions on 
depreciating public facilities -which exist because public agencies do 
not pay income taxes. The city sold its new civic center to a group of 
private investors who could depreciate the facility; the investors then 
leased it back to the city to operate. St. Paul gained a new (and 
significant) income stream; the investors got tax breaks. Everyone was 
pleased, except perhaps the federal government. Historic preservation 
tax credits have worked in a similar way, funneling federal indirect 
subsidy to rehabilitate historic buildings and districts. 
The disadvantage to all of this imaginative activity falls upon the 
federal government. The federal government did not actually withdraw 
its massive aids to urban revitalization. It simply gave up control over 
how much aid it provides, and how and where it is spent. 
Some downtown projects have been subsidized directly by local 
and federal money. Others were helped through planning and land 
assembly. All were assisted by federal tax incentives. The formal 
renewal programs of the 1950s and 1960s provided the foundation and 
impetus for this growth: 
• The local development agencies in both cities have grown 
adept at using available financial tools to spur growth, and 
have aggressively used public bonding authority, TIF 
districts, UDAGs, and tax abatement to leverage private 
investment. 
• Business organizations in both cities have been willing to 
spearhead projects and to foster economic growth in the 
central cities. 
• Public cooperation and support in both cities have remained 
strong. 
• Political leadership, notably from George Latimer in St. Paul, 
has promoted downtown development. 
The Twin Cities' economy has remained healthy, and that health 
has been the primary force behind continued downtown development. 
r 
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legitimate use of this extra money is to retire the district early 
by paying off the debt ahead of schedule. Some cities, 
including Minneapolis, have instead pooled excess incre-
ments to create new development funds. The legislative 
auditor has suggested curtailing this type of activity. 
Tl F is likely to continue as a political issue for some time. It is 
an important tool for cities that have been continually stripped of 
intergovernmental aid since the early 1970s. Affected overlapping 
jurisdictions (notably Hennepin County since Minneapolis is a relatively 
heavy user of TIF) are cautious about TIF because they fear a longpterm 
erosion of the tax base. Cities counter that the benefits of development 
and redevelopment accrue to the county and the schools, but are 
generally subsidized only by city government. TIF is a means of sharing 
the public expense of development among all benefiting local govern-
ments. Some legislators view TIF as a state subsidy whose use is 
controlled by local government and prone to abuse, or at least overuse. 
IMAGINATIVE APPROACHES TO 
DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT 
Changes in urban development methods over the last decade 
have transformed a massive program of direct federal aid into a massive 
array of indirect federal aids. Minneapolis and St. Paul have benefited 
extraordinarily under the new rules. Both cities have efficient, imagina-
tive, and active development agencies which have become quite 
sophisticated about financial matters. The agencies have learned to 
use other people's money- indirect federal and state aid in the case of 
IRBs, and leveraged private investment-to augment local tax resour-
ces and remaining federal aids. Equally important to these agencies' 
success may be the fact that both cities exhibit relatively few economic 
and social problems, and may therefore be more appealing as invest-
ments. 
The driving force behind many of the imaginative techniques is 
federal tax policy. During the early 1980s the amount of depreciation 
allowed on real business and investment property increased dramati-
cally, thereby raising the economic appeal of new construction. The 
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THE LAST DECADE DOWNTOWN 
The downtowns of Minneapolis and St. Paul have experienced 
substantial development ranging from offices to housing since the 
mid-1970s, despite the end of federal project renewal, a deep reces• 
sion, and a general flight of economic activity from the midwest and 
northeast to the sunbelt. To a high degree, the planners' visions of the 
1950s and 1960s have now been realized in the two cities. Recent 
developments have not usually followed the letter of the old plans, or 
even of newer ones, but the ideas of the plans are being realized. Both 
cities have new downtowns - not only new buildings, but new functions. 
The old downtowns of warehouses, light industry, and slum housing 
are gone. The new downtowns have middle- and upper-class residen-
tial developments; expanded professional, managerial, and service 
employment; and some highly successful cultural facilities. Much of 
this growth has been publicly facilitated, though the great majority of 
the investment has been private. 
Some aspects of downtown development in Minneapolis and St. 
Paul have decidedly improved; others have not fared so well. Retailing, 
for example, was present in the old downtowns and it continues today, 
though in a somewhat diminished state. Minneapolis' Nicollet Mall 
generated high hopes for saving downtown retailing in the face of 
competition from suburban malls, and for a time it seemed to work. But 
in recent years, downtown Minneapolis has become more specialized. 
Many stores have acquired an 11up-scale 11 image, and marginal retailers 
located on large project sites have been forced out. At the same time, 
two department stores (Powers and J.C. Penney) have closed since 
1985. Downtown seems to have less to offer to moderate- or low-
income shoppers, who are more likely to use discount stores in any 
case. St. Paul, with less retailing than Minneapolis, had a fairly 
moribund period during the 1960s and early 1970s. The city pinned its 
retail hopes on a downtown mall, and Town Square did bring new stores 
to St. Paul. But none of the three downtown malls (Town Square, 
Galtier Plaza, and Town Center) have been able to generate a night-time 
shopping presence. 
Entertainment has been another problem. In the 1950s most of 
sut the public agencies have fostered downtown development and 
made complementary public improvements, such as parking ramps, to 
ensure that it continues. 
St. Paul can demonstrate how all of these factors have worked 
together. The heart of downtown St. Paul is included in the Downtown 
and Seventh Place Tax Increment District which comprises twenty-two 
city blocks, including the largest of the new developments of the last 
decade- Town Square, Galtier Plaza, and the World Trade Center. The 
only significant growth area not included is Lowertown, the revived 
historic area. Because the TIO approximates the active post-Capitol 
centre growth of downtown St. Paul, the Tax Increment Financing 
report to the state is a convenient summary of public and private 
investment since 1974 when the TIO was created (Minnesota House of 
Representatives' Research Department 1986c). More than $500 million 
has been invested, roughly 56 percent private (including revenue 
bonds) and 44 percent public (see Figure 1). 
General obligation bonds IS29,950,81 ll 
Private investment 1S203,918,0001 
Revenue bonds (S91, 135,000) 
D Private financing S295,053,000 total 
Public financing S234,690, 721 total 
Source: Minnesota Legislative Auditor, 1986, 
Local tax monies ($7,240,076) 
Tax increment financing IS168.465,920) 
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Figure 1. Financing for 
St. Paul's Downtown 
and Seventh Place 
Tax Increment District 
the first run movie theaters were downtown; now they are largely in the 
suburbs. For a time in the 1970s downtown St. Paul had no legitimate 
movie theater, although there were some X-rated options. Important 
cultural facilities, including Orchestra Hall in Minneapolis and the 
Ordway Theater in St. Paul were planted in both downtowns, in 197 4 
and 1985 respectively. Both downtowns have supported the devel-
opment of "artistic" historic areas featuring restaurants and art 
galleries - Lowertown in St. Paul and the warehouse district in 
Minneapolis -with limited success. Other major projects, the newly-
opened World Trade Center and the still-to-be-constructed new 
convention center, remain an unknown quantity. Both downtowns are 
still struggling to compete with suburban shopping malls, multiplex 
movie theaters, and potentially, Bloomington's "Mall of America" 
featuring a wave lake, submarine rides, and 800 stores. In many ways 
those concerned about downtown development are fighting battles 
similar to those that planners waged in the 1960s. Perhaps the stakes 
have even increased. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Cooperation has been the hallmark of renewal efforts in 
downtown Minneapolis and St. Paul -cooperation between public 
agencies, political and labor leaders, and certain business interests. 
Some people lost out in this process, especially small business owners 
who were squeezed out by glittery new office development. Some were 
undoubtedly quite happy to be bought out. Others resisted to no avail, 
and they were moved away in favor of more desirable uses- and higher 
tax bases. Low-income residents were also pushed aside as both cities 
decided to promote downtown living for the middle class. This trend 
has, if anything, accelerated in recent years, as single room occupancy 
hotels continue to be replaced by new downtown development. 
Downtown revitalization has been, first and foremost, a process 
of economic development, and that is how it must be understood. The 
profusion of expensive condominium and rental housing in both 
downtowns during the past decade is not primarily a housing policy. 
These units reflect an effort to revitalize the commercial function of the 
DOWNTOWN RENEWAL 
87 
DOWNTOWN RENEWAL 
88 
city and to help anchor white collar jobs. Attracting middle- and 
upper-class consumers is the name of the game, and it has been played 
aggressively in both cities. Redevelopment has clearly aggravated the 
rental crunch at the lower end of the downtown housing market. 
Developers may not have intended this, but it has been one of the most 
obvious consequences. The corporate city, it seems, does not have 
much room for those who participate only marginally in economic 
activities. 
Minneapolis and St. Paul have dramatically refurbished their 
downtowns during the past three decades. Each has begun or com-
pleted projects that have brought national attention and awards: for 
twenty years Nicollet Mall was touted as the savior of retailing in 
downtown Minneapolis; the Lowertown project in St. Paul is a national 
model for creating a residential community within a virtually abandoned 
downtown. These successes, to be sure, have not come without a 
price. Yet, those who oversaw these redevelopment efforts would 
probably argue that having a lively (and livable) downtown is worth 
whatever costs have to be borne. This was, after all, the goal of all of 
the early downtown plans. After many years it appears that most of the 
planners' goals have been attained. 
r 
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more and more political. Plans could no longer simply be drafted, 
approved, and implemented. If much of the housing in the newer 
renewal areas was going to remain, renewal officials would have to deal 
with the people in the houses, many of whom were owners. As the 
quality of the areas being renewed improved, the challenges to the 
planners became more complex. Increasingly, renewal plans incor-
porated larger neighborhood concerns such as traffic, obsolete 
schools, and decaying commercial areas. Planners had to start listen-
ing to what the residents wanted, and respond to those interests as 
well as their own. 
The story of neighborhood renewal in the Twin Cities, unlike the 
sagas of slum clearance and downtown redevelopment, is largely a 
story of resident involvement. In the early years renewal plans were 
drawn up and implemented fairly quickly. Residents were not consulted 
at the start because the need for improvements was so obvious and 
so great, and most residents were renters. As neighborhood renewal 
became more routine, residents became more willing to fight about 
what was planned for their neighborhoods. People had observed the 
renewal process being carried out in the slums, and decided that their 
neighborhoods deserved better treatment. As long as renewal was 
equated with total clearance and public housing construction, planners 
could expect habitable low-income neighborhoods to resist urban 
renewal. 
The federal government in effect invited this resistance by man-
dating (first with respect to the Model Cities programs of the mid-1960s 
and later for almost any project involving significant public aid) that 
citizen input be sought and incorporated into renewal plans. This 
decision gave rise to the formation of organized and quite powerful 
neighborhood groups in many cities (usually called PACs, or project 
area committees, as mandated by Congress in 1968). These groups 
provided a counterbalance to renewal proposals that most planners 
and city officials had never imagined possible. Increasingly, discrepan-
cies arose between the plans for a particular area's renewal, and how 
those plans were implemented. 
4. NEIGHBORHOODS AND 
HOUSING 
The slum clearance and downtown projects were important 
parts of Minneapolis' and St. Paul's renewal plans. These projects took 
a good deal of time and enormous sums of money to complete. But 
these efforts were only a portion of what each city wanted to 
accomplish. Officials in both places were as interested, and sometimes 
more interested, in neighborhood improvements, and these efforts 
often went far beyond housing problems alone. Subsequently some 
of the most challenging, innovative, and rewarding renewal work was 
done in the neighborhood programs. Here the goal was not simply to 
exchange one landscape for another, but to improve existing 
residential areas aesthetically, economically, and structurally. 
Planners in the Twin Cities approached the problem of neigh-
borhoods with the attitude 11get rid of the worst things first. 11 The slum 
clearance efforts were largely a neighborhood renewal program taken 
to the extreme-the very worst places that people lived in simply had 
to be destroyed and replaced. Once that was accomplished, other 
areas could begin to receive some attention. But even after the worst 
of the slums were eliminated much remained to be done. As one report 
noted, 11 Minneapolis is a city of few slums and widespread blight. 
Neighborhood decay has been masked by the good quality of the 
original development, mostly on uncrowded lots, by handsome mature 
street trees, and by individual efforts to preserve property values." 
(Minneapolis HRA 1977). 
As the renewal program matured and officials gained more 
experience, renewal methods began to change. Throughout the early 
and mid-1960s the emphasis of renewal efforts shifted steadily toward 
rehabilitation rather than clearance. At the same time, renewal became 
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opposing renewal schemes, although the very poorest areas were 
usually cleared early on. In what remained as the least-well-off parts of 
both cities, post-slum clearance, residents in many areas were able to 
resist or reformulate renewal proposals. Ethnic solidarity also seems 
to have been an imprecise variable: some ethnic neighborhoods were 
totally cleared (the Upper Levee in St. Paul) whereas others (like 
northeast Minneapolis) were able to control the shape and form that 
renewal took. 
THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND 
The private housing market in the United States has never been 
able to provide decent, affordable housing to the poorest residents of 
our cities. Governments at various levels have made many efforts to 
alleviate this market failure over the last 100 years. The most prodigious 
efforts were through urban renewal. Since the early 1980s govern-
mental efforts to create housing for the poor have decreased 
dramatically. Throughout the Reagan administration federal aid for 
such housing has declined as the federal government has increasingly 
questioned its own involvement in the housing field. The burden of 
providing housing for people unable to afford decent shelter on their 
own seems to be devolving on local government, non-profit developers, 
and private charities. 
Until the 1930s public involvement in housing in America meant 
local governments trying to control undesirable aspects of the private 
market. By the 1880s most city governments, including Minneapolis' 
and St. Paul's, had acquired the authority to issue building permits and 
administer inspections. These two programs were established to 
maintain the structural quality of the building stock, and thereby to 
promote fire prevention, public health standards, and a vital tax base. 
No public housing was constructed at this time, but both cities' govern-
ments had tentatively entered the housing market. Federal and state 
governments remained uninvolved. This was a time of charitable 
concern for the urban poor of America, and private groups worked for 
better housing, though with little concrete result. 
Zoning, a means of controlling the land and housing markets by 
The response that any particular area might have to renewal 
proposals, and the success that any neighborhood could have in 
resisting the proposal, were largely a product of two factors: luck and 
timing. Luck became a factor in determining how slowly or how quickly 
a particular area was identified for treatment. The issue may have been 
as simple as where most planners lived and what routes they traveled 
every day- and consequently what deteriorated areas they were most 
frequently exposed to. Timing was an even more important factor 
because the mechanisms and requirements for citizen review changed 
over time. Before 1966 citizens had no opportunity to be involved in 
the renewal process. But after 1966, people who lived in areas that 
were designated for renewal became vitally important and had much 
more to say about their futures than those who experienced the 
program's earlier phases. 
The original quality of the housing in any neighborhood being 
considered for renewal was crucially important. If the housing was 
structurally sound enough to escape a verdict of total clearance, 
residents had at least some time to argue about the fine points of the 
proposal. The neighborhood's social and economic composition 
seems to have been less important in determining responses to 
renewal. The poorest neighborhoods did not always fare the worst in 
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Near-south 
Minneapolis, 
late 1950s. 
Another example of a 
block that was cleared 
for public housing. 
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dictating acceptable uses for particular parcels of land, was 11invented 11 
during the 191 Os and spread to most American cities by the end of the 
1920s. St. Paul and Minneapolis passed their first zoning ordinances 
early in the 1920s. The goals of zoning were similar to those of the 
building permit and inspection programs: to promote public health and 
safety, and to preserve property values. Zoning is an effective control 
mechanism, but it is essentially a preventive tactic. It allows local 
governments to prohibit undesired land uses but not to dictate desired 
uses. Local governments continued to control housing, but not to 
create it; the first direct action to create public housing was federally 
sponsored in 1937. 
U.S. Housing Act of 1937 
During the 1930s the federal government's agenda tried to 
respond to needs created by the Depression. One of the new federal 
programs was public aid to ensure decent quality housing for all people. 
Although the federal government had briefly expressed interest in 
worker housing during World War I, and in veterans housing directly 
after the war, the disbursement of direct public funds for low cost 
housing was the first real indication that it felt a responsibility toward 
those who lived in substandard housing. 
The Public Works Administration (PWA) built a number of hous-
ing projects in cities across the nation. These projects, federally owned 
and administered, were intended to serve people who today would be 
called the working poor-people who are unable to afford decent 
housing despite honest and regular employment. The intent of this 
seemingly radical departure from American governmental policy was 
dual, and not so radical after all: to help house some distressed 
workers, surely, but also to stimulate local economies by providing jobs 
for unemployed construction workers. 
Both Minneapolis and St. Paul lobbied for a PWA housing 
project. In each city a private, ad hoc group with official approval 
worked with the city planning commission to apply for a PWA project. 
Minneapolis was successful, but St. Paul was not. The proposed St. 
Paul site was later used for the Mt. Airy public housing project in the 
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1950s. The PWA project in Minneapolis, Sumner-Field, was built 
between 1936 and 1938, and remains occupied today (after several 
remodelings). No more public housing was built in the Twin Cities for 
more than a decade despite serious overcrowding following World 
War II. 
The federal commitment during the 1930s was quite limited. 
Some public housing was built and a few "greenbelt" towns were 
federally supported (three out of a dozen or more that were originally 
projected). In many ways the experiences of the United States during 
the 1930s provided a rationale for the federal government to step into 
the housing arena, even though it had yet to establish a programmatic 
commitment to real intervention. 
U.S. Housing Act of 1949 
In the last years of World War II and into the late 1940s, the U.S. 
Congress debated a housing bill. The final version was passed in 1949 
as the U.S. Housing Act, after strenuous politicking. The bill included 
the disparate elements of a compromise, which it was: slum clearance, 
economic redevelopment, and the construction of public housing. It 
was not a pure housing bill, as its proponents had intended. The 1949 
act included massive aid, and stipulated that all low-cost housing 
destroyed by slum clearance projects be replaced. It held some 
promise as a solution to the housing problems of urban America, which 
had worsened during a decade of depression, and the diversion of 
resources to the war effort in the 1940s. The housing act also provided 
aid for America's downtowns to meet the challenge of a changing 
economy and to provide jobs for thousands of unemployed construc--
tion workers. 
Minnesota had already (in 1947) passed legislation that created 
the Housing and Redevelopment Authorities (H RAs) and allowed them 
to take advantage of this new federal aid. The Minnesota law also 
authorized a small property tax levy, which gave the H RAs a fair degree 
of independence from federal planning grants. The Minnesota HRAs 
were consequently able to plan projects in advance of federal assis-
tance. 
' 
.£ 
By 1949 the necessary elements were in place for a large-scale 
experiment in public housing: local agencies, semi-independent from 
city government, empowered with the right of eminent domain, and 
bankrolled by massive federal aid, could for the first time create decent 
housing for poor people. 
MINNEAPOLIS NEIGHBORHOOD RENEWAL GOALS 
The goals for neighborhood renewal in Minneapolis were set by 
1958 when the HRA made public an overall program for the city. The 
renewal program was ambitious: it specified nothing less than the 
redevelopment of the entire central section of the city. A detailed survey 
outlined the extent of blight in Minneapolis. The whole of the city 
between Lowry Avenue North and 36th Street on the south (except for 
the core of downtown, the Kenwood area, the western reaches of 
Willard-Homewood, far eastern Seward, Prospect Park, and an area 
just south of Loring Park) was identified as needing either major or 
minor rehabilitation or complete redevelopment (Minneapolis HRA 
1958a and 1958b). 
One of the most interesting aspects of the Minneapolis neigh-
borhood renewal program was the plan to link these efforts with 
scheduled freeway construction wherever possible. The proposed 
freeways (194 and 35W) were routed through many of the neighbor-
hoods identified as needing improvements, including some of the worst 
parts of near-north and near-south Minneapolis. (This did not work out 
as well as the planners may have hoped. Large parts of the freeway 
system were delayed until the mid-1980s, or never built, although land 
for the system was acquired in the early 1960s.) 
The HRA had a hierarchy of neighborhood renewal goals by the 
time the plan was published. The list of highest priority projects 
included (see Map 1): Harrison, slated as a pilot rehabilitation project 
and labeled a "twilight zone between clearance and good housing;" 
Riverside, scheduled for clearance and rehabilitation in conjunction with 
the proposed University of Minnesota expansion; the near-north area, 
where clearance and upgrading were identified as a necessary holding 
action to prevent the further spread of blight; Loring Park, "once 
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fashionable (but) deteriorating rapidly" and presenting 11the most attrac-
tive inlying area for residential purposes; 11 and the area around the 
Minneapolis Auditorium. 
The projects listed as medium priority were: Elliot Park south to 
Franklin Avenue, a mixed clearance-rehabilitation area slated for mostly 
non-residential use; the Holmes neighborhood near the University of 
Minnesota, identified as having large sections of structurally unsound 
housing (and next to a planned freeway); Stevens Square, thought to 
be "rapidly deteriorating/ the area north of the Farmer's Market, full of 
"badly deteriorated housing and many junk yards 11 and slated for future 
industrial use; northeast Minneapolis, where the portion nearest the 
river was slated for clearance and future industrial use and the rest, 
which showed "signs of sociological cohesion" was to be stabilized 
through spot clearance and rehabilitation work; and Nicollet Island, 
which was to be cleared and 11made into an asset for the city. 11 
Finally there were the low-priority projects, primarily in places 
that needed some work, but not urgently. For the most part these areas 
were next to those identified for high- or medium-priority renewal 
treatment. This list included neighborhoods such as Como, Seward, 
Powderhorn, and the Nicollet-Lake area (all of which would eventually 
receive some redevelopment aid) (Minneapolis HRA 1958a and b). 
As these groupings indicate, the HRA had a good sense of how 
different areas were to be treated by 1958 when the Urban Renewal 
Program was published. This may be one of the reasons that Minne-
ap o Ii s and St. Paul successfully obtained federal renewal 
funding - much of the hard work of surveying the landscape and 
deciding what remedial measures were appropriate was completed by 
a fairly early date. 
ST. PAUL NEIGHBORHOOD RENEWAL HOUSING GOALS 
Planners for the St. Paul Planning Board and the HRA felt that 
the city was at a critical juncture in the 1950s when federal renewal 
became available. St. Paul was different from older eastern cities; only 
about 75 percent of the land area of the city was built up. Most of the 
vacant land was vacant for good reason, however. It had poor soil 
conditions or difficult topography. Planners felt prospects for the city's 
future were grim unless continued development could be "orderly:' The 
city faced two critical problems. The first, as in Minneapolis, was 
substandard housing and neighborhoods. Between one-third and 
one-half of St. Paul's population lived in areas that planners considered 
"blighted." The second problem was the need for open space. City 
land was filling up, and the booming suburbs beyond the city limits 
threatened to separate urban dwellers from nature. City redevelop-
ment had to balance the correction of blight, the need to enhance the 
city's tax base, and the need for open space (St. Paul City Planning 
Board 1955). 
The strategy for renewing neighborhoods had three tiers, 
depending on physical conditions. The first tier was redevelopment: 
clearing blighted areas and replacing them with better designed 
residential neighborhoods or some more appropriate land use. The 
second tier was rehabilitation: spot clearing blighted properties and 
improving salvageable ones. Rehabilitation, however, was a new and 
unsure idea in the 1950s as the St. Paul HRA noted "probably the most 
unproven and uncharted ... part of the urban renewal program" (St. Paul 
HRA 1959, 9). Conservation of sound neighborhoods was the third tier, 
and the best deal economically. Saving solid neighborhoods made 
sense because the public expenditure prodded private owners to 
invest. Later generations of planners would refer to this idea as 
leveraging. 
By the time the City Planning Board issued its Proposed 
Renewal Areas in 1957, there were already two renewal projects 
operating in St. Paul-the Eastern and Western Redevelopment 
projects around the Capitol. The 1957 plan identified three types of 
neighborhoods as priorities for the next round of renewal. The first were 
significantly deteriorated areas (see Map 2): the Upper Levee, the West 
Side Flats, Seven Corners, and East 7th Street-Minnehaha Avenue. 
Planners found conditions in these areas bad enough to warrant 
extensive, if not total, clearance. Commercial or industrial reuse was 
to be considered for all of them. One of the plan's reasons for including 
the East Seventh-Minnehaha area was to promote "geographic 
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balance" in the city's redevelopment program, since balance was not 
really achieved during the project renewal era. The H RA board had 
adopted an internal policy of not forcing renewal on unwilling neighbor-
hoods and the east side was never treated in the way the planners 
intended. 
The Riverview area on the city's west side above the Flats along 
Concord Street was a priority for another reason. It was in danger of 
deteriorating and needed a mixture of redevelopment and rehabilitation 
to stabilize it. Summit-University was the last priority neighborhood, 
and for an entirely different reason. A formerly desirable housing district 
experiencing decline in the late 1950s, it wasn't quite a detriment to the 
city but it could become more of an asset. 
The planners identified a series of other neighborhoods for the 
next wave of renewal after the projects already underway, and after the 
priorities listed previously. Pockets of undeveloped land, mostly on the 
east side, needed correction of soil and topography problems. A 
number of older working-class districts scattered around the city also 
needed attention: several in the north end, several on the east side, 
and south of Lake Como. Merriam Park and south St. Anthony Park 
were also included in this third group. 
The implementation of St. Paul's renewal strategies was 
tempered by the opportunities that presented themselves. Local 
resources were limited. The ambitious rebuilding of the city could only 
be accomplished with federal aid, and St. Paul planners were creative 
in meeting federal requirements. The Eastern and Western redevelop-
ment projects underway in 1957 used the Capitol Approach project 
expenditures as the local share of project expenses. The Upper Levee 
project used improvements to Shepard Road - already planned and 
intended to provide better access to downtown - as the local contribu-
tion. Essentially, the whole project was financed federally. 
THE NEIGHBORHOOD APPROACH 
The most common critical views of urban renewal hold that 
attention and resources were focused on downtown projects and on 
nearby blighted areas that could be incorporated into the downtown 
,. 
(Fainstein 1983). This criticism views urban renewal as an economic 
development tool that was used unevenly and unfairly. Renewal efforts 
are said to have ignored neighborhoods, or only paid attention to them 
when a particular site was desired for another (usually nonresidential) 
use. 
This criticism of renewal as practiced in some cities may be fair 
and accurate, but it seems not to be true for either of the Twin Cities. 
The very earliest renewal projects proposed for both cities were in 
neighborhoods, not for either of the downtowns (Hi-Lo, Glenwood, the 
Eastern and Western redevelopment projects). The Minneapolis areas 
were not even particularly close to downtown. The downtown projects 
were important to both cities, but no one thought that a renewed 
downtown was enough. 
Minneapolis planners defined their thinking about neighbor-
hoods as a prelude to a comprehensive program of neighborhood 
renewal. "A sound neighborhood is one in which people want to live 
or into which they would like to move ... Conversely, a blighted neigh-
borhood contains people who have to live there" (Minneapolis 
Community Improvement Program 1965, p. 5). The city's task then 
was to discover all the blighted neighborhoods and take "corrective 
action." 
In 1962 Minneapolis began a comprehensive survey known as 
the Community Improvement Program (CIP), funded by a grant from 
the Housing and Home Finance Agency. The goal of this $1 million 
effort was to discover and compare the physical conditions of every 
Minneapolis neighborhood. When it was completed in 1965 the CIP 
contained information about the age, use, and condition of every block 
in the city, as well as information about the economic and social 
conditions of almost all city residents. It was a massive undertaking, 
and remains today the best index of exactly how much change has 
occurred in the past quarter century. 
In the introduction to the comprehensive plan, Lawrence Irvin, 
the Minneapolis planning director, defined the scope of the job ahead 
of the planners. He wrote: 
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... We must recognize too that there is probably no 
neighborhood in Minneapolis which is as good--as 
safe, stable. convenient and pleasant.-as it could or 
should be .... No more than two or three neighborhoods 
in Minneapolis were actually planned to withstand 
present day problems ... It has been estimated that 
over one-fifth (11 square miles) of the residential area 
of the city needs and would be eligible for a formal, 
publicly-aided renewal program. Actually, a much 
greater proportion is being touched by decay and 
blight...ln ten years of operation, less than a half 
square mile of blighted area has been renewed. At this 
rate, it would take over 200 years to renew presently 
blighted areas ... Comprehensive planning is designed 
to speed up the modernization and maintenance 
process ... (emphasis added, Minneapolis Community 
Improvement Program 1965, p. 2-3). 
Although the task before them was immense, Minneapolis plan-
ners set about remaking the neighborhood landscape of the city; St. 
Paul was not far behind. 
Both cities discovered early that one particular factor was crucial 
for implementing neighborhood renewal efforts: the ability to merge 
projections for capital improvements into the renewal process. The 
federal government required localities to contribute one-third of the cost 
of renewal projects. For many cities (including Minneapolis and St. 
Paul) this requirement would have been prohibitive if it had to be met 
with dollars. However, the renewal legislation allowed "normal" capital 
budgeting activities-street construction, the building of new schools 
and fire stations-to be used as the local contribution, or "grant-in-aid." 
This meant that renewal could be thought of as long-range planning, 
and that desired capital improvements could become part of the 
renewal process. It also meant that the cities did not have to raise extra 
revenues to achieve renewal. At the level of an individual project, the 
dedication of capital improvements was a positive sign to developers, 
investors, and residents. It demonstrated that the city was serious 
enough about renewal to divert its own resources toward making it 
happen. 
ll 
I 
t 
CASE STUDIES 
Surveying the range of neighborhoods in the Twin Cities that 
were directly affected by urban renewal yields two major conclusions: 
(1) the number and extent of renewed neighborhoods takes in most of 
the central portions of both cities, covering a much larger area than 
most people might imagine; and (2) what was proposed and 
accomplished under the banner of urban renewal varied enormously. 
The following selected examples represent the whole effort. We have 
created four categories to help describe the different neighborhood 
experiences. These categories are based on the ease with which the 
renewal proposals were implemented, and the degree to which they 
changed when opposition arose. 
1. RENEWAL AREAS THAT WORKED AS PLANNED OR 
IMPROVED OVER TIME 
This category includes renewed neighborhoods that varied 
greatly in the types of housing they contained, and in the 
socioeconomic backgrounds of their inhabitants. What these neigh-
borhoods have in common is that they appeared in much better 
physical shape after the renewal process than when they began, largely 
due to the local residents' dedication. Residents generally viewed 
renewal plans in these areas with a combination of relief and skepticism, 
but worked with renewal officials to make improvements. 
Summit-University 
Summit-University, Selby-Dale, St. Anthony Hill, Cathedral Hill, 
Woodland Park, Crocus Hill, Ramsey Hill, Hill District, Historic Hill 
District, Uni-Dale, North Quadrant, Thomas-Dale, and Central Village-
all of these names refer to parts of the community that is now called 
Summit-University. Some of the names are historic neighborhood 
names. Others are bureaucratic, resulting from urban renewal 
projects, historic preservation districts, or community participation 
districts. The latter have (or had) definite boundaries, the former do 
not. 
Summit-University is a 11natural 11 residential area bounded by the 
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Map 7. Summit-
University Project Area 
University Avenue commercial corridor (or perhaps by the rail corridor 
a few blocks away) on the north, and the steep bluff running southwest 
and then west from downtown. The area is unusual in St. Paul because 
it is not cut into pocket neighborhoods by rail lines, topography, or the 
river. Although the construction of 1-94 in the 1960s across the length 
of Summit-University sliced off the northern section of the community, 
connections between the two sections persist. 
Summit-University has always been a special neighborhood in 
St. Paul. In the city's earliest days the steep slopes of Summit and 
Ramsey hills deterred much residential development. By the 1880s a 
part of Summit-University had become the neighborhood in St. Paul, 
after streetcar service made it accessible. The lower end of Summit 
Avenue remains a magnificent example of a monumental Victorian 
boulevard. Many American cities had similar monumental boulevards, 
including some grander or more extensive than Summit Avenue. Most 
of these have since been destroyed by expanding downtowns or 
extreme decline. Summit Avenue is perhaps the best surviving example 
of this special nineteenth-century urban landscape. 
Not all of Summit-University was populated by the rich, of 
course, but the neighborhood was always middle class or better. The 
best housing was along the southern and eastern edges. Closer to 
University Avenue the housing was less grand. The whole area was 
predominantly residential. Neighborhood stores were located along 
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the streetcar routes, but little industry intruded. The area's housing 
stock is still unique in the Twin Cities- Minneapolis has nothing quite 
comparable in quality and extent. 
For decades Summit-University was protected from downtown 
encroachment by the physical barricade of the bluff, and by the fitful 
pace of downtown development. Still, with the advent of easy 
automobile travel in the 1920s, the city's elite began moving away. But 
Summit-University did not lose all of its middle- and upper-class 
residents. The great mansions along Summit Avenue and in Crocus 
Hill declined somewhat, but were not subdivided and allowed to decay 
as were similar areas in many American cities. This genteel area of the 
neighborhood's southern and eastern fringe helped preserve it. In the 
early 1930s the Pioneer Press could still claim that the Hill District was 
the 11largest solid home community 11 in the country (St. Paul Pioneer 
Press 1931 ). The claim may have been partly wishful thinking, but parts 
of Summit-University did remain healthy. Summit Avenue itself and the 
well-preserved southern edge along the bluff acted as an anchor for 
the whole area. 
The northern fringe provided another sort of anchor. Since the 
1880s, St. Paul's small black community had lived along the railroad 
corridors slightly north of Summit-University. By the beginning of urban 
renewal, 11the black ghetto 11 was still small by big city standards, but 
concentrated. Expansion to the north was effectively blocked by the 
rail corridor, and the dislocations of the Eastern and Western redevelop-
ment projects and freeway construction in the 1950s and 1960s drove 
blacks into the Summit-University neighborhood. Parts of Summit-
University remained unaffected by these changes, but other parts 
declined rapidly. Houses were subdivided and fell into disrepair as their 
owners moved west into newer city neighborhoods or to the suburbs. 
Some houses and businesses were abandoned. Selby Avenue, the 
commercial heart of the district, grew increasingly seedy. 
By the early 1950s Summit-University clearly had many of the 
classic signs of urban decay and disinvestment. Late in that decade 
Summit-University residents began to petition the city government for 
renewal. Those displaced in the renewal areas to the north and from 
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the freeway construction placed pressure on the area, and the ensuing 
deterioration obviously required some action. Planners, politicians, 
and residents knew that Summit-University needed help, and con-
sidered urban renewal the answer. The community was the HRA's top 
priority after the slum clearance projects then in progress were com-
pleted (see Map 7). 
For more than a decade, major problems plagued renewal 
efforts in SummitNUniversity despite the city's and residents' determin-
ation to improve the area. Considerable conflict over renewal arose 
between the city and HRA leaders on the one side, and community 
leaders on the other. These conflicts were intensified by the fact that 
community leaders came from three different sources. First there were 
the 11professional 11 leaders - ministers and social agency workers. 
During the years of decline, Summit-University acquired a number of 
social agencies including the Hallie Q. Brown Community Center, and 
local chapters of the Urban League and the NAACP, that continued to 
play an important part in the life and health of the area. Traditional black 
organizations and black ministers resisted the city's efforts to conduct 
renewal without substantial resident involvement. 
Businessmen comprised the second leadership group through 
their commercial clubs. The third group of leaders came out of 
indigenous citizen organizations. Often these groups formed in 
response to some unwanted city action. The Dale-Selby Action Coun-
cil, for example, formed in the early 1960s to protest HRA plans to 
construct a public high rise for the elderly on the abandoned Neill 
School site. Residents felt that the Neill playground was vital play space 
in a crowded neighborhood. The HRA built the high rise despite 
protests, but the organization survived and formed one core of resident 
power (Torstenson 1966). Some of these organizations were funded 
by "War on Poverty" money from the federal government. Other citizen 
groups were formed by the middle-class residents who were beginning 
to try to restore old homes in the area. 
The Cathedral I project of the early 1960s was to have been the 
first stage of renewal of Summit-University. The HRA received a 
planning grant in 1962, partly in response to those displaced by the 
construction of 1-94. The project area covered 282 acres and was to 
have been renewed in three stages, but only the first stage, comprising 
forty-eight acres, was achieved. Cathedral I had a specific client, the 
St. Paul School Board, which proposed an unusual method of renewal. 
The board was looking for a site for a technical school, so the HRA 
cleared an area alongside the St. Paul Cathedral. The housing cleared 
was a mixture of aging single-family and multi-family dwellings that were 
not, by 1960s standards, worth saving. A decade later, with the 
rehabilitation craze in full swing, much of this housing stock would 
probably have been salvaged. The remainder of the Cathedral project 
was later incorporated into the Summit-University project. 
The first application for a planning grant for Summit-University 
(called Selby-Dale at that point by the HRA) was denied by HUD. The 
federal officials felt that the HRA was unable to handle more projects 
until the Eastern and Western redevelopments were complete. By 1964 
Selby Avenue, west of 
Dale Street, 1967. 
When areas like 
Summit-University had a 
high population density, 
commercial streets like 
Selby Avenue could 
survive. When this 
neighborhood began to 
lose population, many 
businesses closed. The 
street later became ripe 
for redevelopment. 
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planning had finally begun under conventional renewal rules (and with 
federal money). In 1966 an impressive covey of St. Paul business, 
religious, labor, and governmental notables made a trip to Washington, 
D.C. to lobby for approval. They were successful. At the time of its 
approval in 1969, the Summit-University project, as it was called by this 
time, was the largest neighborhood development project in the country. 
It totaled 1,035 acres and housed 21,700 residents (St. Paul Dispatch 
1966). 
But the divisions of the last decade had not been healed by the 
mission to Washington, D.C., and another legislative change provided 
a powerful mechanism for resident activism. No sooner had Summit-
University been finally approved when the Model Cities Act was passed, 
which delayed the project. The act proposed to cure the perceived ills 
of urban renewal - already in much public disfavor- by giving residents 
a strong voice in the process and progress of renewal. St. Paul 
planners considered Summit-University a logical place for this kind of 
Great Society social experiment given the wide mix of social groups, a 
history of effective community politics, and enough social and physical 
decay to interest the bureaucrats in Washington, D.C. The availability 
of more federal money provided a big incentive for an area to be 
declared a demonstration project for the Model Cities program. In St. 
Paul this idea was pushed from two quarters: city government, under 
the direction of St. Paul Mayor Tom Byrne, and community groups, led 
largely by black organizations and religious leaders, black and white. 
Another hiatus delayed renewal of Summit-University while 
officials from the HRA and Model Cities program fought over control of 
the renewal effort. They struggled over control of the federal money 
and the professional staff who would carry out renewal in the area. For 
more than two years, successive vituperative public meetings did little 
to resolve differences. Meanwhile Neighborhood Development Pro-
gram money was used to selectively clear substandard housing in the 
neighborhood. In late 1969 HUD issued an ultimatum: the city had 
thirty days to decide how it would operate its Model Cities district. A 
compromise was worked out; the Model Cities Neighborhood Planning 
Committee would have some control over both money and staff, and 
' 
the city government, through the H RA, would retain a share of the 
power. An uneasy, but functioning, partnership ensued. 
By late 1970 the project was finally implemented, and redevelop-
ment began in 1971. Arguments continued over clearance and 
relocation, especially within the black community. During the decade 
that the renewal project was being contested Summit-University be-
came home to most of St. Paul's black population, and now renewal 
efforts threatened many with another displacement. But renewal could 
not be stopped. By 1978 more than $32 million in direct aid had been 
spent on Summit-University. The Model Cities program ended in 1974, 
but the tradition of citizen involvement continued. 
Summit-University is the Twin Cities' best, and perhaps only, 
example of extensive gentrification. The considerable public expendi-
tures during and after renewal formed the base for gentrification and 
rehabilitation in this area, and the city is still investing in it. Even the 
deteriorated commercial strip along Selby Avenue is finally being 
revived with new commercial and residential development, aided by the 
city government. 
The renewal of Summit-University had (and has) a dual focus: 
preserving the historic landscape and creating a cosmopolitan com-
munity. The two thrusts have often worked at cross-purposes. Both 
have been at least partly achieved, though the preservation effort is 
more secure. The HRA did extensive house moving within the district 
to promote its historic ambience an innovation that troubled HUD 
auditors for years. The preservation of the physical character of the 
area was clearly important to keeping and attracting middle-class 
households to the area. Summit-University provides an elegant urban 
setting that suburbs cannot match. 
It is not as evident that the goal of maintaining a healthy (in 1970s 
urban planning ideals) mix of different racial, social, and economic 
groups has been realized. The mix does exist, but poorer people are 
still being pushed to the west and north. The tensions between the dual 
goals of renewal persist. A 1984 WTCN broadcast video, 11 Nuthin's the 
Same Anymore: The Gentrification of a Neighborhood," though not a 
balanced view of renewal, poignantly evoked the resentments and fears 
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The Summit-University 
renewal area, 1983. 
Though some Victorian 
housing was cleared in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, 
most survived, and was 
eventually renovated. In 
this area, the renovation 
process that began fifteen 
years ago still continues. 
of many black residents. They were pushed out of the Rondo area by 
the freeway and now fear being pushed out of Summit-University by 
rising property values. They think that too much of the money spent in 
Summit-University has been spent to attract middle-class people and 
not enough to help poor people. Conflicting goals have plagued 
renewal and improvement efforts in this community from the start. 
These mixed agendas produced some landscape oddities. The 
Urban League office sits across from the meticulously restored Blair 
House condominiums on Selby Avenue. A few blocks away, a tattered 
(and currently closed) soul food restaurant faces a nattily restored 
Victorian firehouse, now turned into a fern-bar restaurant; the two 
eateries probably never serve the same clientele. In recent years some 
of the more run-down commercial buildings have begun to sprout 
Southeast Asian businesses as a new group starts to climb the 
socioeconomic ladder. 
Summit-University is a large area whose renewal results have 
not been uniform. North of the freeway, in the north quadrant of the 
original project area, is Central Village, a bit of suburb-in-the-city 
designed to retain St. Paul's black middle class. Next to it, at the corner 
of University Avenue and Dale Street, Unidale Mall has been less 
successful. Ideally, this project was to create a suburban shopping 
mall in the heart of the city. Even by generous standards, it has failed. 
Forced on city planners by neighborhood activists, the mall suffered 
the perennial problem of finding suitable tenants. Some that it did 
attract, such as a welfare office, are scarcely the stuff of suburban 
dreams. 
A 1980 assessment of Summit-University's public efforts 
prepared by a left-leaning planning organization said, 
It is generally recognized that the acquisition and 
demolition practices of the city's Housing and Rede-
velopment Authority have had tragic consequences ... 
severely reducing the housing stock, displacing a large 
percentage of its population and contributing to a 
general ambience of decline (Community Planning 
Organization 1980, p. 2). 
This analysis clearly encompasses habitual views of renewal 
rather than thoughtful analysis; urban renewal did not cause the decline 
of Summit-University. The neighborhood was already deteriorating in 
the 1950s and required substantial public investment to alter the 
decline. Much has been accomplished in the neighborhood, especially 
physical improvements. Most streets in the area have been repaved 
(not true elsewhere in much of St. Paul); there have been extensive 
public improvements and massive private investment in housing. 
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The Summit-University 
renewal area, 1983. 
Some parts of 
Summit-University, like this 
block in Selby Avenue, 
were totally cleared. A 
blighted commercial area 
was razed and replaced 
with coop housing units, 
sponsored by a non-profit 
housing developer. 
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Summit-University is certainly better than it was. It is also better than it 
would have been without renewal and without the accompanying public 
and private expenditures. Twenty years of urban renewal have not 
solved all the area's problems. The question of how to provide decent 
housing for low-income residents remains important, and it is an issue 
infinitely more difficult to solve without the assistance that renewal funds 
provided. 
St. Anthony 
The St. Anthony East and West projects are widely regarded as 
the most successful renewal effort in Minneapolis (League of Women 
Voters 1976). Located in lower northeast Minnneapolis in an area that 
had experienced continuous settlement by Eastern European 
immigrants since the 1890s, the St. Anthony projects were first 
proposed in 1964 (after the big 11problem 11 neighborhoods had received 
HRA's attention). Like many other central-city areas, the St. Anthony 
area population decreased in the 1950s, and was beginning to show 
its age. Northeast's ethnic homogeneity and essential stability 
prevented most planners from thinking of it as a slum. But they did 
recognize that much of the aging housing stock needed substantial 
improvements, and that some of it desperately needed to be removed. 
Parts of the northeast community confronted renewal even 
before 1964. The Hi-Lo redevelopment was the first project completed 
by the H RA in the early 1950s. It was an effort to regrade some 
unusable land on the far northern boundary of northeast and create a 
semi-suburban landscape on it (Minneapolis HRA 1977). More than a 
decade later the residents of the Beltrami Park area in lower northeast 
rejected a renewal plan for their neighborhood, claiming that it would 
mean an infusion of public housing. The northeast community seemed 
to want some of the obvious physical improvements that renewal could 
bring, but also wanted to control what the final product would be. 
The St. Anthony projects differed substantially from Summit-
University. The housing stock in St. Anthony had always been 
serviceable rather than stylish. The area was a classic working-class 
landscape with houses, churches, schools, stores, bars, and factories. 
f 
East Hennepin 
Commercial Area 
., Broadway St 
~ 
It never attracted the upwardly mobile social set so the problems 
presented by the loss of wealth or status were not an issue. What St. 
Anthony did face were problems with deferred home maintenance, and 
a housing stock that had become less and less acceptable to middle 
income households over time. Planners and area residents both 
perceived that renewal of some sort was the only way to prevent young 
residents in the northeast area from moving to the suburbs. 
The objectives for St. Anthony's renewal were varied. Planners 
wanted to create a balance of residential, commercial, and industrial 
uses, and to improve the area's physical characteristics. Residents 
wanted to reroute heavy traffic around the community. They also 
wanted to preserve the neighborhood's identity and heritage as the 
oldest part of the city. 
The urban renewal agenda that city planners first proposed for 
St. Anthony differed markedly from what was actually implemented. 
The standard renewal practice of clearing and rebuilding was 
proposed, as it had been in other neighborhoods, but at a greatly 
reduced scale. Still, the community was outraged. Don Risk, the area's 
alderman, proposed that the city council hold its hearings on the 
renewal plan at a church in the community. For the first time ever this 
Map 8. St. Anthony 
Renewal Projects 
St. Anthony West 
renewal area, 
mid-1960s. 
This deteriorated block 
near Broadway, was 
slated for clearance. 
St. Anthony West 
renewal area, 
late 1960s. 
The same block now, 
after clearance and 
reconstruction, has 
low-rise housing. 
was done. One thousand residents confronted the mayor and the HRA 
director, booing the renewal plans. Residents had strong concerns 
about the way in which public improvements would be assessed 
against them, and some were not even convinced that all this improving 
was necessary. 
Ultimately, the residents' fierce opposition convinced the HRA 
that the original renewal proposal should be modified. The northeast 
area renewal would proceed largely as a rehabilitation project. 
Clearance would be limited to the area of shanty housing near the river 
, 
' on land west of University Avenue, but everything else south of 
Broadway and west of Central Avenue would be rehabilitated. Spot 
clearance would occur only when structures were beyond salvation, or 
not worth the rehabilitation investment. Residents would receive grants 
and loans to carry out rehabilitation work. New public improvements 
were targeted to reinforce the rehabilitation efforts -streets and curbs 
would be rebuilt and a new school constructed. And a comprehensive 
code enforcement program was begun to ensure that plumbing, heat-
ing, and wiring throughout the area were brought up to modern 
standards. 
The St. Anthony project was divided into two parts by 
Washington Street N.E (see Map 8). The area east of 5th Street 
improved incrementally as some houses were torn down, others were 
newly built, and most were re-sided or repainted. On some streets, lots 
that had been cleared were sold to the neighbors on either side to 
decrease the feeling of crowding in the neighborhood. A total of 500 
units were rehabilitated and 300 were removed after renewal in St. 
Anthony East began in 1968. In the western part of the project area, 
renewal work was more dramatic and started earlier (in 1964). Here, 
entire blocks of substandard housing were removed and replaced with 
new ranch houses and split-levels. A total of 300 houses were removed 
and 1,000 brought up to code (Minneapolis HRA 1963a, 1966b). 
Local residents' influence was visible in this decision. A PAC 
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St. Anthony renewal area, 
1979. 
In another part of the 
renewal area substandard 
dwellings were totally 
cleared and replaced with 
single family suburban 
style units. 
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was formed in 1972, in accordance with federal regulations requiring 
citizen commentary on renewal plans. A successful petition to prevent 
construction of a low-income high rise inspired the PAC to be active. 
From then on, whenever a large block of land became available, the 
PAC held a community meeting and voted to have single-family housing 
built on the parcel. This tactic was the community's way of compen-
sating for the already large amount of multi-family housing in the area. 
By the time that renewal was completed in both areas in 1979, 869 units 
had been substantially rehabilitated, nearly 200 new houses had been 
built, and the most deteriorated areas were completely revamped. The 
federal government had spent $10.2 million, while the city had spent 
$3.4 million (Minneapolis HRA 1979a). 
After the federal phase of the St. Anthony West project closed, 
the project reopened as a tax increment district and another $900,000 
was spent. The intent was to complete some projects that were not 
part of the renewal program: to acquire the Little Sisters of the Poor 
Home for the Aged and rehabilitate it as a rental complex with some 
low- and moderate-income housing; and to finance the development 
of land acquired for an interstate freeway link (1-335) that was never 
built (Minnesota State Planning Agency 1978). Today the St. Anthony 
renewal area appears to exude residential pride for having steadily 
improved through the years. Newer and older houses stand side by 
side, most of them well maintained. Aside from the stock of suburban 
style houses along the river, there are no obvious hints that this 
neighborhood has weathered some dramatic transitions in the past 
twenty years. 
There are many possible explanations for St. Anthony's rather 
positive renewal experience. Certainly the social-ethnic-religious 
cohesion of the area and its inherent stability were a factor. Neighbor-
hood residents were united about what they expected from renewal - a 
physically improved version of the community serving the same resi-
dents who had always lived there. But the politics of the neighborhood 
and of the city provide another clear reason for the area's successful 
renewal efforts. Residents got involved in the renewal process early 
and stayed involved throughout every stage. Moreover, they had 
f 
political clout that few other Minneapolis residents could match. 
From the early 1960s to the late 1970s the aldermen repre-
senting St. Anthony and the rest of northeast (Don Risk, Sam Sivanich, 
Al Hofstede, and Dick Miller) were among the most powerful in the city. 
Hofstede even served several non-consecutive terms as mayor 
throughout the 1970s, and Sivanich has served on the Hennepin 
County Board since the late 1970s. In the years since urban renewal 
formally ended in Minneapolis, the St. Anthony area has consistently 
received a healthy share of city resources available for various improve-
ment projects. 
Another factor that distinguished the St. Anthony projects from 
their contemporaries was the attention paid to commercial improve-
ments. Efforts to improve St. Anthony's business climate eventually 
expanded far beyond what the renewal planners' proposals had en-
visioned. Since St. Anthony's southern boundary encompassed part 
Main Street NE, 1986. 
This site, in the St. 
Anthony West renewal 
area, was cleared in the 
late 1960s for a freeway 
segment that was never 
built. Finally, in the 
mid-1980s, the right-of-
way was given back to 
the city and use_d for 
affordable housing. 
East Hennepin Avenue, 
1986. 
Renewal here emphasized 
helping this commercial 
area remain competitive. 
Not surprisingly, the 
primary issue was parking. 
Parking bays and sizable 
parking lots were created. 
of the historic Hennepin Avenue commercial strip, this attention to 
commercial activity is perhaps not so surprising. When renewal for St. 
Anthony was proposed, the Hennepin Avenue commercial area in 
northeast was severely deteriorated. Neighborhood services such as 
restaurants, bars, and funeral homes existed alongside businesses that 
drew customers from farther away, including a large discount furniture 
operation and one of the area's largest liquor retailers. All of these 
enterprises were housed in antiquated facilities and shared the major 
problem that plagued all older streetcar strips: too little parking. 
Retailers here also had to deal with the daily concentration of derelicts 
from the nearby tenements on Nicollet Island. 
Improvements of Hennepin Avenue's commercial area began in 
the early 1970s in connection with a long-planned traffic project. 
Reconstructing the approach to the Hennepin Avenue bridge turned 
1st Avenue N.E. and Hennepin Avenue into a paired set of one-way 
streets, thus reducing the number of lanes on Hennepin Avenue. 
Parking bays were installed, and a few older structures were removed 
to create parking lots. Some successful businesses that wanted to 
remain in the area constructed new buildings (Surdyk's liquor store and 
West Photo) and a new branch of Northwestern Bank was also built. 
These improvements occurred slowly over a ten-year period. The 
Hennepin Avenue East strip is in better physical shape today, but is not 
f 
yet a completely vibrant commercial area. The recent addition of the 
mixed-use Riverplace project at the foot of Hennepin Avenue has made 
the situation even more complex. Riverplace's advertising emphasizes 
its nightlife-entertainment opportunities rather than Hennepin Avenue's 
more basic services. 
2. RENEWAL AREAS WHERE PLANS WERE CHANGED OR 
STOPPED DUE TO CITIZEN ACTIVISM AND OPPOSITION 
Neighborhoods in this category were almost exclusively in Min-
neapolis and geographically fairly close to one another. Each had a 
large quantity of substandard housing populated by low-income 
individuals (rather than families). University students (or ex-students) 
who were politically active and knowledgeable about government 
programs composed a substantial subset of the population in each of 
these neighborhoods. This group often led the opposition to renewal, 
and usually was successful in altering the original plans. 
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Riverplace, 1985. 
Located between East 
Hennepin and First Street 
NE, this project sits on a 
prime piece of renewal land. 
Assembly of the land began 
in the late 1970s, and the 
mixed-use project (housing, 
office, and retail) opened in 
1984, following a great deal 
of community concern about 
the height of the towers. 
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Map 9. Cedar-Riverside 
Renewal Area 
Cedar-Riverside 
If any part of the Twin Cities is widely recognized for its belief in 
and support of citizen activism, it is surely Cedar-Riverside. This is the 
Minneapolis community that played David against a corporate Goliath, 
and won. The renewal plan proposed for Cedar-Riverside was 
ultimately turned upside down. Residents here fought to conserve the 
stock of inexpensive housing instead of having it cleared. The people 
who led the battle against the city's vision of renewal in this community 
Augsburg College 
94 
,, 
have since. served as advisors and consultants to community groups 
in both cities. Arguably, their actions have given many people some 
reason to believe that they can indeed control what happens in their 
own communities. 
Cedar-Riverside was on the city's high priority list for renewal not 
because of its physical conditions, but primarily because the area had 
been chosen by the University of Minnesota for its new campus 
(Martin 1978). No one doubted that Cedar-Riverside needed improve-
ments of many kinds. Like other areas of the Twin Cities, it had a stock 
of old and poorly maintained housing. In the western portion of the 
community, aging industries competed with housing for space. The 
area had more bars than any other part of the city except downtown. 
The population had been declining since 1920, and those remaining 
were elderly or fairly transient, and generally without financial 
resources. 
Although some small private developers had been buying land 
in Cedar-Riverside since the late 1950s, in general, most of them were 
reluctant to build anything. Every developer was aware of the possibility 
of renewal and no one wanted to be caught owning structures that were 
about to be condemned when renewal finally occurred. Serious inter-
est in Cedar-Riverside flared up when the University of Minnesota 
expanded to the west bank of the Mississippi River in 1962. The new 
campus area was connected to the main campus by a pedestrian 
bridge across the Mississippi River. This was a clear signal to investors 
that many changes were inevitable, though the exact dimensions of 
change were still unknown. 
By the early 1960s, Cedar-Riverside's elderly Scandinavian 
residents were being replaced by young students who were attracted 
to the convenient and inexpensive, if substandard, housing. The new 
residents took little interest in the formal renewal designation many 
were busy protesting the Vietnam War. It would be some time before 
their attention was diverted to their own neighborhood, but when that 
happened it would have a lasting impact. 
Cedar-Riverside was designated an urban renewal area late in 
1968. The major opposition to renewal came from local business 
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Cedar-Riverside, 
late 1950s. 
These buildings were 
located on what the HRA 
considered one of the 
"most blighted" sites in 
Minneapolis. Structures 
such as these were 
removed to make way for 
senior citizen high-rise 
units. 
people, who saw no place for themselves in the redevelopment 
process. Some residents argued for a commitment to low-income 
housing in the renewal plan - to no avail. Older residents tended to 
support the idea of renewal. They knew that the community could not 
remain as it was, though some were also distressed at the prospect of 
losing their homes. The latter concern was eased somewhat by the 
construction of three high rises for the low-income elderly in the area 
between 1961 and 1962. At least long-time residents would not have 
to leave the neighborhood. 
The renewal plan that the Minneapolis City Council approved for 
Cedar-Riverside was somewhat unusual. It explicitly recognized the 
interests of the private developers by excluding their property from 
acquisition, provided that a redevelopment agreement between all 
parties was reached within five years. Property belonging to the 
University of Minnesota, St. Mary's and Fairview hospitals, and 
Augsburg College was also exempt from acquisition (see Map 9). The 
HRA would acquire little land in Cedar-Riverside but would oversee, and 
have to approve, whatever the private developers proposed. By the 
end of 1968 most of the privately held land in Cedar-Riverside was 
controlled by one developer, Cedar-Riverside Associates (CRA), who 
r 
proposed some grand plans for the area. 
CRA's notion of renewal in Cedar-Riverside involved rebuilding 
the entire community-spot clearance would not do. It envisioned a 
"new community" with strong links to the University of Minnesota and 
to the arts facilities it was trying to attract to the area. Its vision was 
ultimately enshrined in a proposal for a 11 New Town-In Town; 11 a place 
that would house 30,000 people in a high rise, high-density urban 
environment. This plan was accepted not just by the city, but was also 
endorsed by the federal government when Cedar-Riverside was named 
the first urban new town under the New Communities Program in 1971. 
Construction began on the first phase of the new town in 1972, and 
nearly 1,300 units of rental housing ranging from publicly subsidized to 
higher income were occupied starting in 1973 (Martin 1978). 
Renewal planning for Cedar-Riverside reached its peak with the 
"New Town" designation and the high rise construction of Cedar Square 
West. Even while the first stage of construction was still underway, the 
young, activist residents of Cedar-Riverside began to oppose further 
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Cedar-Riverside, 
mid-1960s. 
One of the first senior 
high-rises to go in was 
Cedar-Hi Apanments. 
These first towers 
were east of Cedar 
Avenue and south of 
Sixth Street and they 
paved the way for 
more to come. 
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Cedar-Riverside, 1974. 
Cedar Square West was 
part of the new town-in 
town chosen for 
Cedar-Riverside. Located 
just north of the Cedar-Hi 
Apartments, this project 
continued the process 
begun earlier of removing 
older run-down buildings 
and replacing them with 
new units. 
development. In December of 1973 they instituted a legal challenge to 
the Environmental Impact Statement that CRA filed for the second stage 
of the project. Their suit charged that the proposed development did 
not adequately assess how high rise, high-density construction would 
affect the neighborhood's environment. The plaintiffs had particular 
concerns about relocation, the lack of sufficient low-income housing, 
and the deleterious effects of high rise housing on children. By 1973 
hostility to the development proposed for Cedar-Riverside was 
widespread within the community. 
The lawsuit initiated a series of events that resulted in the 
rejection of the "New Town-In Town" renewal proposal. While the suit 
was underway, CRA could not continue construction on the second 
phase. This injunction coincided with the nationwide recession of 1973, 
and the forced delay seriously crippled CRA's financing. At one point 
the court decided the lawsuit in favor of the resident plaintiffs. Although 
immediately appealed, this decision laid the groundwork for a very 
different brand of renewal in Cedar-Riverside. 
After a long series of court battles and many years of arguing 
about Cedar-Riverside's future, the activist residents finally got what 
they wanted early in 1980. The old renewal plan calling for high-
density development was abandoned; the neighborhood's 
revitalization efforts would now emphasize rehabilitation and spot 
clearance. Minneapolis officials also had to recognize that neighbor-
hood activists would play a major role in the redevelopment process, 
because they had been so instrumental in bringing about these 
changes. The activists were quick to respond with ideas and plans for 
what they wanted their community to become. Their goal, above all, 
was to prevent Cedar-Riverside from slipping too far away from its 
beginnings -to maintain the sense of community and the low-income 
housing opportunities. 
Ironically, organized opposition to Cedar-Riverside's renewal 
came out of the PAC that the federal government mandated as a 
mechanism for resident review. In Cedar-Riverside, as in St. Anthony, 
PAC members became politically astute and learned how to work the 
system. By 1975 the Cedar-Riverside PAC had even set up its own 
development arm: the West Bank Community Development Corpora-
tion (CDC), which is still the local organization that other groups try to 
emulate. Their first creation was a co-op grocery, and later a co-op 
pharmacy. Within a short time, having found a way to link the funding 
of low- and moderate-income housing to the construction of a new 
hotel, the CDC became involved in a complicated partnership with the 
city and the Carlson Company. The West Bank CDC is now firmly in 
the development business. Area residents, in their capacity as CDC 
members and employees, decide which houses in Cedar-Riverside will 
be demolished or rehabilitated, and who will move in when the work is 
complete. The community group has now taken the place of the old 
HRA, and is performing many of its former functions. 
Seward 
When first proposed in 1959, the Seward renewal project in 
south Minneapolis did not seem difficult or controversial. This was one 
of the city's low-priority areas; it was run down, but not in desperate 
straits. In 1950, city planners considered 25 percent of the housing in 
Seward dilapidated (this included all dwellings without private baths). 
H RA officials proposed renewal for Seward earlier than they expected 
because it bordered the proposed 1-94 freeway (Minneapolis HRA 
1959). Highway clearance would begin a process that the HRA could 
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Map 10. Seward 
Renewal Projects 
E Lake St 
then continue. 
Moline 
Site 
City officials had other improvements in mind for Seward as well. 
Several small, outdated elementary schools were to be replaced by a 
larger new school, and playground facilities were to be improved or 
constructed. A new fire station was to be located in the area, replacing 
the old Station Number 7 in Cedar-Riverside. Planners were also 
concerned about the area's traffic patterns -there were too many 
accidents, too many area streets were cut off or crossed by rail lines, 
and generally too much traffic for the size of the area. In Seward, 
planners associated blight with the presence of railroad shops and 
yards, conflicting land uses, and the deteriorated housing. 
The renewal program that planners proposed for Seward 
included all of these proposals, but it focused on housing improve-
ments. Almost all of the housing south of the 1-94 route was to be 
upgraded. From Hiawatha Avenue to 25th Avenue, new residential 
development was proposed while rehabilitation would be used from 
25th to 31st avenues. The only part of Seward left untouched by 
renewal would be the far eastern corner nearest the Mississippi River 
(see Map 10). The need for renewal in Seward was proclaimed by HRA 
in language that did little to clarify what was being done and why: "The 
,.. 
, 
rnarket demand for land in the neighborhood is presumed to be 
insufficient to overcome obstacles in the assembly and clearance of 
land on anything more than a token basis." (Minneapolis HRA 1959, p. 
B7). By saying that the reason for clearance was the lack of a strong 
demand for land in Seward, the planners did little to assure residents 
that the need was real. 
Throughout the 1960s renewal proceeded slowly in Seward. 
The rehabilitation of eastern Seward was the first part of the renewal 
project. This work began in 1963 and was completed in 1974. As in 
eastern St. Anthony, code enforcement and spot clearance were used. 
The freeway was built, traffic improvements were made, and the new 
school was constructed. Work in southern Seward, which transformed 
an area of mixed housing and rail-related industry into a light industrial 
area, was also well underway by 197 4. Here the biggest question was 
the Minneapolis Moline site near East 27th Street and Minnehaha 
Avenue. When the giant farm-machinery factory was torn down in the 
early 1970s, conflict over the reuse of the site flared. Area residents 
supported industrial redevelopment while the city insisted on retail use. 
Because the conflict occurred when Dayton-Hudson happened to be 
choosing a site for its first central-city discount operation, new industrial 
use was overruled by city officials. With the 1976 opening of a Target 
store, large-scale discount retailing made its first appearance outside 
of the Twin Cities' suburbs. A small shopping mall connected the 
Target store to a Super-Valu grocery store. This initial experiment in 
suburban-style shopping for the central city would ultimately prove so 
successful that it would be repeated several more times in the Twin 
Cities. 
As renewal work was well underway in eastern Seward and in 
the southern industrial section, HRA's attention turned toward western 
Seward. But some things had changed since the original renewal 
designation, most specifically the population of western Seward. Some 
of the elderly residents had been replaced by students who moved here 
because of the low rents and the proximity to the West Bank campus 
of the University of Minnesota. As in other renewal areas, a PAC 
formed, and was soon battling the proposed clearance of western 
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Milwaukee Avenue, 
early 1970s. 
This block was slated for 
clearance because the 
housing was too old to be 
salvaged and the street 
too narrow. 
Seward. Residents of the area, particularly the younger ones, could 
not see the sense in removing a habitable stock of inexpensive housing. 
That residents' notions of habitable housing were somewhat at odds 
with the planners' definitions is an understatement. 
The PAC fought the proposed clearance, asking that the form 
of renewal in western Seward be changed to rehabilitation. The PAC 
had conducted its own survey of the area, using local architects, and 
found merit in the old houses of western Seward. The PAC argued that 
these houses should be saved and preserved, especially a two-block 
area of workers' housing on Milwaukee Avenue dating from the 1880s. 
The PAC contended that these houses derived historical significance 
for their role in sheltering early immigrants, and that they should be 
considered an asset rather than a liability. These preservation senti-
ments struck a response in the broader community; the broken-down 
houses of Milwaukee Avenue even drew media attention since they 
were such unlikely candidates for preservation. In the end the residents 
won. 
In 1972 the HRA resurveyed the neighborhood and agreed to 
consider rehabilitation for 180 of the 330 homes scheduled for demoli-
tion. The PAC did not end its activity with this agreement, however. It 
r 
l 
continued to argue for the area's historic significance, proposing that 
the Minnesota Historical Society study Milwaukee Avenue as a possible 
candidate for historic district designation. This designation was finally 
accomplished in May 1974 when Milwaukee Avenue was added to the 
National Register of Historic Places as one of the earliest "vernacular" 
districts - its restoration would be a living memorial to unnamed and 
unknown railroad workers and their families. (Most of the national 
historic districts designated before the early 1970s reflected a definite 
elitist notion about what was worth saving and restoring.) 
The Seward PAC pursued the historic angle as the only way to 
save its neighborhood. Its goals were only slightly different from those 
of the H RA. The PAC was intent on saving the architectural heritage of 
the community, in addition to maintaining home ownership. The PAC 
also expressed a strong interest in preserving the area's economic mix, 
so few opposed the construction of senior citizen high rises or scattered 
subsidized housing. (One specific PAC goal was to rehabilitate existing 
housing and keep it affordable for area residents. To accomplish this 
a local architectural group, Seward West Redesign, took on the job of 
rehabilitating vacant houses that the HRA sold to it.) 
The role that historic preservation played in the renewal of 
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Milwaukee Avenue, 
mid-1980s. 
Instead, the block was 
renovated and the street 
converted to a 
pedestrian mall. The 
houses were improved 
beyond their original 
conditions and the area 
was declared an historic 
district. 
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Seward was an important one. It gave area residents a tool to express 
their displeasure with the HRA's visions for their community. The initial 
renewal activity in western Seward happened to coincide with the 
federal mandate for resident review of renewal plans, as well as with a 
burgeoning interest in saving and restoring old houses. The residents 
who were active in the PAC were not as well off as those fighting for the 
preservation of Summit-University. But their interest in the artifacts of 
the past was just as strong. The argument they made in favor of 
preserving a nineteenth-century working-class landscape was telling -
they were helping to extend the public understanding of what 
Minneapolis' history was all about, as well as making the historic 
landscape of the city more inclusive. 
It turned out that preservation was a viable alternative for western 
Seward, though at the time few could have imagined how successful it 
would be. In the decade or so since Milwaukee Avenue's historic 
district designation, this area has changed rather substantially. 
Milwaukee Avenue itself has been fully restored, and the narrow street 
down the middle has been transformed into a landscaped pedestrian 
strip. Surrounding streets are full of restored houses, many of them 
the work of individuals who had little to invest but their sweat and 
dedication. Some newer in-fill houses have been built on lots where 
spot clearance occurred, along with some low-income housing that 
blends into the area rather well. Today, it would be very difficult for 
anyone encountering Seward for the first time to believe that sections 
were once deemed in need of almost total clearance. 
3. RENEWAL EFFORTS THAT WENT ASTRAY-
PROJECTS THAT WERE PLANNED, NOT ALWAYS 
CARRIED OUT, AND SELDOM SUCCESSFUL 
Lest we assume that every renewal project in the Twin Cities was 
at least a qualified success, there were also projects that never quite 
worked out as planned. The problem in these neighborhoods was not 
citizen opposition so much as citizen apathy. These neighborhoods 
tended to be off the beaten path, and had no organized voice to speak 
for them. Renewal in these places has been an on-again, off-again 
process- improvements would be made, but not enough to cause 
significant changes. 
Near-North 
The near-north side of Minneapolis has been the object of 
government planning and improvement efforts for more than fifty years, 
as the Glenwood profile previously demonstrated. But Glenwood was 
not the only part of the near•north side to receive aid; in fact it was a 
relatively small part of the total picture. By the late 1970s the entire area 
from the Mississippi River to the western city limits, and from the 
Burlington railroad tracks to north of Broadway had been part of one 
improvement program or another. More than fifty years of diverse 
programs have certainly changed this area. Nearly all of the industries 
are now gone and some sections, like Lyn Park, have improved 
dramatically. Although success stories here do exist, they are limited, 
and there has been little to compare to the south Minneapolis com-
munity control experiments which have done much to improve those 
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neighborhoods. 
Since planners had begun programs by the late 1950s to clear 
the Grant and Glenwood neighborhoods and to rehabilitate nearby 
Harrison, they had hoped to stall deteriorating conditions in this part of 
the city. This proved to be impossible, for the very process of renewing 
these areas had repercussions on the rest of the near-north community. 
The relatively healthy areas that surrounded Glenwood when clearance 
was first proposed in 1950 had, by the late 1960s, begun to change. 
The Plymouth Avenue riots in 1967 spurred the Jewish community to 
flee to the suburbs, leaving the near-north community without its most 
stable and financially able residents (Palm 1969). Left behind in this 
process was a large stock of abandoned housing, most of which was 
in rather good condition. Parts of the north side traditionally had large 
numbers of homeowners, but they were increasingly being replaced by 
renters without the resources or skills to maintain the houses they 
rented. 
The cycle of near-north renewal efforts can perhaps be sum-
marized in the experiences of the Harrison neighborhood (see Map 11). 
Immediately west of the Glenwood slum clearance project, this area 
was chosen in 1959 as the city's first overall rehabilitation effort. 
Planners hoped that the effort would extend the impact of Glenwood 
improvements even farther and allow the city to upgrade an area that 
did not need total clearance (Minneapolis HRA 1966a). To the city 
planning staff, neighborhood rehabilitation seemed to hold more posi-
tive potential than clearance, and its effects could be spread more 
widely throughout the entire community. 
At the start of the rehabilitation project, Harrison was a crowded 
area of small dwellings (mostly duplexes) developed before 1900; it was 
populated largely by Finns and those of Finnish descent. The first 
planning study in 1959 indicated that housing was not residents' 
biggest concern. In the 1964 CIP survey, five years after the rehabilita-
tion program began, Harrison's housing was uniformly rated in 
fair-good condition. Residents complained about issues other than 
housing however: the lack of nearby stores, the lack of good north-
south bus service (to get them to Plymouth Avenue and to Broadway 
r 
I 
where the stores were), too much traffic in the area, and the smell of 
Bassett's Creek. 
The proposed renewal program did not respond to these con-
cerns directly. Its purpose was to improve and upgrade the housing 
and the surrounding environment. In clear contrast to Glenwood, the 
Harrison program was a rehabilitation project. At the most, only 150 
houses would be acquired (out of more than 700), primarily for ex-
pected freeway development to the north and the south of Harrison. 
The planners' major complaint was that houses were too close 
together (only five to s'ix feet between houses), and many yards had an 
old shed. Because most houses did not meet the zoning requirements 
for lot sizes, planners encouraged owners of nonacquired properties 
to purchase adjacent cleared properties as part of the upgrading effort 
(Minneapolis HRA 1966a). 
As the rehabilitation of Harrison proceeded, a neighborhood 
advisory group was closely involved. Their role seems to have been 
merely advisory, not intrusive, as some of the later neighborhood 
groups would be perceived. This difference may stem from the fact 
that Harrison residents were invited to participate in the planning effort 
while later neighborhood groups were mandated by law to participate 
in the planning process. The end result, however, was the same: 
neighborhood residents worked with official planners. But those neigh-
borhood groups whose presence was mandated had the force of law 
behind them and generally felt more in control of whatever happened. 
The Harrison rehabilitation project was nearly completed when 
the Plymouth Avenue riots broke out. Although Harrison was not 
immediately affected, its residents had to face ongoing negative per-
ceptions of the entire near-north side. By the late 1970s, housing in 
Harrison was in average condition for the city, though ten years earlier 
it had been better-than-average. Perhaps this indicated that earlier 
rehabilitation efforts did not have a long-term effect. Still, more than 80 
percent of the single-family homes and more than 60 percent of the 
duplexes were owner-occupied in 1978, in dramatic contrast to neigh-
boring Glenwood where almost all units were rental (Minneapolis Office 
of the City Coordinator 1978). 
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In 1968 an even more extensive portion of the near-north area 
was designated for renewal. This new project included a neighborhood 
just north of Harrison, called Hay, and another area north of the old 
Glenwood-Grant clearance project, called Hall. Both areas still con-
tained some good quality housing. As the city-wide survey noted, "The 
western edge of the neighborhood is as fine a residential area as can 
be found in Minneapolis 11 (Minneapolis Community Improvement Pro-
gram 1967). City planners identified Hay's problems as social rather 
than physical, noting the large number of 11for sale" signs, the large 
proportion of elderly people, and the progressive movement of blacks 
into the formerly Jewish neighborhood. The situation in Hall was 
somewhat different. Planners considered Hall the most seriously 
deteriorated portion of the north side outside of already designated 
renewal areas. Most of the housing here, they felt, needed a significant 
amount of repair. 
The renewal plans for these areas addressed several other 
concerns. Both neighborhoods were affected by nearby commercial 
decline. Each bordered on Plymouth Avenue, which by 1968 contained 
several blocks of burned-out commercial structures. Both had 
obsolete school buildings that needed to be replaced. And each was 
affected by programmed highway improvements: Hay abutted Olson 
Highway which was about to be upgraded to a freeway, and Hall was 
adjacent to the projected extension of 1-94. Officials conceived the 
renewal plan as a way to address these myriad concerns in a coherent 
fashion. 
Renewal in the near-north area has been a slow and continuous 
process. It was not until the late 1970s that new rental housing was 
finally built on Plymouth Avenue's empty lots. The 1-94 project was 
stalled until the early 1980s, though land was cleared for it in the 1960s. 
Portions of the near-north area were later selected for special city 
programs: West Broadway became a tax increment district in 1973 to 
promote economic development; Willard-Homewood, which included 
the Hay renewal area, became a neighborhood development program 
(using CDBG money) in 1975. Additionally, a new shopping area, 
anchored by a Target store, opened on West Broadway in 1982. The 
'T:HO (Willard-Homewood Organization) vigorously supported urban 
/ homesteading efforts. Consequently, the number of owner-occupied 
homes on the western edge of the near-north neighborhood has 
increased, and the decline of this area has been reversed. Even some 
changes that were unthinkable ten or twenty years ago have occurred, 
such as the construction of market-rate housing developments like the 
Boardwalk project just south of Broadway near Lyndale. 
Despite all of these programs and all of the successes, the 
near-north area still suffers from negative public impressions. This is 
partly due to the concentration of public housing and subsidized 
housing in this part of the city, largely in the Glenwood, Grant, and Hall 
renewal areas. Much of this housing is for the elderly, and other 
neighborhoods (notably Phillips) also have large amounts of low-
income housing. But the concentration of this housing stock on both 
sides of Olson Highway, a major suburban commuter route, sustains 
many peoples' quite negative impressions of near-north. 
Nicollet Island 
The Nicollet Island renewal project has been around for so long 
and gone through so many different transformations, that few people 
remember what was originally supposed to happen here. The island 
today has a kind of romantic, nonconformist mystique about it. But 
twenty years ago most planners thought of it merely as a slum that had 
to be removed. In some ways Nicollet Island could be considered 
another story of citizen opposition. As in Seward and Cedar-Riverside, 
Nicollet Island residents managed to stave off the forces of improve-
ment. But the island's renewal experience was not so much a matter 
of residents countering the evil forces of renewal as it was the story of 
public agencies competing for the privilege of reshaping the island, 
each in their own way. 
Nicollet Island had been an odd hodge-podge from its first 
development in the late nineteenth century. The southern part of the 
island had always been industrial in character; the mid-section con-
tained upper-middle class row houses and, after 1900, a Catholic high 
school; the northern end was a mixture of working-class housing and 
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Map 12. Minneapolis 
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a few substantial Victorian structures (see Map 12). Every part of the 
island had been deteriorating since the early twentieth century. By the 
mid-1960s, when the Gateway renewal project was well underway, the 
Minneapolis HRA turned its attention to nearby Nicollet Island as part 
of the agency's neighborhood renewal efforts. The island's population 
by this time was very mixed: transients occupied the middle and 
southern portions (some had moved from Gateway), and elderly 
working-class people and some young 11hippies 11 lived on the northern 
tip. 
H RA planners considered much of the island a skid-row 
environment. By the mid 1960s, a row house that had originally 
contained eight units was divided up into eighty-eight sleeping rooms. 
The city planned to remove most of the existing housing, but the 
ultimate reuse of the land was unclear. The clearance initiative was 
complicated because HRA planners recognized that the island was a 
repository of many historic buildings, some of which could prove to be 
significant. Still HRA's plan to clear the island was approved by the city 
council without significant opposition in the late 1960s, though funding 
for the project was delayed. 
By 1970 the HRA was ready to begin work on Nicollet Island. As 
part of the federal renewal guidelines, the agency had to find a group 
of island residents to review the plans and their implementation. 
Reaction to these efforts was not enthusiastic. But after some Min-
neapolis HRA community organizers convinced a small number of 
residents to get involved, a citizen participation group eventually began. 
A young man named Fred Markus who had learned his politics in the 
radical atmosphere of Madison, Wisconsin in the late 1960s emerged 
as a leader of the citizen group (Henig 1981). Along with the other 
young island residents, Markus thought that total clearance was 
inappropriate, but they seemed powerless to prevent it. The H RA ·was 
already cooperating with the state highway department to rebuild the 
east bank approach to the Hennepin Avenue bridge. In the process all 
of the tenement housing on Hennepin Avenue was removed, and more 
housing nearby was destroyed when De LaSalle High School 
expanded. 
Almost accidentally, Markus had learned that historic designa-
tion afforded some protection to areas affected by federal spending. 
He quickly joined forces with the Minnesota Historical Society to have 
the island included in the proposed St. Anthony Falls National Register 
district. This effort was successful, and in 1971 the historic district was 
designated. Complete clearance would now be more difficult and 
would, moreover, be subject to both state and city agency approval. 
The Nicollet Island PAC membership was never large, but it was 
committed to maintaining the residents' fragile stake in the island. By 
1976, Markus had managed to get the PAC some CDBG funding-
about $30,000 per year-and the PAC promptly spent some of this 
money to begin island improvements. Residents were hired to clean 
up empty lots and plant community gardens. The island's physical 
environs were improving slightly just as the Minneapolis Community 
Development Agency (MCDA, the successor agency to HRA) was 
buying up all the houses-still it seemed, with the intention of tearing 
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them down. Meanwhile the Minneapolis Park Board had been planning 
to designate the island a regional park, and it too was acquiring land. 
Residents opposed both ideas, but they did not control any of the land. 
The indecision and conflicts surrounding Nicollet Island's 
redevelopment continued for nearly another decade while the remain-
ing houses continued to deteriorate. In 1985, all interested parties 
finally reached a compromise about the island's future. Most of the 
land (excepting De LaSalle High School and two private residential 
developments) was turned over to the park board, which would clear 
the remaining industrial sites, begin park improvements, and hold 
long-term leases for the housing parcels. In an arrangement similar to 
one made with Cedar-Riverside residents, MCDA agreed to rehabilitate 
the housing on the island, working through a community development 
corporation to insure resident control. MCDA also agreed that current 
residents would have first claim on the renovated units. 
In late 1987, nearly twenty years after renewal was proposed for 
the island, the landscape remains remarkably unchanged. Most in-
dustrial structures and the worst tenements have been removed, and 
some areas have been turned into community gardens, but Nicollet 
Island still seems a bit out of sync with the rest of Minneapolis' renewal 
efforts. It is an idiosyncratic place that resists easy categorization. 
Improvement efforts here, in contrast to almost every other part of the 
city, were complicated by the presence of semi-independent and 
competing agencies (MCDA and the Minneapolis Park Board) trying to 
reach different, and sometimes incompatible, goals. 
4. THE COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING APPROACH 
Powderhorn 
No place in the Twin Cities has had a more complex renewal 
experience than that of the Powderhorn area, in part because the area 
is so large and diverse. In the 1960s the Powderhorn community 
encompassed all of south Minneapolis between Lyndale and Hiawatha 
avenues. It extended from 1-94 to 42nd Street on the east side of 35W 
and from Franklin Avenue to 36th Street on the west side of the freeway 
(see Map 13). It was the largest area in Minneapolis to undergo renewal 
T 
24th St 3 
5 
6 
26th St 
Lake St 
36th St 
5W 
\ 
4 
7 
Corcoran 
1 Stevens Square 
2 Elliot Park 
3 Washburn Fair Oaks 
4 Phillips 
5 Whittier 
6 Hospital Area 
7 Powderhorn Park 
Standish 
efforts. Within Powderhorn's boundaries were some of Minneapolis' 
poorest areas as well as some formerly luxurious sections on Park 
Avenue and near the Institute of Arts. 
Excepting several blocks around Lake Street, Powderhorn has 
been spared total clearance. This is perhaps the only consistent 
element in the community's overall renewal experience. Spot 
clearance and scattered-site housing construction have been used 
widely in Powderhorn. One section (Washburn-Fair Oaks) was desig-
nated a historic district. Private reinvestment has been a hallmark of 
this particular area, as in Whittier and in the area surrounding Powder-
horn Park. Elsewhere (Phillips in particular) community-controlled 
development has been prominent. Major Twin Cities' corporations 
have also played a role in renewing the Powderhorn community. 
The one constant element in this area's twenty years of renewal 
efforts has been citizen participation. This portion of south Minneapolis 
has been a nursery for activism on a level unknown elsewhere in the 
Map 13. Powderhorn 
Model City Area 
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Twin Cities, except in the nearby Cedar-Riverside and Seward neigh-
borhoods. This was due, in part, to the presence of activist students 
and ex-students in Powderhorn during the mid to late 1970s. 
Powderhorn's response to renewal can be viewed in part as an exten-
sion of the activist-interventionist renewal stance of Cedar-Riverside 
and Seward. But nonstudent, non-political (i.e., older) residents also 
played a large role in Powderhorn's redevelopment. 
The Powderhorn community was a candidate for renewal from 
the beginning but planners never considered it a critical area. In the 
HRA's 1958 program it was one of the low-priority projects. 
Powderhorn had the usual problems: an aging housing stock, includ-
ing many dwellings that had been converted to rooming houses; a 
mixture of industry and housing, especially along the 29th Street 
corridor; and schools that needed replacing. In addition, the neighbor-
hoood needed to respond to three projected interstate freeways: l-35W 
was to be built through the middle of Powderhorn, the Hiawatha freeway 
on its eastern edge, and a crosstown freeway parallel to 28th Street. 
But Powderhorn also had unusual assets for a renewal area, 
including cultural resources such as the Minneapolis Institute of Arts 
and the Swedish Institute which attracted people from all around the 
region. Several hospitals helped to provide jobs and an identity for the 
community. A few of the hospitals, notably Abbott-Northwestern and 
Mount Sinai, were anxious to expand their facilities and services. A 
struggling, but still viable, shopping area focused around the Sears 
store at Chicago Avenue and Lake Street was also present. By the 
mid-1960s the Lake Street strip, long the dominant commercial center 
of south Minneapolis, had to compete with suburban malls. The 
Powderhorn Business Association, intent on achieving parity through 
parking ramps, sometimes was opposed by resident groups with 
different concerns. 
As in other renewal areas, evidence of blight in Powderdorn was 
widely dispersed, but generally the most significant deterioration was 
close to Franklin Avenue. Continuing south through the community, 
the physical environment improved, so much so that neighborhoods 
like Corcoran and Standish were to be conserved. In contrast, the 
Phillips neighborhood (bordering Franklin Avenue) was designated by 
planners for immediate action, to slow down the widely recognized 
deteriorating conditions. For the most part, the focus of renewal in 
Powderhorn was to improve the existing housing stock. This strategy 
recognized that the community would continue to provide housing 
opportunities for low- and moderate-income city residents. 
Powderhorn residents were among the first in Minneapolis to 
organize, long before large numbers of students appeared. They were 
not opposed to renewal, but they were skeptical about it. The first local 
advocacy group, the Phillips Neighborhood Improvement Association 
(PNIA), was formed in 1962, even before Powderhorn was targeted for 
renewal. Like their counterparts in northeast Minneapolis, Powderhorn 
residents realized some of the implications of renewal. Having 
observed the near-north side renewal project, they were firmly opposed 
to clearance. Fortunately, the city agreed with this assessment, so 
little conflict occurred in the early years. 
Powderhorn's renewal commenced in the mid-1960s when the 
area became Minneapolis' Model Cities demonstration project. As 
such, it had access to special revenues and special opportunities such 
as programs for job training, economic development, elderly care, and 
Phillips neighborhood, 
early 1960s. 
Housing like this was 
cleared to make way for 
low rent public housing. 
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chemical dependency among many others. The Model Cities 
approach to improving low-income communities was more com-
prehensive than what was typically achieved through urban renewal. 
Where renewal programs generally assumed that physical improve-
ments to the landscape would encourage social improvements, the 
Model Cities approach assumed that funding for social programs had 
to be specified, and that these funds should accompany, or even 
precede, whatever landscape improvements were planned. The Model 
Cities program was one of the classic "Great Society" efforts of the 
mid-1960s. Like the Headstart and food stamp programs, it addressed 
complex problems in a scattered-shot way, not knowing what would 
succeed. 
The Minneapolis Model Cities project was slightly ahead of its 
time - local discussion of the idea preceded the federal program by a 
year or more. Based on information in the city-wide survey, local 
planners saw a need for simultaneous programs in the areas of 
education, housing, health, and social services (Minneapolis Com-
munity Improvement Program 1965). Improving these aspects of city 
life, planners thought, would ensure an attractive alternative to subur-
ban living within Minneapolis. Planners would concentrate their efforts 
on heavily deteriorated areas (such as the near-north and near-south 
sides), but they also wanted to spread the effect of these programs 
throughout the entire core of the city. Local thinking (articulated by 
Robert Jorvig, then the Minneapolis City Coordinator) held that such a 
broad approach could work here because local problems were more 
manageable than in other cities (Jorvig 1985). 
For the next eight to ten years, until the Model Cities program 
was phased into the CDBG process, many incremental improvements 
transpired in the Powderhorn community. A number of senior citizen 
high rises were built; neighborhood parks were expanded and 
improved; a large new elementary school replaced several old school 
buildings; and a new high school was created, with magnet programs 
to draw students from the entire city. By the late 1970s the housing 
stock had visibly improved as well, but this only occurred sporadically, 
as in a small section of Whittier. Other parts of the community, most 
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notably the Phillips area, had not improved much at all. 
Despite all the projects made possible through the Model Cities 
program and through private investment, some of Powderhorn's old 
problems persist. Planners and residents alike remain concerned 
about the Lake Street and Franklin Avenue commercial strips, which 
now must compete with central city shopping malls, as well as suburban 
ones. Powderhorn citizens' groups have tried, with some success and 
abetted by the VCR boom, to eliminate the X-rated movie theaters and 
massage parlors from these streets to make them more appealing to 
area families. 
The housing stock in Powderhorn has improved some, yet 
substandard units remain since much of the housing is among the 
oldest in the city. Still, housing improvement efforts in Powderhorn 
have been of heroic proportions: by the late 1970s, after more than a 
dozen years in the Model Cities program (including the use of CDBG 
money), 1,875 dwellings units had been rehabilitated. The rehabilita-
tion cost more than $25 million, with most of it federally provided 
(Minneapolis HRA 1979b). Rehabilitating this number of units was a 
Phillips neighborhood, 
mid-1960s. 
The same site now holds 
a high-rise building that 
provides public housing 
for seniors. 
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major undertaking, accomplished primarily through the use of grants 
and low-interest loans to homeowners. One quite innovative approach 
to housing problems blossomed throughout the Powderhorn com-
munity in the 1970s when more rental units were transformed into 
cooperatively owned units than in any other part of the Twin Cities. This 
shift created a need for residents who were capable of managing their 
own housing, and greatly increased the amount of owner-occupied 
housing as well. 
Throughout the 1970s the Phillips neighborhood experienced 
more changes than the rest of Powderhorn. The minority population, 
primarily composed of blacks and Native Americans who had long been 
present, was increasing, although 74 percent of the residents in 1978 
in Phillips were white. But a new group, Southeast Asian refugees, was 
becoming visible in the community. The Asians competed with other 
low-income households for low-cost housing, and sometimes taxed the 
housing supply by crowding several families into a single unit. 
PNIA, the neighborhood group, was the best organized citizens' 
group outside of Cedar-Riverside by the late 1970s. It tried to respond 
to the varied changes occurring in the community by lobbying city 
council members for assistance, suggesting zoning. changes, and 
helping to decide how CDBG money should be spent. PN IA also 
developed its own neighborhood plan, focusing on maintaining afford-
able housing and creating additional units. To ensure community 
control a local development corporation was formed, as was a credit 
union and a neighborhood land trust (Lauria 1980). The latter was a 
particularly unusual effort: with funding from Honeywell, the trust 
purchased houses from nearby Elliot Park that would otherwise have 
been destroyed and moved them into Phillips. 
PNIA was so successful in its various efforts, and so convinced 
that its situation was unique, that by 1980 it refined the notion of 
community power even further. It asked the city to create a new 
planning district exclusively for the Phillips neighborhood. Geographi-
cally the neighborhood was one of the largest in the city, but it would 
become the smallest planning district. The city agreed to this change, 
in effect ratifying the political acumen of this one citizens' group. (In 
t Minneapolis' system, several neighborhoods constitute a community, 
and the larger community area functions as a planning district.) 
Urban renewal in general required citizen involvement in a way 
that few other federal programs did before or have since. In the Twin 
Cities, citizen participation was one of the keys to a successful renewal 
experience -from the neighborhood's perspective, if not always from 
the city's. In the cases of Minneapolis and St. Paul, planners viewed 
the prospect of citizen involvement positively from an early point. For 
example, in the early 1960s the Minneapolis HRA opened field offices 
even before it was clear that federal dollars would support them. By 
1968 there were twenty-five offices with 250 to 300 employees (Min-
neapolis HRA 1977). As early as 1965 the resident councils were at the 
center of rehabilitation efforts city-wide. 
One can, of course, be cynical and say that nothing different 
occurred even when citizens did participate in the renewal process. 
One analysis has in fact taken this view, arguing that, in practice, citizen 
participation meant participation by existing local leaders (McKay 
1969). It further argues that citizen involvement in the renewal process 
was minimal until the Model Cities programs of the mid-1960s, and after 
that point it was the same "preachers and paid staff members" who 
were represented, not ordinary citizens. 
This may have been the case for some renewal projects, 
notably those on the near-north side of Minneapolis. But it does not 
explain or account for the high degree of citizen participation (and later 
of citizen control) in many of the near-south side projects in Minneapolis 
(Lauria 1980). The experiences of these projects support the argument 
that urban renewal empowered residents, altered the relationship 
between citizens and their local governments, and ultimately, even 
changed the local governing process. 
NEIGHBORHOOD RENEWAL: THE SOCIAL 
AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 
Minneapolis and St. Paul had consistent goals in carrying out 
neighborhood renewal projects. The most important were to stabilize 
neighborhoods, promote home ownership, and retain or attract 
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middle-class families. Most of the rehabilitation efforts within the 
renewal programs centered on owner-occupied dwellings. Conse-
quently, in part, the bottom end of the rental market has been squeezed 
tightly, and a burden placed on the public housing and subsidy 
programs that were to address this problem. 
Three issues have generally characterized local city involvement 
in the maintenance, renewal, and promotion of neighborhoods and 
housing. 
1. Local governmental authority in this area has grown 
gradually, but steadily, and now plays a significant role. In 
the 1880s, city governments imposed and enforced building 
codes; by the 1920s both cities had zoning, and the idea of 
public planning, however ineffective in those years, took root. 
During the 1930s local authorities and leaders of both cities 
sought federal aid for public housing, though only 
Minneapolis succeeded. In the 1950s the semi-
independent HRAs acted to clear slums and build public 
housing. Recently public efforts of this kind have been 
deflected a bit, but not ended. In the late 1960s the HRAs 
tried new strategies: subsidized housing, scattered-site 
public housing, systematic code enforcement, selective 
clearance. In the 1970s there were further innovations, 
including St. Paul's aggressive programs to boost 
neighborhood commerce. Municipal involvement in 
housing and neighborhoods has now been institutionalized. 
People may debate the city's proper role in these activities, 
but there is no question that the city should be involved. 
2. At the same time, federal responsibility for, and direct 
involvement in, neighborhood and housing issues has 
decreased. The federal government ventured into this area 
with its first construction of public housing in the 1930s. After 
a long hiatus federal efforts resumed in the 1950s, largely 
through transferring money to local operating agencies. 
Although the federal government continues to make money 
for housing available to developers, households, and public 
T 
f agencies, local housing efforts now take precedence over 
anything that the federal government is doing in this area. 
This shift involved other factors, of course, including federal 
tax policy, federal and state housing programs, local 
nonprofits and foundations, and the emergence of 
community-based political leaders. 
3. Tensions continue to exist between the social and economic 
objectives of local housing efforts. Every city needs to pay 
attention to both social and economic issues, but in a 
particular location these objectives can be quite 
incompatible. With respect to neighborhood development, 
local governments have two major goals: to improve the 
lives of the city's poor, and to maintain or enhance the city's 
tax base by retaining or attracting middle-class families. In 
the past decade these tensions regularly surfaced in debates 
over gentrification, the label used when middle-class 
households invest in and settle in poor neighborhoods. 
Such debates are of public interest because middle-class 
in-migration has usually had some inducement, even 
possible governmental assistance. City governments need 
to mediate between lower-income residents' legitimate 
needs and middle-class newcomers' demands. 
In the previously described case studies there are some factors 
that, taken together, begin to explain why neighborhood renewal efforts 
worked as they did in the Twin Cities. These factors also begin to 
explain why renewal in the Twin Cities often looked significantly different 
from what was done in other cities. 
Class-Status Issues 
The role played by social class and status has always been 
crucial in analyzing urban renewal. This is as true in the Twin Cities as 
elsewhere, but there are some important distinctions. In some cities 
local activists criticized the urban renewal program for being a program 
of "Negro removal." The thrust of this criticism was that well-sited 
minority neighborhoods were emptied to provide sites for higher in-
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come developments (Hartman 1964). In the Twin Cities two black 
neighborhoods were dispersed not by renewal per se, but by freeway 
construction. Throughout the period of urban renewal the minority 
population of both cities was so low ( 4 to 5 percent) that renewal 
programs to move this group around could not have been very 
effective. 
An interesting pattern emerges in looking at local responses to 
renewal in class-status terms in the Twin Cities. Neighborhoods with 
well-educated, low-income residents fared much better throughout the 
renewal process, as did ethnic communities with strong political clout. 
In such areas residents were consistently able to stop or change 
renewal plans and often gained a large measure of control over the 
process. Student residents of these areas had the necessary 
knowledge to 11fight city hall 11 ; they, along with elderly residents, had time 
to spend in the often tedious process of community organizing. 
Areas that house large numbers of students, however, are not 
low income in the usual sense, even though the student residents may 
not have much disposable income. The student population brought 
skill and ability to these low-income communities, as well as fairly 
middle-class attitudes about people's ability to control their own 
destiny. Part of the difference between levels of citizen involvement in 
Minneapolis and St. Paul may be explained by their differing student 
populations. St. Paul's large contingent of college students tends to 
be "traditional"-they finish school in four years and usually live on 
campus. Students at the University of Minnesota, in contrast, spend 
more than five years in college and normally live in the community rather 
than on campus. This is especially true for the graduate students who 
come from outside Minnesota and spend five to ten years working 
toward degrees. The two cities' respective housing stocks may sug-
gest another reason for their different levels of citizen involvement: 
Minneapolis had a large stock of inexpensive rental housing con-
centrated around downtown and the university; St. Paul's supply of 
similar housing was not especially close to downtown, and quite far 
from most of the colleges. 
Citizen participation in community activities became even more 
important in 1975 when the state legislature provided funds for com-
munity development corporations. Grants for these projects were quite 
specific: groups receiving grants had to be nonprofit organizations 
attached to a specific geographical area; 60 percent of the board 
members had to be poor residents of the community; nonprofessional 
hiring had to be done among defined low-income groups (Lauria 1980). 
Residents who were students were not the only ones to note the 
significance of this opportunity, but neighborhoods that housed activist 
students (and former students) had an advantage in this process. The 
activist student groups' organizational skills, and knowledge about how 
to get things done, gave these neighborhoods a head start in the 
community development business. Areas like Cedar-Riverside, with its 
experienced community organization, were consequently able to imple-
ment their own, rather than the city's plans. 
The Private Sector 
In the Twin Cities another aspect of urban renewal differed 
markedly from the norm. This was the role played by private investors 
in certain renewal areas. The classic urban renewal role for private 
investors was to acquire land at low prices and then proceed with 
whatever project they had planned. This was certainly one role that 
investors played in Minneapolis and St. Paul, as they did elsewhere. 
But private investors, and especially large local corporations, had an 
even greater involvement in the Twin Cities' renewal. 
Although it did not become obvious until much later, the success 
of certain renewal projects depended heavily upon the Twin Cities' 
business interests. As a matter of course, the business community was 
quite involved in downtown renewal efforts in both cities. But 
businessmen also supported certain neighborhood renewal efforts, 
notably on the near~south side of Minneapolis in some of the most 
politically active parts of the city. Corporate involvement was, in many 
ways, one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Twin Cities' 
renewal experience. Corporate involvement with renewal was 
symptomatic of the strong role that corporations play in the Twin Cities' 
nonprofit organizations. Led by Dayton's (later Dayton-Hudson) in the 
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1960s, many of the large corporations joined what was called the "5 
Percent Club," pledging to donate 5 percent of their pre-tax profits 
annually to nonprofit organizations (Bemis and Cairns 1981). 
The corporations that participated in this process had mixed 
motives: some were interested in overall social improvement efforts, 
some were trying to protect investments they had already made in 
somewhat marginal areas, and some wanted to prove that business 
could create housing and jobs cheaper and more effectively than 
government could. Their approaches differed as well. Some corpor-
ations intended to make money from their neighborhood activities; 
others wrote it off as a worthwhile social investment. Regardless of the 
motives or the tactics devised, an epidemic of corporations "adopting" 
neighborhoods in Minneapolis ensued during the early 1970s. 
Within the spectrum of corporate activity, both positive and 
negative experiences occurred. Honeywell's involvement was one of 
the most positive. The company made a commitment to the Phillips 
neighborhood, one of the poorest in the city, following a decision to 
expand the corporate headquarters and remain in the neighborhood. 
Honeywell's efforts focused on improving the housing stock. Money 
was provided to fix up houses and keep them available for the low- and 
moderate-income residents of the area, especially those who had been 
displaced. Honeywell also encouraged its corporate staff to work on 
neighborhood issues, and made one executive available on a full-time 
basis to the community. The company made no pretense that it would 
make money in this effort. The management seemed to believe that 
investing in the local community was good business sense (Cox 1978). 
Dayton-Hudson also had a positive neighborhood experience 
with its choice to invest in the Whittier area. Like Honeywell, it had a 
clear rationale for choosing this particular neighborhood. The Dayton 
family had long been one of the strong supporters of the Minneapolis 
Institute of Arts, located in the center of the Whittier area. In the early 
1970s the institute made a commitment to expand its space. Soon 
after, Dayton-Hudson began to assist the neighborhood with a $5 
million, five-year grant for planning and physical improvements (Brooks 
1984). The money was funneled through the local residents group, 
r 
r 
f Whittier Alliance, and the residents participated in debates about how 
the money should be spent. 
Other corporate ventures into neighborhood improvement were 
somewhat less successful. General Mills made a commitment to the 
Stevens Square area, just south of downtown Minneapolis. It planned 
to rehabilitate the older apartment buildings, generally upgrading the 
quality of the housing stock, but it gave no commitment to retain local 
residents. General Mills created a for-profit subsidiary to support work 
already begun by a local developer. Within a short time, friction 
erupted. The neighborhood group objected to General Mills' making 
the area less affordable, and organized labor objected to its use of 
unskilled laborers for the rehabilitation work. By the end of 1979, 
General Mills had spent $1 O million in the area, and a great deal of 
physical improvement had been accomplished. But the company 
decided to end its special relationship with this area. The return on 
investment it had expected simply was not there (Cox 1978). 
Control Data had an even less favorable experience when its 
foray into neighborhood improvement was actively and vocally 
opposed by local residents. Control Data had chosen the Elliot Park 
area as one of the sites for its 11City Venture" job creation and housing 
program. From a corporate standpoint, the choice was an unfortunate 
one. This area was already engaged in fighting City Hall and various 
corporate powers over the nearby construction of a domed stadium. 
The very idea of a corporation coming in to "improve" Elliot Park was 
anathema to the area's already beleagured low-income residents. 
They fought back, making it clear that they needed no corporate 
assistance to bring about their vision of the future. After several years 
of frustration, Control Data finally ended its involvement in Elliot Park. 
These various strains of corporate community involvement 
describe a complex pattern. Corporate involvement in local areas was 
not the only kind of private investment during these years. Private 
individuals, through their independent decisions about where and how 
to live, were just as important. And there were other kinds of 
philanthropic neighborhood efforts, most notably the McKnight Family 
Housing Fund. The fund was not tied to a specific community, but 
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sought to make home ownership affordable throughout the Twin Cities 
area. 
The corporate agenda for any particular neighborhood had to 
compete with residents' own ideas, and the corporations did not always 
win. In fact, corporations were seldom able to direct activity in any given 
community. Usually the corporation found itself supporting residents' 
groups, or working with them once a plan of action was formulated. 
What is most interesting and instructive is that the corporations tried to 
become involved in neighborhood affairs at all. The message that 
might be derived here is an interesting one in light of prior urban renewal 
efforts. The corporations' view seemed to be that grand urban design, 
as practiced through urban renewal, was unnecessary; perhaps the 
time had come for them to focus on smaller, more feasible projects. 
Political-Structural Issues 
In the years since neighborhood renewal began in the Twin 
Cities, striking changes in some neighborhoods, as well as in the 
renewal process, have occurred. Renewal per se is, of course, now a . 
dead issue. This has been recognized by renaming what would have 
been called renewal, redevelopment. 
In the late 1970s both cities instituted rather far-reaching 
changes in their handling of redevelopment projects. The old renewal 
agencies, the HRAs, were eliminated. In 1978 St. Paul chose to merge 
its HRA directly into the new Department of Planning and Economic 
Development. This agency combined the functions of project planning, 
financial-technical assistance, and project management. It works 
directly with the mayor to centralize and speed up development 
decisions. St. Paul also has a port authority, which can choose to assist 
various development projects by providing financing. Most developers 
find this an efficient system. It may even be that the recent turnaround 
in St. Paul development can be partly attributed to the ease of conduct-
ing development business there. 
Minneapolis chose a slightly different tactic by creating the 
Minneapolis Community Development Agency (MCDA). This change 
appeared to be a streamlining of the process, but in fact planning and 
T 
development were maintained as separate functions. City planners 
reported to the city council, but development was implemented by the 
MCDA. Not surprisingly, many found this a cumbersome process. In 
effect, three city agencies administered development: the city council; 
the MCDA, which handled tax increment financing, oversaw commer-
cial and industrial properties as well as housing; and the Minneapolis 
Industrial Development Commission (MIDC), which managed industrial 
revenue bonds as well as buying and selling industrial land. 
In this framework the city had split goals for redevelopment. 
MCDA adopted an interventionist stance whereas the MIDC followed 
the lead of market forces. Agencies were pitted against one another 
and lengthy fights ensued, notably over the Burlington Northern land 
on the downtown riverfront, and over the use of cleared land in 
northeast Minneapolis when plans for an interstate freeway were aban-
doned. The MCDA and the city council were often at odds because 
CDBG money required council approval. The old HRA staff, now within 
MCDA, defined themselves as the protectors of the citizen participation 
process, which they feared the politicians did not sufficiently respect. 
One long-time city employee summed up the city's development 
process as "screwed up and chaotic" (Mack 1980, p. 67). This assess-
ment was ratified early in 1986 when the city council voted to abolish 
the MCDA and fold its functions back under the wing of the council. 
The political-bureaucratic framework for making development 
decisions became quite complicated when urban renewal formally 
ended. What was formerly handled by a moderately sized staff now 
requires a large staff, and financial specialists occupy the roles formerly 
filled by city planning generalists. With no commitment from the federal 
government to support city improvement, cities themselves have had 
to become more sophisticated and creative to generate development. 
EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF PUBLIC 
AND SUBSIDIZED HOUSING 
Providing decent, affordable housing was one of the two main 
thrusts of urban renewal when it began in 1949. In the early years local 
housing agencies made a concerted effort to create a broad spectrum 
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of public housing, though these efforts were often constrained by 
available sites. The renewed slums of both cities were where the first 
highly visible public housing projects were built. In the public mind, 
public housing and slum clearance efforts were inextricably linked even 
though, by the end of the 1950s, the first active period of public housing 
construction had ended. Over the years, public efforts to build low-
income housing have wavered, and finally have become a local, rather 
than a federal, initiative. 
Throughout the first stages of urban renewal, massive federal 
aid allowed local authorities to construct substantial quantities of public 
housing. The first housing built under these programs was con• 
centrated in large projects, often with high rise buildings, and mixed 
elderly residents with families. Many of the design elements associated 
with these projects have since been discredited, including site planning 
that left little usable open space, and the usual provision of double 
loaded corridors. Constructing high rise units for households with 
children - not a characteristic of Twin Cities projects -was roundly 
criticized by some scholars and community activists beginning in the 
early 1970s, but these units remain in use in many cities. 
During the early stages of urban renewal the HRAs also had to 
contend with the fears of private landlords, worried that public housing 
would glut the lower end of the housing market and drive down rents. 
These fears were unrealistic since the HRAs could barely afford to 
replace units lost to slum clearance, but they made the politics of public 
housing quite difficult. The 1950s projects are still the bulk of the Twin 
Cities' stock of public housing for families (see Map 14). The projects 
include: 
Minneapolis 
• Glendale completed in 1952; 158 family and 25 elderly 
units. 
• Lyndale-completed in 1959; 86 family and 87 elderly units. 
• Olson - completed in 1960; 66 family and 186 elderly units. 
• Glenwood -completed in 1960; 220 family units. 
• Sumner-Field -ownership transferred from the federal 
government in 1958; 240 family and 21 O elderly units. 
r 
~ 
i 
Sumner 
Glenwoo~ ~eld " ■Olson N~ ■McDonough 
• Lynda le 
~ Glendale 
-~• 
' 
■ Mt.Airy 
St. Paul 
• Roosevelt - completed in 1952; 320 family units. 
• McDonough - completed in 1952; 520 family units. 
• Mt. Airy completed in 1959; 272 family and 176 elderly 
units. 
The sometimes difficult politics of public housing construction 
clearly reflected national debates over the public housing issue. At the 
outset, political parties and organized labor both favored building such 
projects. Opposition came from the real estate industry and from those 
who opposed government interference in the housing market on prin-
ciple. During the early 1950s these groups organized several 
unsuccessful attempts to stop the public housing effort. Still, such 
opposition generally affected the location of most public housing 
projects in the Twin Cities. 
■Roosevelt 
Map 14. Minneapolis 
and St. Paul Family 
Public Housing 
Projects 
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Few Minnesotans were against the idea of building public hous-
ing, especially if the cost was borne largely by the federal government. 
But as in most states, locating public housing projects was always a 
problem - no one wanted a project next door. Solutions in St. Paul and 
Minneapolis mirrored those in other cities. Most projects were built 
either on land that had been vacant and remote from other neighbor-
hoods, or on land cleared specifically for urban renewal. Roosevelt, 
McDonough, and Glendale were all built on previously unused land. 
Mt. Airy and all the Minneapolis projects except Glendale were built on 
partially cleared land. McDonough and Roosevelt border a middle-
class neighborhood and Glendale is adjacent to an upper middle-class 
area, Prospect Park. The residents of this area had an especially active 
DFL group that, in a fit of liberal enthusiasm, lobbied their alderman to 
have a housing project nearby. The Glendale site was formerly a gravel 
pit. 
When neighborhood renewal efforts were at their peak in the 
1960s, federal money was still available for public housing. But by this 
time, public support for public housing, and for family projects in 
particular, had vanished. The HRAs had learned that mixing family and 
elderly units did not work well, and that most neighborhoods objected 
to the location of family projects nearby. Neighborhood opposition, 
along with some well-publicized failures in some cities, finally under-
mined the local housing authorities' abilities to provide the range of 
public housing units that were needed. Both the Minneapolis and St. 
Paul HRAs used money in the late 1960s to build what was politically 
possible in each city: high rise public housing for the elderly. 
Few city residents opposed the idea of high rises for the elderly, 
nor were their locations problematic. Providing housing for everyone's 
needy 11grandma11 was a politician's dream issue. Many early projects 
of this type were built on parcels of cleared land that had not been taken 
by developers. Additional elderly high rises were later built in middle-
class neighborhoods, often on abandoned school sites. By 197 4, 
when President Nixon declared a moratorium on the construction of 
public housing, Minneapolis had thirty-one high rises for the elderly and 
St. Paul had sixteen (see Map 15). Projects in progress were completed 
r 
in the mid-1970s, but the big push was over, and this particular housing 
effort often did not resume when the moratorium was lifted. 
Political support for the concept of broad-spectrum public hous-
ing had largely evaporated during the 1960s. By 1960 most of the 
project-style family housing to be built in the Twin Cities was already 
standing. Still, local efforts on behalf of low-income housing continued 
in three distinct forms: (1) public high rises for the elderly continued to 
be built; (2) family public housing units were no longer grouped together 
but built on scattered sites, reducing local political opposition; and (3) 
public agencies increasingly supported privately owned subsidized 
housing over publicly owned housing. The public effort to improve the 
low cost housing stock has clearly shifted over the years. Where public 
agencies previously built and owned low cost housing, we now have a 
mixed system of public inducements for private construction and 
ownership, and some aid to households. The federal government has 
Map 15. Minneapolis 
and St. Paul Subsidized 
and Public Housing for 
the Elderly 
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also reduced its participation in housing efforts, leaving the states, and 
especially local governments, to take up the slack. 
Federal Subsidy of Housing Developers 
Loans, grants, and mortgage guarantees to developers of new 
or rehabilitated housing have been a part of federal urban aid since the 
1950s. The earliest programs helped nonprofit developers to build 
low-cost housing. Later the same idea was extended to for-profit 
developers. The operating principle is the same: a government 
agency helped a developer to charge less for new or rehabilitated 
housing through grants, below-market loans, or a mortgage guarantee 
that makes a private loan possible. Most units built or rehabilitated with 
this assistance were rented, but in recent years the same methods have 
been used to promote home ownership for low-income households. 
Federal housing subsidies were provided under numerous dif-
ferent programs, usually known by their legislative shorthand: 202, 
221 (d)(3), 221 (d)(4), 235, 236, 312, and various portions of Section 8. 
Different provisions of these laws help developers build different kinds 
of housing with varied methods of assistance, but all share two impor-
tant characteristics. They induce private production of subsidized 
housing, and contractually oblige owners to keep the units at a sub-
sidized rate, usually for a stipulated period of time. 
An outstanding example of this type of government assistance 
is the Liberty Plaza project on Dayton Avenue in St. Paul's Summit-
University neighborhood. Liberty Plaza is a 173-unit complex built 
between 1967 and 1969 with a HUD-guaranteed mortgage. Dayton 
Avenue Presbyterian Church, a neighborhood institution, was the 
developer. The project was remodeled in 1983 with a $843,000-HUD 
renovation grant. Initially, 90 percent of the Liberty Plaza residents were 
black; today 85 percent are Hmong. Although the neighborhood and 
its residents have changed, Liberty Plaza has been consistently 
regarded as a successful development and a good place to live (St. 
Paul Dispatch 1984). 
r 
te and Local Subsidies sta 
In recent years, federal subsidies for developers have been 
augmented by state and local government. The Minnesota Housing 
Finance Agency (MHFA) began making loans and grants for housing 
in the early 1970s. Municipal housing agencies were authorized to 
rr,ake similar loans and grants in the mid-1970s. The primary source 
for state and local funding of housing subsidies has been tax-exempt 
bonds - some general obligation bonds and numerous revenue bonds. 
In both cases this local effort conceals an indirect federal and state 
subsidy. Because the interest paid on these bonds is exempt from 
income taxes, they can be sold at below-market rates. 
How housing revenue bonds have influenced the production of 
affordable housing can be seen in two Minneapolis apartment build-
ings: Symphony Place and The Pinnacle at Riverplace. In 1986, the 
rents for one bedroom apartments started at $460 per month at 
Symphony Place, and $645 at The Pinnacle. Efficiencies at The 
Pinnacle started at $535 per month. The average rents charged in 
Minneapolis at this time were under $300 per month for efficiencies, 
and under $350 for one-bedrooms. Rents charged in these buildings 
reflected the costs of construction, not the needs of the clientele 
intended to be helped by revenue bonds. It seems unlikely that the 
neediest people in Minneapolis could rent at either building. Housing 
revenue bonds have served as a useful means of financing market-rate 
housing in downtown neighborhoods. They have also produced some 
moderate-income units, but have not created housing that the poorest 
urban residents can afford. 
Direct Aid to Households 
The Section 8 program provides subsidy to developers of low-
cost rental housing, but it has another component, also a subsidy, that 
operates in a different fashion. Section 8 provides direct assistance to 
low-income households. This assistance pays roughly three-fourths of 
the household's monthly rent costs, subject to some limitations. The 
law specifies entitlement criteria, and also limits the number of people 
who can receive Section 8 certificates in each city. Exact figures do not 
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exist, but the number of eligible households in the Twin Cities (and in 
all cities) far exceeds the number of available Section 8 certificates. 
Currently, households with an adjusted income of less than 50 percent 
of the metropolitan median are technically eligible if they pay more than 
30 percent of their income for rent. Housing units that are eligible for 
Section 8 subsidies are determined through a formula that calculates 
the fair-market rental ratio for a given metropolitan area. The Section 
8 standard is a rough measure, but it is the closest available to a federal 
definition of housing affordability. 
Relying on the Private Market 
Since the withdrawal of large-scale direct federal aid in the 
mid-1970s, public policy regarding affordable housing has experienced 
a philosophical shift. Now the inclination is to rely on the private housing 
market - at a time when construction costs have escalated so much 
that it is difficult to build affordable standard-quality housing. Federal 
and state loan and grant programs have encouraged the construction 
of a fair quantity of subsidized housing locally because the MHFA has 
been more active than most state governments. And the Metropolitan 
Council has actively promoted a more equitable distribution of public 
and subsidized housing across the metro area. City governments are 
now closer to the issue of public and subsidized housing than other 
levels of government. They build what little public housing there is 
being built (through the scattered-site program), are the main 
facilitators of subsidized construction, and own and maintain the exist-
ing stock of public housing. 
Still, not enough public and subsidized housing is available to 
meet the need. Both St. Paul and Minneapolis have long waiting lists 
of people who are eligible for existing units, and they sometimes wait 
months or even years to occupy them. The supply of low-cost 
housing in the Twin Cities is inadequate, as in most major cities. The 
situation is especially bad for large families (those needing three, four 
or five bedroom units). Waiting lists are longest for these rental units, 
which are the most difficult to find. 
A spatial imbalance in the distribution of family units also exists. 
r 
,he politics of the 1950s allowed 11projects 11 only in certain kinds of 
areas, remote from 11 nice 11 neighborhoods. Planners in the 1950s 
clustered family housing units in large numbers and, since the 1950s, 
not much money has been allocated for these kinds of units. Today, 
public housing for families is clustered in large projects in areas that are 
generally undesirable for residential development. The situation is 
worse in Minneapolis where most of this housing is largely concentrated 
on either side of Olson Highway, just north and west of downtown. St. 
paul's family projects are located in four widely separated parts of the 
city. 
prospects for Affordable Housing 
Efforts to add affordable housing units in Minneapolis and St. 
Paul have been more successful than in most American cities. Still, the 
following problems remain: 
• America has a persistent population of people (although not 
always the same people) who simply cannot afford adequate 
housing, and local governments lack the capacity to address 
housing issues at this scale. Producing housing for 
low-income people is not really a housing problem in any 
case; it is an income problem. And in our system only the 
federal government can effectively attempt income 
redistribution. Local efforts in this area have been 
considerable and imaginative. But they cannot increase or 
match the stock of low-cost housing that federal efforts of the 
1950s created. 
• Our policy of relying on the private market for affordable 
housing means that most of it will still cost too much. With 
some exceptions, most subsidized housing is accessible to 
moderate-income households (using HUD definitions). 
Low-income households cannot afford these units, and that 
is not likely to change. 
• Most existing federally subsidized projects are bound by 
contracts that will begin to expire late in 1989 and through 
the early 1990s. After these contracts expire and the 
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mortgages are paid off, owners are free of any obligation to 
rent their housing at below-market rates, a situation that may 
breed an even worse crisis in our urban housing alternatives. 
MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
One of the crucial elements in the discussion of public and 
subsidized housing has to do with the role of the HRAs. In the early 
days of renewal a major goal of each city's HRAwas to get inexpensive 
housing built. This implied activities of all kinds: acquiring and clearing 
properties, actually constructing units, and moving in tenants. Through 
most of this time momentum was focused on getting as many units built 
as possible. There was not time, nor much perceived need, to focus 
on management problems. The HRAs' working assumption seemed 
to be that people needed better housing and would be grateful for 
whatever they were given. 
With time this situation changed. The stock of subsidized and 
public housing expanded greatly in the 1950s and 1960s, and the HRAs 
were soon faced with the problem of managing, a stock of housing 
rather than just adding to it. There may be some glory attached to 
creating a needed social good like housing, but there is only constant 
aggravation in the daily process of overseeing what was created. 
Recently national efforts have been made to turn the management of 
public housing over to the tenants. In part, this is an aspect of current 
budget balancing efforts -to have the private sector assume formerly 
public responsibilities, and save government money in the process. 
But it also belatedly recognizes that people living in public housing may 
be better managers of their own homes than paid outsiders. 
One other distinction should be made about housing for low-
and moderate-income people in the Twin Cities: the dominance of 
scattered-site housing, in contrast to the large public housing projects 
that are typical of many cities. This is not to say that the subsidized 
housing stock in the Twin Cities is without problems. But problems 
associated with low- and moderate-income housing in both cities have 
been more manageable than those in headline-grabbing projects like 
Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis, and Cabrini-Green in Chicago. For example, 
r 
the most serious difficulty with public housing in Minneapolis in recent 
years has been its underuse, not racial warfare or escalating violent 
crime as in many other cities. 
Minneapolis and St. Paul have not found some magic solution 
to the problem of managing low-income housing. Because most of the 
Twin Cities' population is white and middle class, the social problems 
that other cities have with this housing stock are not so obvious here. 
But some credit must also be given to those who argued persuasively 
for not concentrating the low-income housing stock in only a few 
geographic locations. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Neighborhood renewal efforts in the Twin Cities have been 
judged largely successful in the years since these programs began. 
The worst parts of Minneapolis and St. Paul in the 1950s have improved 
dramatically- most of the old housing has been removed, and new 
housing and new commercial and industrial structures have been built. 
Still, a question can be raised about the extent of these successes, 
particularly in geographical terms. 
In the 1958 Urban Renewal Program, 20 percent of the land in 
Minneapolis was judged in need of total redevelopment or substantial 
rehabilitation (Minneapolis HRA 1958b). Mapped out, this amounted 
to most of the older sections of the city, and this is where most 
expenditures for neighborhood improvement occurred, whether under 
urban renewal or under later programs. If these areas are compared 
with a more recent analysis of housing conditions in Minneapolis, an 
interesting pattern emerges. The 1980 "State of the City" report 
delineated areas where 25 percent or more of all units were substan• 
dard, and with few exceptions the areas identified were the same as 
those chosen for renewal or rehabilitation. The exceptions are also 
instructive: downtown and the St. Anthony area of northeast Min-
neapolis stand out as the places where significant improvement has 
occurred. 
In hindsight then, what may we say about the process of 
neighborhood renewal in the Twin Cities? Clearly the strategies and 
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goals changed over time, in part accommodating citizens' wishes and 
desires. One study underscored this situation by observing that 
clearance declined and rehabilitation increased through the late 1960s 
and the 1970s, even when it cost more (Minnesota State Planning 
Agency 1978). 
Arthur Naftalin, mayor of Minneapolis during the 1960s, has 
described the complex process of renewal in Minneapolis as largely 
successful, particularly when one considers the large number of agen-
cies that were involved -a dozen or more. He especially noted the 
following: the presence of a high-quality, dedicated HRA staff; HRA 
commissioners who avoided patronage and acted as a bridge to the 
community; aldermen who changed their attitudes about renewal when 
the successful projects convinced them it could work; a supportive local 
press; a business community that was interested and supportive, even 
of such radical proposals as that of city-wide public housing; and 
residents who were involved and willing to donate their time to com-
munity improvement. Above all, Naftalin credited the fact that housing 
and renewal efforts were combined in one agency, and that their work 
was linked to a comprehensive city planning effort (Naftalin 1970). 
In light of recent proposals from St. Paul and Minneapolis for a 
state-funded neighborhood revitalization program, urban renewal 
clearly did not erase all deprived neighborhoods from the urban 
landscape - even in such relatively well-off places as the Twin Cities. 
One might well question whether that was even the programs' intent. 
Given funding limitations, the lobbying needed to get projects ap-
proved, and the need to mesh neighborhood projects with external 
forces like freeway construction, it is not surprising that renewal was 
not a uniform success. Two facts stand out in all of this: (1) some 
extremely deteriorated neighborhoods in both cities were so thoroughly 
eradicated that no one now remembers how bad they were, or that 
some of them even existed; and (2) many of the neighborhoods that 
composed the poorest parts of both cities in the 1950s remain in similar 
straits today despite some of the best efforts of renewal programs. 
Neighborhood renewal turned out to be no match for loss of jobs, lack 
of education, and major population shifts. It succeeded in neighbor-
r 
r 
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hoods where residents understood the process and took charge, but 
no amount of renewal could help neighborhoods where residents had 
no reason to hope for or expect improvements in their lives. 
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5. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
Downtowns and residential areas are not the only components 
of city life. The fiscal health of most cities requires balanced economic 
activities, and this usually means some kind of industry. Industry 
provides jobs - though not always for city residents - and also pays 
greater property taxes than other activities. City governments and city 
business organizations have always sought to attract new employers 
and retain existing employers to bolster the property-tax base. 
Since the late 1940s, two sweeping changes have favored new 
kinds of industrial buildings and new industrial locations. New tech-
nologies of production and warehousing made extensive, one-story 
buildings more efficient than old-fashioned multi-story buildings. And 
significant public subsidies for freeways made trucking dominant over 
railroad transportation, thus favoring fringe locations on highways, 
away from congested city streets. Fewer industries are now tied to 
railroad service, and are consequently free to locate away from older 
industrial areas. 
In the Twin Cities these changes had two major effects. The first 
was that areas for warehousing and light industry near the two 
downtowns became obsolete. What was left of these in the 1970s was 
used less and less intensively until historic preservation consciousness 
arose, and tax legislation subsidized the conversion of the old, newly 
picturesque buildings. Lowertown in St. Paul and parts of the area west 
of downtown Minneapolis are now being refurbished, but no longer 
serve as industrial districts. The nineteenth-century structures in these 
areas are also being converted into commercial and residential use, 
and remaining industries are being driven out by rising rents. 
The second result was the institutionalization of industrial 
development as a function of city government. Before World War II the 
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business of attracting new employers was carried on by business 
groups acting in a public relations capacity. These business groups 
advertised each city as a good location for whatever reasons seemed 
plausible. City governments were not closely involved in this process. 
Little public or private money was spent to attract new employers, and 
there were no sustained efforts of this kind. But since the 1950s 
Minneapolis and St. Paul have both created large and effective industrial 
development agencies. 
Cities try to maintain a supply of available industrial land for two 
reasons: to attract new employers and to accommodate present 
employers who wish to expand. From a national perspective, Min-
neapolis and St. Paul have been peculiar because neither has had a 
significant amount of abandoned industrial land. The difficulty in the 
Twin Cities has been finding ample land that is suitable for industry. 
Cities have two sources of land for industry: clearance and 
redevelopment of land previously used for some other purpose, or 
developing land that has never had any urban use. Minneapolis has 
little unused land; St. Paul, however, is in a better position because of 
its supply of river front land south and east of downtown. Both kinds 
of 11new11 land usually require some public investment to attract a private 
user. Redeveloped land must be acquired and cleared, often at con-
siderable expense. Vacant land usually must be acquired, though 
some may already be publicly owned. Additionally, vacant land often 
requires an investment to correct shortcomings that inhibited prior 
use -poor drainage, for example. Both kinds of land need new urban 
services-water, sewer, roads, and utilities, and both kinds can only be 
offered to industrial users if some public subsidy absorbs part of the 
cost of site preparation. 
St. Paul and Minneapolis have both had several public agencies 
involved in industrial development and redevelopment since World War 
II. At various times in each city, the HRA, planning departments, and 
specific development agencies have been involved. In Minneapolis 
during the 1950s the Minneapolis Industrial Development Commission 
was in the development business, but the most successful local 
development agency has been the St. Paul Port Authority. Both cities 
r 
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J have experienced periods of interagency competition, but in the last 
J decade efforts in each city have become better coordinated. Today, 
the MCDA is the prime development agency in Minneapolis. The Port 
Authority and the Department of Planning and Economic Development 
both are still involved in industrial development in St. Paul, and their 
efforts are coordinated by the mayor and the council. 
THE ST. PAUL PORT AUTHORITY 
The most remarkable local financial innovation of the 
postrenewal years has been the St. Paul Port Authority, often referred 
to as "the Port. 11 Although other municipalities in Minnesota have all of 
the legal powers of the Port, and theoretically all of the same pos-
sibilities, the Port is unique and likely to stay that way. Its position in 
St. Paul, and its economic strength, are the product of almost fifty years 
of development under quite varied conditions. The agency that 
resulted from this process is not easily reproducible. 
Since its inception the Port has gone through several develop-
mental stages, outlined as follows: 
• Limited purpose industrial development, 1929 to about 1960. 
The Port was created in 1929 for the limited purpose of 
building and operating a barge terminal downstream from 
downtown St. Paul. For almost thirty years the Port did little 
else. Beginning in 1929, the barge terminal finally was filled 
in the 1970s, and the Port ran it (Midwest Research Institute 
1981 ). 
In the mid-1950s St. Paul business and political leaders 
saw the need for an industrial development agency. The 
HRA might have filled this role, but it already had a sour 
relationship with some of the city's business community, 
largely because of its aggressive championing of public 
housing. In addition, an industrial development agency 
needed to be able to own and operate its own industrial 
parks, as the Port did, but the HRA could not. 
In 1957 the legislature granted the Port, and ultimately 
other municipal port authorities, much broader powers. 
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Such agencies could now condemn land and issue bonds to 
raise capital for development. 
• Large-scale industrial development, the 1960s and early 
1970s. By the early 1960s the Port was ready for a greatly 
expanded role: the construction of a number of industrial 
parks. The first projects replaced the dilapidated housing 
opposite downtown. Later parks used pockets of vacant or 
blighted land in poor condition away from the river. 
During the start of this period the Port's activities were 
largely financed with general obligation bonds - debt that 
must be repaid by city taxpayers if a development does not 
succeed. Most of the Port's developments did succeed, and 
the risk has certainly been rewarded. Throughout this period 
the Port's assets grew substantially along with its skills, and 
the agency's ties to St. Paul's business community grew 
accordingly. 
By the start of the 1970s the Port had to face a major 
problem: very little land was left to convert into industrial 
parks. In a sense, the Port had accomplished its develop-
ment purpose, though of course it still administered the 
industrial parks. 
• Industrial development finance, the 1970s. In the mid-1970s 
the Port's role changed again. In addition to operating 
industrial parks, the Port began to finance 11off-site 11 
development of industrial and commercial firms on land it did 
not own. Before 1970 all Port projects were on-site; from 
1975 to 1980, more than half of its projects were off-site. 
Initial off-site projects were largely industrial in keeping with 
the Port's traditional emphasis. But, increasingly, the scope 
of its investments broadened. The Port has become a major 
factor in financing service-sector job growth in St. Paul. The 
financial tool that powered the great spurt of Port investments 
was the industrial revenue bond. The use of general 
obligation bonds ceased almost completely in this period. 
r 
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During the 1970s the Port's assets grew tremendously, 
in part due to its wise use of temporary investments. The 
Port made money not only from its development projects and 
industrial parks, but also from capital 11parked 11 in productive 
investments between projects. 
• Investment banking, the 1980s. The Port's industrial parks 
are now 90 percent full, and it has total assets of more than 
$600 million -far more than is needed to operate industrial 
parks. The Port's role is now two-fold: to maintain the city's 
system of industrial parks and act as a full-spectrum 
development finance arm for the city. In 1983 the Port began 
the newest industrial park, the Empire Builder, which opened 
in 1985. But its industrial park business is mostly a 
maintenance business now (Midwest Research Institute 
1981, 1984). 
In recent years the Port's off-site investments have 
covered the full range of city projects, including several of the 
biggest: Galtier Plaza, the World Trade Center, and Energy 
Park. At one point in 1986, following a series of defaults, the 
Port owned most of the hotels in the city. The Port's good 
bond rating and immense assets make it useful as a 
packager of development deals, and its imagination seems 
to know no bounds. 
The St. Paul Port Authority has been the most stable of the 
industrial development agencies in the Twin Cities, retaining the strong 
support of the St. Paul business community for several decades and 
avoiding the periods of confusion and misdirection that have peri-
odically afflicted other development agencies. During the past half 
century the Port has responded to new city needs, new financial tools, 
and its own developing aptitudes and assets. Its original brief was quite 
simple: develop vacant land to add jobs and a tax base to St. Paul. 
The Port has been wildly successful in its original task-so successful 
that it has had to find new projects to use its current assets of more 
than $90 million. 
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The way in which the Port works is different from the Department 
of Planning and Economic Development, St. Paul's planning and 
development arm. The Port behaves more like a private investment 
banking firm than like an arm of the municipal government. Always 
close to the city's business community, the Port has studiously avoided 
the social issues that tarnished the old HRA's image in some 
businessmen's eyes. The Port acts as an important link in public-
private partnerships because of its 11business-like 11 image and massive 
assets devoted almost entirely to business development. 
But the Port differs from a bank in several important respects: it 
is under the city's political control; its investments are confined to the 
city's geographic bounds; it owns the industrial parks from which it 
derives income; and it enjoyed (through 1986) an indirect tax subsidy 
through its industrial revenue bonds. If the Port is less than a bank, it 
is also less public than other agencies. It operates more like a business, 
with a much narrower purpose Oobs and tax base) than other agencies. 
And because of its phenomenal success, the Port has not been closely 
supervised by St. Paul's elected officials. 
ST. PAUL INDUSTRIAL PARKS (see Map 2) 
St. Paul got into the industrial development field earlier than 
Minneapolis with its 1960s' projects. Minneapolis did not start to 
actively develop industrial jobs until the early 1970s. 
• Barge Terminal Number 1. This project, the Port's first, 
opened in 1929. Seven industrial projects have been 
established to date on the site. The latest, in 1982, 
comprises thirty-five acres. The land was an unoccupied 
floodplain before the Port acquired it, and it was usable only 
after a levee was built. 
• Riverview Industrial. A large area across the river from 
downtown was actually the site of two adjacent projects: one 
run by the HRA, and the other by the St. Paul Port Authority, 
roughly contemporaneous. 
The Port portion, the eastern section, comprised 273 
acres of substandard, flood-prone housing. The Port began 
r 
clearance in 1960 and displaced 436 families and 111 
individuals. Since 1963, it has financed fifty-one exclusively 
industrial projects in its portion of Riverview. 
The HRA portion, the western part of the west side flats, 
comprised 146 acres of deteriorated housing and some 
industry. The area was cleared of most buildings beginning 
in 1964, and flood-proofed with the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers' assistance; ninety-seven families and twenty-five 
individuals were displaced. The total cost was $8.3 million, 
three-fourths of which was federally funded. The reuse was 
industrial. The HRA project was closed in 1972, but some of 
the sites were still vacant. The Port subsequently funded 
twenty-one projects in the HRA part of Riverview. 
• Red Rock Lake. This huge (1,700 acres) site was vacant, 
marshy land the St. Paul Port Authority acquired in 1960. 
Parcels are improved when a tenant is available. Since 1965 
five projects have been undertaken. 
• Northport. The St. Paul Port Authority acquired a 
thirty-five-acre site north of Holman Field in 1962. It was an 
unoccupied floodplain that required filling and improve-
ments. To date only one project has been achieved; 
Northport is in a flight pattern of the airport and there is a 
restriction on building height. 
• Southport. The St. Paul Port Authority acquired this 
sixty-five-acre site south of Holman Field in 1963, and cleared 
the few scattered houses for heavy industry requiring barge 
slips. To date nine projects have been undertaken. 
• Midway. The St. Paul Port Authority opened a fifty-two-acre 
park in the West Midway-St. Anthony Park area in 1976. It 
did not issue any bonds to purchase the land since it had 
enough cash. It did issue bonds to finance individual 
tenants. The largest tenant is the Amtrak depot. Now full, 
Midway's prior land use was a railroad classification yard. 
• Arlington-Jackson. The Port opened this industrial park in 
North St. Paul in 1978. Located just west of 135E and a mile 
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south of Larpenteur Avenue, there have been two projects 
to date. 
• Empire Builder. The St. Paul Port Authority acquired this 
disused railroad land in 1983. The site comprises thirty-two 
acres and includes the old Jackson Street car shops, which 
are historically significant and will be partly preserved. 
MINNEAPOLIS INDUSTRIAL PARKS (see Map 1) 
• Seward South. HRA planning for the Seward area began in 
1963. The area was ultimately redeveloped in three stages: 
Seward South, Seward East, and Seward West. Seward 
South was an area of mixed commercial, industrial, and 
residential land uses, most of it in poor condition. The largest 
share of the original project area of 104 acres was cleared 
and converted to industrial use. The park was substantially 
full by the early 1970s, by which time $4.5 million in federal 
funds had been spent. Later expansion was made possible 
with other funding sources. 
• Broadway l-35W. The HRA declared this area of 139 acres 
a tax increment district in 1977. A half million dollars in CDBG 
money was used to start development. 
• Kasota. The Minneapolis Industrial Development Com-
mission opened this park in 1973 on sixty-nine acres of filled 
swampland, and sold three million dollars in bonds. The park 
is now full. 
• Northgate. This HRA project is a tax increment financing 
district within the former Grant renewal area. 
• North Washington. The HRA declared this area a tax 
increment district in 1973, and sold $4 million of bonds in 
1974 and $7.7 million in 1975. The 275-acre-area included 
mostly unstable soils with a few obsolete buildings and 
several scrap yards. 
During the last two decades public development agencies have 
subsidized the creation or retention of thousands of jobs. The question 
of how many of the jobs would be here today if there had been no 
subsidy cannot be answered exactly. It is safe to say that St. Paul and 
Minneapolis would not be as vital as they are today without the 
development agencies. Exactly what their condition would be is impos-
sible to answer. St. Paul and Minneapolis, however, are gaining jobs, 
unlike many older cities. St. Paul, especially, has an impressive number 
of manufacturing jobs. The St. Paul Port Authority's aggressive promo-
tion, substantial investment, and judicious portfolio management 
certainly is part of the reason for the continuing strength of manufac-
turing in the city. The concentration of corporate headquarters and a 
varied, flexible local economy in the Twin Cities also help to sustain 
manufacturing jobs. 
Few city-owned industrial sites are now being developed, 
partly due to a lack of suitable sites of sufficient size. The most likely 
source of new land in large parcels is disused railroad land, and both 
cities have extensive tracts of railroad-owned land that is no longer used 
for railroad operations. Some of this land might have industrial park 
potential, but there are several difficulties, the major one being that the 
railroad companies own the land and often have their own ideas about 
development. The use of some parcels is restricted due to site 
problems. For example, the large area east of downtown St. Paul that 
is no longer used for classification yards is swampy and not suitable 
for large buildings. Much of the disused railroad land is located where 
new nonindustrial uses may seem more desirable. This includes river 
front land near both downtowns, and various interests are competing 
to convert this land to open space or residential and commercial uses. 
ENERGY PARK 
A good example of the pitfalls and potentials of redeveloped 
railroad land is Energy Park, a large mixed-use project in St. Paul's 
Midway district that began in 1982. Energy Park does not fit any of the 
neat categories the table of contents suggests; it is simultaneously 
industrial, commercial, and residential. Though not typical of any other 
projects in the Twin Cities, Energy Park is a quintessential 1980s 
development activity. Begun long after renewal formally ended, it owes 
a clear debt to the skills and attitudes that evolved throughout renewal. 
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Energy Park personifies the new aptitudes and objectives of municipal 
government in the Twin Cities. 
St. Paul managed to turn a liability- more than 200 acres of 
largely disused railroad land in the heart of the city- into an ambitious 
opportunity and, if the current trend continues, a glittering success. 
Having burst forth in the heat of the mid-1970s' energy crisis, the Energy 
Park project was intended as a model urban environment. Energy 
conservation was its theme: people would live and work within the area, 
most jobs would be energy related, and all buildings would be energy-
efficient. Little of this actually came to pass, and some critics consider 
Energy Park a failure. 
The first few years were certainly not encouraging. Planning and 
start.up took much longer than municipal officials anticipated. The 
energy crisis appeared to have ended - or so many Americans have 
chosen to believe - thus undermining the whole premise behind the 
"model urban environment. 11 At the beginning Bandana Square, the 
project's retail center, seemed to be a bust. The condominiums didn't 
sell well. Job growth, industrial tenants, housing construction - nothing 
went according to plan. 
By 1985 Energy Park's future began to look brighter and today 
the project is plainly a success, even though it is not exactly what was 
planned. The first two phases of housing construction are now com-
plete and largely occupied. The industrial space is filling in, though not 
all employment is energy related. Ambitious job goals are being 
pursued and some have been met. The commercial and retail space 
is also filling in - Bandana Square now seems prosperous. Energy 
Park might not be what city officials envisioned, but it is certainly far 
better than an abandoned railroad yard. 
Energy Park seemed to be a radical new idea, and it was an 
ambitious venture in scale and theme. But it is really the logical result 
of changing municipal government through thirty years of renewal. 
Fundamentally, municipal officials have now accepted development as 
a local function. Probably no one questions any longer whether city 
governments should be involved in economic development, only how 
they should be involved. Other factors that contributed to Energy 
Park's success were the St. Paul Port Authority's economic strength 
and industrial marketing skills; the Planning and Economic 
Development's staff creativity in packaging the deal and obtaining 
substantial and extraordinary federal aid; the involvements of the 
nonprofit Wilder Foundation in the housing and retail development, in 
cooperation with the Department of Planning and Economic Develop-
ment; the inclusion of representatives from several district councils in 
the project's planning; the various agencies' flexibility- including their 
ability to adapt to the loss of the project's original theme; and finally, 
George Latimer's leadership as mayor. 
CONCLUSION 
Industrial development activity has not abated over the years, 
just changed in style. Since the late 1970s most has been "offwsite" 
away from agency-owned industrial parks. This trend has allowed the 
development agencies to expand their operations and to influence 
more employers. 
The financial tools used by the agencies have been refined and 
the management of development has become more sophisticated. 
Energy Park, 1986. 
Land that had been 
used for heavy industry 
and railroad repair 
shops was converted to 
a large mixed-use 
project ( office, retail, 
and residential). The 
housing shown here is 
high density, but 
designed to take 
maximum advantage of 
the site. 
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The St. Paul Port Authority, especially, has aggressively used revenue 
bonding to finance new and expanded industry. It pioneered the use 
of small-issue bonds that group a number of small development 
projects into one issue. This method provides below-market financing 
to smaller companies than would have been possible before, and 
makes financing off-site employers easier. 
The industrial development agencies are no longer only in-
dustrial. The Minneapolis agencies were combined in 1980 into the 
Minneapolis Community Development Agency, which promotes 
development of all kinds in the city. In St. Paul, the Port has branched 
out into non-industrial financing also, and the Department of Planning 
and Economic Development promotes all types of development as well. 
The industrial landscape of both cities has been transformed in recent 
decades with the assistance and planning of these public agencies. 
6. RE-EVALUATING URBAN 
RENEWAL 
In 1964 the urban renewal program was labeled the federal 
bulldozer in the most often-cited conservative attack on the program 
(Anderson 1964). In recent years it has been subjected to various leftist 
critiques (Fainstein 1983; Mollenkopf 1983). Both approaches tend to 
categorize and analyze urban renewal as a time-bound effort and, 
arguably, both miss something in the process. If nonacademics and 
nonpractitioners think of renewal at all, they likely consider it one of 
those 1960s programs that didn't work very well. None of these 
approaches is helpful in trying to analyze the ongoing effect of urban 
renewal. 
It is important to distinguish among the various strains of urban 
renewal as it was practiced in America's cities. What was done under 
the banner of urban renewal in Philadelphia, Chicago, and New Haven 
was not exactly comparable to what occurred in Minneapolis and St. 
Paul. Urban renewal was not a national program directed by 
Washington, D.C. in the usual sense. Federal officials had to approve 
projects to make funding available. But officials in Washington, D.C. 
did not choose what would be proposed. The role of local governments 
was crucial to urban renewal, and with this came local political con• 
siderations and local constraints. As local officials worked out local 
renewal decisions, the program assumed distinctive characteristics. 
So a devastating critique of, or high praise for, any single renewal 
experience does not necessarily say much about anyplace else. 
Major urban renewal efforts of the 1950s to 1970s must also be 
recognized as part of a continuum of city improvement ventures. Urban 
renewal cannot be understood if it is viewed as an isolated effort. The 
1950s and 1960s renewal programs were direct descendants of the 
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"City Beautiful" plans of the 191 Os and 1920s. As previously described, 
the "clean-up" process in the downtowns of Minneapolis and St. Paul 
had been underway more or less for forty years before renewal officially 
started. Nor was the role of business in this effort anything new. Selling 
land to developers at "bargain basement" prices was a new twist on an 
old theme. In earlier decades businessmen organized themselves and 
produced plans to increase the value of land they already owned. The 
federal government's role in all of this was new, but the process was 
quite familiar in many ways. 
Urban renewal of the past few decades can also be philosoph-
ically linked to the recent explosion of interest in public-private 
partnerships. The idea of cities involving themselves as limited partners 
in development projects seems new. But this is essentially the same 
role that cities played under urban renewal when they acquired parcels 
of land and cleared them. Economic revitalization of the city was, and 
still is, the focus of all such efforts. Methods to accomplish this goal 
differed under urban renewal (for example, funding formulas were 
exceedingly generous from the city's perspective), but the goal was still 
the same. Federal urban renewal programs, in the Twin Cities and 
elsewhere, were just another manifestation of ongoing efforts to im-
prove America's cities. And these efforts have been underway more 
or less continuously at least since the early part of the twentieth century. 
The urban renewal program stands out from earlier and later 
improvement efforts, in part, because of the explicit "social" goals that 
federal renewal programs were thought to contain. The social agenda 
of the 1949 housing legislation was candid -- it called for decent housing 
and a decent residential environment for all Americans. But the renewal 
legislation that ensuing sessions of Congress approved never took this 
agenda seriously. The front-end costs of providing decent housing for 
all would be high, though the social costs of not doing so have never 
been adequately measured. In a democractic system, where people 
are expected to work for what they have (or inherit it or win it in a lottery), 
it probably is and always has been politically untenable for the govern-
ment to think about "giving" good quality housing to people who need it. 
The usual critique of urban renewal holds that it provided new 
office buildings, luxury housing, and civic centers at the expense of 
affordable housing (Hartman 1964, Fainstein 1983). The evidence for 
this view is strong, particularly in the case of New York and other large 
cities. But it is an incomplete description of the renewal experience of 
the Twin Cities. New office buildings did result from renewal, although 
in the case of Gateway in Minneapolis, it took twenty years for this 
process to be completed. A small amount of "luxury" housing was 
created, but the amount was miniscule and the quality prosaic when 
compared to what has been built in recent years with UDAGs (Urban 
Development Action Grants) and revenue bonds. 
The social agenda of the urban renewal program was part of its 
downfall. Renewal was criticized by conservatives for providing hous-
ing for poor people, and by liberals for not providing enough. This 
bipartisan criticism is one measure of how difficult it has been to meet 
the housing goals of the original legislation. Another aspect of urban 
renewal's downfall was the widespread public perception that the 
housing built through this program was inferior even for people with few 
options. The well-publicized failure of the Pruit-Igoe project in St. Louis 
undoubtedly contributed to this belief. Planners learned a great deal 
about low-income housing through the renewal process, including what 
worked and what didn't. Surely one of the basic lessons was that 
Americans did not want their tax dollars spent on bad housing. 
Housing improvement was certainly a goal of urban renewal, 
both as envisioned and as practiced. But the overarching economic 
and political agendas that could be accomplished were usually more 
important. The positive benefits of downtown redevelopment could be 
easily demonstrated, and there was a reliable constituency for projects 
of this sort. Public housing was harder to sell, and it benefited the 
"wrong" people-those who were economically and politically power-
less. 
URBAN RENEWAL AND RECENT IMPROVEMENTS 
In the Twin Cities, urban renewal efforts have had an interesting 
and somewhat peculiar relationship to the most recent city improve-
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ment efforts. This is the case for projects associated with historic 
preservation as well as for brand new development. If one simply maps 
the newest developments, the physical proximity of the renewal 
projects to current investment efforts is striking. 
One could argue, for example, that most of the acknowledged 
local preservation successes would have been impossible without the 
renewal efforts that preceded them. Let's take two examples. The 
restoration of houses in St. Paul's Historic Hill was, in part, a clear 
response to renewal activities in Summit-University. But Historic Hill's 
redevelopment was also explicitly linked to downtown improvements. 
The assumption was that a renewed downtown would stimulate white 
collar workers' interest in living nearby. In the early 1970s, people in 
the neighborhood began to realize that the houses were worth saving 
and repairing. But a substantial investment of both federal and local 
money ($34 million) had been made before the preservation instinct 
really took hold. Under urban renewal, the worst housing had been 
cleared; many other houses were improved at least slightly; a new 
school, playground, and community center had been built; and streets 
were repaved, sidewalks replaced, and the sewer system modernized 
(Old Town Restorations 1975). It is not surprising that after all this was 
achieved, parts of the community seemed worth saving. 
A similar link can be made between the salvation of Milwaukee 
Avenue and the renewal done in the Seward area. Here again, the 
preservation effort followed closely after the renewal decision that 
would have cleared much of western Seward. The argument in favor 
of preservation was more difficult here, for the housing stock was 
decidedly proletarian. Once the historic district designation was estab-
lished, the city found that people were willing to purchase and fix up the 
area's old houses. Soon serious investment (both financial and sweat 
equity) was very apparent. The major renewal work here changed a 
nearby area from a heavy industrial area to a light industrial and 
commercial area - and in the process provided the western Seward 
area with a strong southern boundary. In recent years there has been 
substantial private investment in the area surrounding Milwaukee 
T ; 
Avenue. If anything, the improvements there have far exceeded what 
planners originally envisioned through renewal. 
One can also argue that there is a clear link between renewal 
and more recent development-that renewal in the 1950s and 1960s 
enabled certain kinds of projects to become possible in the 1980s. 
such an argument holds that renewal is part of a long-term urban 
redevelopment strategy- perhaps even a crucial part. Speculation 
about these issues is problematic, of course. But it does seem that 
without the renewal efforts of the 1950s and 1960s, the recent construc-
tion booms in both downtowns would have been considerably less 
fervent. Without the enormous Gateway project, which removed more 
than one-third of the existing downtown, Minneapolis would have 
presented a far different potential to investors in the 1970s. The whole 
thrust of downtown development in Minneapolis - of creating a new and 
modern core - essentially depended on having eliminated the 
troublesome areas that might scare off potential investors. In St. Paul, 
where a smaller downtown renewal project was carried out in the 1960s, 
the effects of limited renewal helped forestall new investment for almost 
a decade. 
In this context it is useful to consider a development like 
Riverplace in Minneapolis and its relationship to the renewal of lower 
St. Anthony in the late 1960s. First proposed in the mid-1970s, 
Riverplace's several hundred luxury high rise rental units and con-
dominiums, its retail center and offices finally opened in 1983. Could 
anyone have seriously argued that a development of this size and 
complexity might have occurred on the river front without the prior 
renewal of St. Anthony? The East Hennepin Avenue business district 
is not the first location that most investors would choose for upscale 
shops. In its formerly decayed state such a locational decision would 
have been impossible. Not even the most avid boosters of the St. 
Anthony community expected to have something like Riverplace as a 
neighbor. Now that they do, the impact of the renewal in this area 
seems even more dramatic. 
Urban renewal is not a quid pro quo in the analysis. Some cities 
that had many urban renewal projects still had a stymied environment 
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for new development throughout the 1970s (such as St. Louis until the 
early 1980s). Conversely, some cities with small amounts of urban 
renewal have had intensive and steady amounts of redevelopment (San 
Francisco, for example). Obviously the location, migration pattern, and 
economic and social base of any city is critical in determining whether 
investment will occur. The pattern in the Twin Cities might suggest, 
though, that a positive relationship exists between urban renewal and 
newer development stategies. Perhaps the link between these two 
stems from community leaders' and local investors' attitudes. If the 
climate for a city's improvement has been positive for several decades, 
it is likely that such a city would have used whatever tools were available, 
including urban renewal, to achieve its goals. 
EFFECTS, AND SIDE .. EFFECTS, OF URBAN RENEWAL 
The urban renewal program evolved over time before it was 
finally eliminated. And though new redevelopment tools came into play, 
the essential goals of urban renewal remained reasonably intact. In 
summary, what urban renewal accomplished in the Twin Cities (and 
probably elsewhere) went far beyond what officials originally intended 
and planned. Although Twin Cities planners ultimately envisioned 
rebuilding the whole city, their immediate objectives were more limited 
when urban renewal began in Minneapolis and St. Paul. The earliest 
goals were to revive and modernize the downtowns and clean up some 
especially visible slum areas nearby. At the start no one envisioned 
that resident-responsive community development would become a 
normal and accepted process. Certainly no one thought that the very 
meaning of the term blight would be altered so that an area that 
planners perceived as slums could be saved by being designated 
historic. 
At the most basic level urban renewal changed the way that 
public business was conducted in the Twin Cities. For example, now 
no one asks whether planning and economic development should be 
a function of government at the city or regional level. It is assumed that 
this is appropriate. In 1945, planning in both cities was quite limited: 
one planning engineer in each city. Each planning engineer was an 
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program began in the 1950s. But a close examination of the Twin Cities' 
experience shows that this phenomenon is more complex. Neighbor-
hood advocates have to expand and extend their views when elected 
to city office. They can certainly be partisan on behalf of their con-
stituents, but they also have to consider the overall city perspective on 
many issues. 
Minneapolis, for example, currently has several city council 
members who were elected because they were "neighborhood" types: 
they opposed certain kinds of development, and opposed downtown 
development at the expenset of the neighborhoods. Two have 
recently been criticized by their supporters for "selling out" to downtown 
interests, for supporting projects they would have been expected to 
oppose from a neighborhood perspective. It will be instructive in the 
coming decade to see how representatives of the neighborhood move-
ment fare in city politics as the immediacy of their opposition to planning 
efforts fades. 
Minneapolis and St. Paul currently differ in the area of citizen 
participation. The citizen participation system in St. Paul is very active 
and effective. Minneapolis' citizen participation mechanism, on the 
other hand, is more obviously political. Though ostensibly quite dis-
tinct, citizen efforts in both cities tend to work best for middle-class 
neighborhoods. In some ways it is ironic that processes instituted to 
give poor people a voice in city politics have largely gained power for 
middle-class women. Only in the few blue collar ethnic enclaves are 
the traditional avenues into politics -parties or unions-still evident. 
Another aspect of planning and development changed in re-
sponse to renewal. Entirely new, or at least more effective, informal 
power groups emerged. Business organizations had always had a 
voice in city decisions, but now they became real partners with local 
government in determining what improvements would occur, especially 
in the downtowns. The Minneapolis Downtown Council has been quite 
effective in this regard. In the 1950s the downtown business com-
munity focused attention on the retail competition coming from the first 
suburban shopping malls. The business community worked with city 
officials to identify downtown improvements that could make a dif-
adjunct to public works engineering, and neither could effectively 
influence public decision making. Today, hundreds of professionals 
work in the areas of planning and economic development (150 in St. 
paul alone). Their agencies have become an indispensable and ac-
cepted part of municipal government. 
One clear outcome of renewal efforts in the Twin Cities has been 
to alter the way in which community redevelopment is conceptualized. 
Planners can no longer simply decide what to do and then implement 
their decision. Now planners must follow complex procedures for 
soliciting resident opinion about a given project and for involving 
residents in planning from the start. Neighborhood organizers have 
learned how to fight city hall, and some have even become developers 
in their own right. 
This rearranging of the usual process can be directly attributed 
to urban renewal. It is unlikely that local governments would have 
asked residents to review renewal decisions if the HUD legislation had 
not required it. Once this process was legitimated it was impossible to 
stop it or to predict how far it would go. In the Twin Cities, and 
particularly in Minneapolis, this decision has had far-reaching effects, 
and has dramatically changed the conduct of city affairs. Citizen 
participation is now a legitimate and often crucial part of the planning 
process, though it still does not work with equal efficiency for all groups. 
Citizen involvement in planning has taken many forms; some-
times it has been combative, sometimes conciliatory. Unexpectedly, it 
has produced a new crop of city leaders. People schooled in neighbor-
hood politics, who got their feet wet by taking on city hall, now hold 
elected office in those same city halls. More than half of the current 
Minneapolis City Council members, for example, were schooled in such 
situations, as were several St. Paul City Council members. Many of 
these politicians got their start in politics by opposing city-proposed 
planning efforts. Several prominent big city mayors (Henry Cisneros 
of San Antonio, Raymond Flynn of Boston) are also veterans of the 
neighborhood movement. 
This pattern suggests that politicians in many cities now view 
neighborhood interests more favorably than when the urban renewal 
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ference. And they were willing to back their ideas with money, as the 
creation of the Nicollet Mall (financed largely through private assess-
ments) demonstrated (Aschman 1971). 
The St. Paul business community's involvement in downtown 
development has been more sporadic until fairly recently. St. Paul had 
a businessman mayor, George Vavoulis, during the late 1960s, and 
prominent businessleaders like First Bank President Philip Nason, were 
quite active in downtown projects. But the impetus for downtown 
redevelopment in St. Paul has come largely from the city government. 
This has been especially apparent since 1976 -during George 
Latimer's past dozen years as mayor, much of the inspiration for 
downtown projects has come directly from the mayor's office. 
Still, both downtown business communities have worked with 
officials since the early 1960s to build and extend the skyway systems. 
(In Minneapolis the skyway system is privately financed and main-
tained; in St. Paul it is a public system.) The downtown councils in both 
cities now have a strong presence in local decision-making circles, and 
their influence cannot be discounted. 
City governments had to learn new responsibilities and new 
ways to reach decisions in response to pressures created by urban 
renewal. New agencies were created to handle the renewal business; 
some were later disbanded or reshaped, and some still wrestle with 
elected officials for political control and power. In response to the 
success that certain agencies had with renewal efforts, city govern-
ments themselves have had to become more effective. This was most 
obvious in St. Paul: Capitol Centre was a substantial start on downtown 
redevelopment in the 1960s, but further work was soon stymied; it took 
a 1972 charter change that provided for a strong mayor, combined with 
Latimer's 1976 election and the formation of the city's Department of 
Planning and Economic Development, to finally energize downtown 
redevelopment. Alone, none of these would have been sufficient to 
accomplish the task. 
Local government attention to economic development may be 
the only really new function for cities in recent memory- and both 
Minneapolis and St.Paul have become expert in this field. Because 
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urban renewal was the foundation for entirely new functions within city 
government, it altered the financial workings of cities. New sources of 
federal funding became available through renewal and other "Great 
Society" programs, but cities had to compete for these resources. 
Minneapolis and St. Paul fared far better than either should have 
expected to in this effort, given the relative lack of need compared to 
other cities. From the beginning both cities have successfully used 
every new federal financial tool that was made available. One indication 
of their success can be seen in recent discussions about eliminating 
UDAGs: both cities have received the largest possible amount of 
UDAG money, even though they are among the group of cities judged 
to be least in need. 
One can argue that Minneapolis and St. Paul have independently 
arrived at characteristic styles of urban development. Both cities are 
noted for their high rate of bonded indebtedness, but this is coupled in 
both cases with quite good bond ratings. Both cities have, and always 
have had, good city staffs, a large amount of cooperation from the 
business community, and ongoing support from the voters. This style 
seems to work well here, but may not be widely transferable. 
It is important to remember that the Twin Cities have a number 
of special circumstances that make this style possible: a homo-
geneous population base; a mixed economy that is not over dependent 
on heavy industry; a much larger number of corporate headquarters 
than the population base would predict; a high level of state aid to 
municipalities; a political tradition of intervening in problems before they 
get out of hand; and the presence of numerous foundations that take 
an active interest in community problems. 
THE LANDSCAPE LEGACY OF URBAN RENEWAL 
The urban renewal program was invented to alter the face of 
America's cities, to erase what was old, worn-out, and no longer useful. 
This it did with abandon, though not without substantial assistance 
from the federal highway program. In 1949, not very many planners, 
or even the members of congress who supported it, imagined that 
urban renewal would eventually transform the look of United States 
cities. What existed in the 1920s only in the minds of visionary arch-
itects like Le Corbusier- cities of skyscapers and high-speed 
highways- became a real possibility, even for medium-sized cities like 
St. Paul and Minneapolis. As cities across the country simultaneously 
grew taller and spread out, they lost some distinctive visual elements. 
City landmarks were sacrificed to progress and modernity as the 
historic cores of most cities were reconstructed. 
Like most other American cities in the late 1940s, Minneapolis 
and St. Paul still harbored large fragments of their nineteenth-century 
pasts. Office functions were concentrated in the downtowns, as were 
most opportunities for entertainment and shopping. Downtown resi-
dents were predominantly those who could not afford someplace 
better. To the extent that tall buildings existed, they too were 
downtown. But American downtowns, apart from New York City and 
Chicago, were not the 11tall 11 places that many are today. The 
Northwestern Bell building and the Foshay Tower defined the Minne-
apolis skyline, as the First National Bank building did for St. Paul. With 
few exceptions - Rand Tower and the Medical Arts Building - most 
other structures in both cities were between two and twelve stories high, 
and none were connected by skyways. 
Photographs of downtown Minneapolis in the late 1940s reveal 
the changes most vividly since St. Paul has retained more of what was 
originally built. To contemporary eyes, downtown Minneapolis with its 
collection of masonry buildings would look dark, though not without 
some charm. Lower Nicollet Avenue was a treasure chest of nineteenth 
century commercial architecture. Two railroad stations were in use; 
restaurants and theaters, legitimate and otherwise, were numerous. 
Hennepin Avenue was a continuous ribbon of brick and stone buildings, 
none over eight stories high. 
Urban renewal started transforming the Twin Cities' downtowns 
and the process continues today. Tall office buildings dot the skylines 
of both cities now, and luxury condominiums, built in the heyday of 
UDAG appropriations, stand where low-income people used to live. 
The very borders of both downtowns have been extended. The core 
area of Minneapolis today extends from the Mississippi River to Loring 
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Park to the Metrodome, and central St. Paul encompasses everything 
from the Civic Center to Lowertown, and connections to the State 
Capitol are planned. 
Landscape changes stemming from urban renewal were not 
restricted to the downtowns. Entire neighborhoods of nineteenth-
century houses disappeared or were dramatically altered through 
renewal efforts. Neighborhood grocers have vanished in most areas 
of Minneapolis and St. Paul, and have been replaced by the ubiquitous 
gas station-food shop. Today it is not surprising to find high rise 
buildings in neighborhoods of single-family homes, though nothing like 
this existed as recently as 1960. Twin Cities residents now generally 
take freeways, speed and mobility for granted, though in 1950 many 
did not even own a car. 
Today Minneapolis and St. Paul, like most other American cities, 
look far different than when the urban renewal program began -they 
look newer, shinier, and taller. They are also far less densely populated 
and the distances between buildings are much greater in many parts 
of both cities. Because urban renewal coincided with the international 
style's influence on American architecture, there was a uniformity about 
what got built, in office towers as well as housing projects. One of the 
costs of cleaning up our cities has been a lessening of the visual 
distinctions between cities in different parts of the country. As the first 
national program directed exclusively at American cities, urban 
renewal's landscape legacy has, at best, been mixed. 
CONCLUSION 
Terminology, definitions, and the basic discussion about cities 
have all changed since the advent of urban renewal. Situations that 
resemble urban renewal are now called something else: "tax-increment 
districts, 11 "enterprise zones, 11 and 11 intensive-treatment areas. 11 The 
assumptions that long ruled urban development have been almost 
completely transformed. Slums were once the exclusive scourge of big 
cities; now slum conditions can be found in inner suburbs and in rural 
areas. Blight is a passe concept; the idea has been reduced to a 
technical qualification for tax-increment and other financing. Issues 
that focus on economic improvement and investment tactics now hold 
center stage. For cities like St. Paul and Minneapolis, urban renewal 
made this transition possible. It succeeded in addressing the concerns 
of the time in a way that made those particular concerns no longer 
relevant. No one could responsibly argue that these two cities have 
solved all of their social and physical problems. But current concerns 
are far different (and possibly more difficult) than those at the forefront 
in the late 1940s. 
The urban landscape has been forever altered since the heyday 
of the urban renewal program, largely through the tools it provided. If 
few people can recognize downtown Minneapolis of 1950 in the current 
landscape, that is one measure of how successful urban renewal and 
its successor programs have been. Many of our basic ideas about 
cities have changed, partly as a result of urban renewal. The idea of 
the "corporate city" is now firmly established; most people's images of 
11city 11 begin with corporate office towers, and many of these towers 
began with urban renewal decisions. Most of our notions about 
physical mobility now encompass an entire metropolitan area. The 
interstate freeways, linked to neighborhood renewal efforts, enabled 
many people to move beyond the city's previously restricted bound-
aries. 
Lifestyle changes cannot be directly attributed to urban renewal, 
but they constitute some interesting and influential changes in our cities. 
During the much touted "return to the city" in the 1970s, selected, 
architecturally distinctive, neighborhoods were revived. To some de-
gree this constituted a repudiation of 1950s values and ideas -the "life 
can only be lived in the suburbs" mentality. The rediscovery of the city 
reflects decisions made by the baby-boom generation at a particular 
point in its development, and it may be a short-term phenomenon. 
Absent the reinvestment in downtowns brought about through renewal, 
it is unlikely that this residential commitment to central cities would have 
been so vigorous, or even possible. 
Urban renewal alone was not responsible for any of these 
changes. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, rising levels of real 
personal income generated improved housing conditions across the 
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country, and people's expectations rose along with their incomes. The 
residential environment of cities in the United States was improved 
through renewal efforts; most of what officials identified as the worst 
housing in the early 1950s was removed throughout the next twenty 
years. But individual expectations about the size of dwelling units, the 
provision of private bathrooms, and separate bedrooms for each child 
probably had more to do with improving the residential landscape of 
cities than did all of the renewal regulations taken together. 
Still, the effects of urban renewal have been substantial. For 
many people, urban renewal's impact on the landscape has colored 
our perceptions of American cities. Many Americans came to expect 
that older, worn-out urban areas would simply be removed and 
replaced- and that it was up to the government to do this. Renewal 
severed long-standing ties within certain neighborhoods, and arguably, 
had a negative effect on many people as a result. Because the urban 
renewal program was about physical improvements, irrespective of 
people's feelings, residents who felt an attachment, even to blighted 
neighborhoods, were often forced out. This approach didn't always 
improve the image, or the environments, of these neighborhoods. In 
some odd ways, the simple acknowledgment of the city's physical 
problems and the efforts to address them, made some people per-
manently afraid of the city. 
Urban renewal was a public policy, just like many others, that 
had some positive as well as negative aspects, and these were not 
uniformly distributed. Through a complex set of circumstances, Minne-
apolis and St. Paul survived urban renewal better than some other cities 
and prospered, in part, because of their experiences with renewal. This 
statement should not be taken as an unconditional endorsement of the 
renewal process. It simply indicates that urban renewal was a more 
complex program than many people have thought. Though the urban 
renewal program itself has ended, it continues to affect our urban 
landscapes, and city residents continue to feel the consequences of 
long-ago urban renewal decisions. 
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